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Spontaneous Tax Coordination: On
Adopting a Comparative Approach to
Reforming the U.S. International Tax
Regime
Anthony C. Infanti*
ABSTRACT

The excessive complexity of the U.S. international tax
regime is well documented. Although many commentators have
cited the need for simplification, theirproposals often maximize
other policy goals at the expense of simplicity. Even reform
proposals aimed principally at clarifying the tax code are
ordinarily focused on the "internal" complexity of the code,
seeking improvements only for U.S. taxpayers struggling with a
single complex provision of the code or the baffling interaction,of
two U.S. rules. This Article focuses on the interaction between
U.S. tax law and the rules of other nations, and is intended to
illustrate the benefits that spring from viewing the U.S. reform
debate from an internationalperspective. In this pursuit, the
Article considers the viability of using the model of
internationaltax coordination to improve efforts to reform the
U.S. international tax regime. To test the usefulness of the
framework, the Article applies it to a discrete issue of
internationaltax law-the treatment of contributions made by
domestic taxpayers to foreign non-profit organizations. After a
thorough examination of the tax law of a samplingof nations on
this topic, the Article concludes that the proposed framework is
a flexible and useful approach to reform that allows for the
effective balancing of costs and benefits of reform and may also
reduce internalcomplexity.
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I. INTRODUCTION

From relatively simple roots, the U.S. international tax regime1
has grown into a farrago of rules that is considered, even by tax
attorneys, to be one of the most complex areas in the Internal
Revenue Code. As the complexity of this regime has grown, so have
the burdens imposed on all of those affected by it:
There is a general consensus today that the Internal Revenue Code ...
provisions applicable to international income, in particular, are
excessively complex. Since passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
taxpayers and practitioners have voiced growing concerns that the

1.
Throughout this Article, the phrase "U.S. international tax regime" is used
as a convenient shorthand for the myriad of tax rules that govern the foreign activities
of U.S. taxpayers and the U.S. activities of foreign taxpayers.
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international provisions are too difficult to interpret and too costly to
apply. Tax administrators and tax policymakers have voiced parallel
concerns with the growing costs of administration and the increased
2
difficulty of enforcement.

If this complexity continues to grow unchecked, the burdens imposed
on taxpayers, practitioners, and administrators may soon become so
onerous that the U.S. international tax regime will simply collapse
under its own weight.
Despite the obvious need to reduce complexity, "simplicity
always seems to be the forgotten stepchild of income tax policy."3 In
the debate over how to reform the U.S. international tax regime,
commentators "[r]outinely [pay] lip service ... to the idea that the tax
law ought to be as simple to comply with and administer as possible;
4
then, after a nod and a wink, vaulting complexity overleaps itself.
Even when they have pointedly addressed the need for simplification,
commentators have narrowly focused their attention on the "internal"
complexity of the U.S. international tax regime. In other words,
commentators have generally viewed the regime in isolation, and
they have only considered methods for reducing the complexity of
individual U.S. rules or of the interaction of one U.S. rule with
another U.S. rule.
Such a narrow view of the U.S. international tax regime is,
however, out of step with reality. The regime does not operate in
isolation, but rather continuously interacts with the international tax
regimes of other countries. These interactions inevitably engender
conflicts between the U.S. and foreign rules, and these conflicts create
additional "external" complexity that imposes further burdens on
Its practical
taxpayers, practitioners, and administrators.
largely been
complexity
has
external
notwithstanding,
importance
ignored by commentators.
The purpose of this Article is twofold: first, to underscore the
need to investigate methods for achieving simplification, and second,
to bring a more practical dimension to the reform debate by
broadening the perspective from which the U.S. international tax
regime is viewed. The move from a national to an international
perspective should also foster a more holistic approach to reform,
allowing the burdens created by both internal and external
complexity to be addressed and, perhaps, remedied. To accomplish

2.

U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM: AN INTERIM REPORT

1 (1993), available at LEXIS 93 TNI 15-12 [hereinafter TREASURY REPORT ON
INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM]. See also 2 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, STUDY
OF THE OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF

1986, at 386 (Comm. Print 2001) [hereinafter JCT SIMPLIFICATION REPORT].

3.
Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles,
Outdated Concepts, and UnsatisfactoryPolicies,54 TAX L. REV. 261, 310 (2001).
4.

Id.
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these twin aims, this Article explores the viability of adopting tax
coordination-an accepted remedy for external complexity--as a
framework within which the U.S. international tax regime might be
reformed.
The remainder of this Article is divided into five parts. Part II
discusses the terms of the traditional reform debate, further explores
the notions of internal and external complexity, and introduces the
notion of tax coordination as a potential means of reducing external
Part III refines the concept of tax
and internal complexity.
coordination in an effort to provide a more precise vocabulary for use
in the remainder of the Article. Employing this vocabulary, Part IV
first elaborates on the theoretical operation of the proposed
framework, and then considers the costs and benefits of adopting this
approach to reform. Part V examines the manner in which the
proposed framework is expected to operate in practice. Because the
application of the proposed framework to the task of reforming the
entire U.S. international tax regime is beyond the scope of this
Article, Part V focuses on a single, concrete example, namely the
reform of the Internal Revenue Code provisions governing the
Part VI
deductibility of cross-border charitable contributions.
consists of concluding remarks.

II.BACKGROUND
A. The Rise and Fall of the 1920s Compromise
The U.S. international tax regime is rooted in a compromise
made during the 1920s concerning the proper division of the
jurisdiction to tax income derived from cross-border transactions. By
definition, "cross-border" transactions are connected with more than
one country. Taxpayers who choose to engage in such transactions
risk the possibility that each country that can claim a connection to
the transaction will also claim the right to tax the income derived
from the transaction. The connections that most commonly form the
basis for such claims are the residence of the taxpayer ("residence
jurisdiction") and the source of the income derived by the taxpayer
("source jurisdiction"). 5 For example, if a U.S. citizen were to perform
services in a foreign country, the United States would assert
residence jurisdiction as a basis for taxing the income derived from
the transaction, while the foreign country might assert source

5.
AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF
UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION II: PROPOSALS ON UNITED STATES INCOME TAX
TREATIES 5 (1992).
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jurisdiction as a basis for taxing the same income because it considers
the income as having been derived from within its territory. 6 Thus,
absent coordination between residence and source countries, the
same income may be subject to tax two, three, or more times. This
"chilling
possibility of double or multiple taxation surely may have
7
effects on international trade, investment, and commerce."
The high tax rates left in the wake of World War I sharply
focused attention on the potentially chilling effects of double taxation
This
and spurred a movement dedicated to its elimination.8
movement "gathered considerable momentum"9 during the 1920s,
and eventually led to an international consensus, sometimes referred
to as "the 1920s compromise,"'1 regarding the manner in which the
jurisdiction to tax should be divided between residence and source
countries.1 1 The United States has codified the 1920s compromise in
of cross-border
its domestic
laws governing the taxation
The 1920s compromise has also served as the
transactions. 12
foundation for the United States' extensive network of bilateral
13
income tax treaties.
Over the past seven decades, the U.S. codification of the 1920s
compromise has evolved into "an increasingly complex maze of

See id.; Julie Roin, Rethinking Tax Treaties in a Strategic World with
6.
DisparateTax Systems, 81 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1759-60 (1995).
7.
AM. LAW INST., supra note 5, at 5.
8.
See International Double Taxation: Hearing on H.R. 10,165 Before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 71st Cong. 4 (1930) (statement of A.W. Mellon,
Secretary of the Treasury), reprinted in 1 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL
REVENUE TAXATION, 87TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES TAX
CONVENTIONS 18 (Comm. Print 1962). For example, in the United States, a normal tax
of 1% and an additional graduated surtax of up to 6% were imposed on the net income
of individuals beginning in 1913. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(A)(1)-(2), 38 Stat.
166, 166 (1913). By 1918, the normal tax had been increased to a maximum of 8% and
the graduated surtax had been increased to a maximum of 65%. Revenue Act of 1918,
ch. 18, §§ 210-11(a), 40 Stat. 1057, 1062-64 (1918). These rates were not lowered until
1922. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 211(a)(2), 42 Stat. 227, 235-37 (1921).
International Double Taxation: Hearing on H.R. 10,165 Before the House
9.
Comm. on Ways and Means, supra note 8, at 18.
10.
Graetz, supra note 3, at 262.
Under this compromise, jurisdiction to tax active business income is
11.
accorded to the source country, and jurisdiction to tax passive investment income is
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of
accorded to the residence country.
International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1306
(1996) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Proposal for Simplification]; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
From Income to Consumption Tax: Some InternationalImplications, 33 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1329, 1329-30 (1996). For a historical perspective on the development of the
1920s compromise, see Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O'Hear, The "OriginalIntent"
of U.S. InternationalTaxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1094-95 (1997).
See Avi-Yonah, Proposalfor Simplification, supra note 11, at 1316-28.
12.
13.
See id. at 1307. For a list of the countries with which the United States
currently has income tax treaties in force, see Richard Gordon et al., Current Status of
U.S. Tax Treaties. 31 TAX MGM'T INT'L J. 114 (2002).
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While a certain measure of complexity is a natural
rules. '14
concomitant of any developing system of legal rules, 15 the complexity
of the current U.S. international tax rules cannot be attributed solely
to their maturation and closer reflection of economic realities. 16 Some
commentators have attributed the rules' excess complexity to the
multitude of conflicting considerations that must be taken into
Other
account when formulating international tax policy. 17
commentators have attributed their excess complexity to "the trend in
the international tax area to enact provisions based on isolated policy
This ad hoc
considerations without an integrated approach." 18
approach is evident in the Internal Revenue Code's foreign tax credit
provisions and in the series of regimes enacted by Congress to combat
the abusive deferral of taxation through the use of foreign
corporations. 19 Although Congress may have intended to "make an

14.
Karen V. Kole, The Status of United States InternationalTaxation: Another
Fine Mess We've Gotten Ourselves into, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 49, 49 (1988).
15.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 529 .(Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob B. Cooke
ed., 1961).
It has been frequently remarked with great propriety, that a voluminous code
of laws is one of the inconveniences necessarily connected with the advantages
of a free government. To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is
indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents,
which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that
comes before them; and it will readily be conceived from the variety of
controversies which grow out of the folly and wickedness of mankind, that; the
records of those precedents must unavoidably swell to a very considerable bulk,
and must demand long and laborious study to acquire a competent knowledge
of them.
Id.

See, e.g., Daniel N. Shaviro, Does More Sophisticated Mean Better? A
16.
Critique of Alternative Approaches to Sourcing the Interest Expense of U.S.
Multinationals,54 TAX L. REV. 353, 353-55 (2001).
17.
TREASURY REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM, supra note 2, at vi;
Stanford G. Ross, A Perspective on InternationalTax Policy, LEXIS 85 TNI 3-4 (1985)
("What accounts for the extraordinary complexity of international tax policy? Part of
the answer is that there are not only a host of sometimes conflicting policy
considerations to balance in resolving almost every issue, but there generally are a host
of competing viewpoints as to each policy consideration that is considered relevant.").
18.
Kole, supranote 14, at 54. See also GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, U.S. TAXATION
OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME: BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 47 (1992) ("The complexity of the

present US law reflects no new architecture, but rather an extensive patchwork
designed to repair a succession of leaks."); James S. Eustice, Commentary, 9 AM. J. TAX
POL'Y 101, 102 (1991) C'The United States has exercised undeniable leadership, if that
is the word, in drafting complex, microregulatory, anti-abuse driven statutory
provisions in the international tax area that are second to none .... "); Graetz, supra
note 3, at 263.
19.
See Kole, supra note 14, at 59 ("Ad hoc legislative adjustment may be
leading to a more theoretically perfect foreign tax credit mechanism. Unfortunately,
this 'perfect' mechanism may be impossible for either the taxpayer or the Service to
administer.. At what price victory?"); John McDonald, Anti-Deferral Deferred: A
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inherently imperfect system perfect" when it enacted each of the
individual provisions in these areas, when one considers these
provisions as a whole, it becomes clear that they have resulted in the
imposition of "monumental administrative burdens" on taxpayers,
20
practitioners, and administrators.
Of late, a growing chorus of voices has been calling for the
wholesale reform and restructuring of the U.S. international tax
regime. 2 1 These calls for reform have been prompted not only by the
onerous complexity of the U.S. international tax regime,2 2 but also by
Proposalfor the Reform of International Tax Law, 16 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 248, 251
(1995) ("The trend has been for Congress to make each successive anti-deferral regime
more aggressive in limiting deferral opportunities ....
Unfortunately, however, these
regimes were each developed to prevent a particular type of deferral which Congress
thought was abusive. They were not developed to promote one overarching tax goal.
As a result, they overlap and cause considerable confusion."). See infra Part III.B.2. for
a more detailed description of the manner in which foreign corporations may be
employed to obtain deferral of taxation.
20.
Kole, supra note 14, at 49.
See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, Proposalfor Simplification, supra note 11, at 1303-05;
21.
Graetz, supra note 3, at 269; Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 11, at 1024-26; Robert A.
Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of Multinational
Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 18 (1993); Charles E. McLure, Jr., Substituting
Consumption-Based Direct Taxation for Income Taxes as the International Norm, 45
NAT'L TAX J. 145 (1992); John S. Nolan, United States Taxation of Foreign Investment
in the United States, 8 AM. J. TAX POLY 291 (1990); Robert J. Peroni, Back to the
Future:A Path to ProgressiveReform of the U.S. InternationalIncome Tax Rules, 51 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 975, 975-76 (1997); Walter D. Schwidetzky, Subpart F, 1986 and
Beyond, 17 U. BALT. L. REV. 213, 247-48 (1988); SECTION OF TAXATION, N.Y. STATE BAR
ASS'N, REPORT ON PROPOSALS FOR GUIDANCE WITH RESPECT TO PASSIVE FOREIGN
INVESTMENT COMPANIES (2001), available at LEXIS 2001 WTD 109-41; David R.
Tillinghast, International Tax Simplification, 8 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 187 (1990); Alvin C.
Warren, Jr., Alternatives for InternationalCorporate Tax Reform, 49 TAX L. REV. 599,
607-12 (1994).
There has been an independent debate over whether existing international tax
norms may be adapted to the evolving area of electronic commerce or whether a new
set of norms must be developed. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF
TREASURY, SELECTED TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
(1996); COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
CLARIFICATION ON THE APPLICATION OF THE PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT DEFINITION
IN E-COMMERCE: CHANGES TO THE COMMENTARY ON THE MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON
ARTICLE 5 (2000); COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: TAXATION FRAMEWORK CONDITIONS (1998); COMM. ON FISCAL
AFFAIRS, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., TAX TREATY CHARACTERISATION
ISSUES ARISING FROM E-COMMERCE (2001), available at http://www.tax-news.com/asp/
res/Treatycharfinalrep.pdf; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, InternationalTaxation of Electronic
Commerce, 52 TAX L. REV. 507, 531-51 (1997); Arthur J. Cockfield, BalancingNational
Interests in the Taxation of Electronic Commerce Business Profits, 74 TUL. L. REV. 133,
138-39 (1999); Stanley I. Katz, International Taxation of Electronic Commerce:
Evolution Not Revolution, 52 TAX L. REV. 655 (1997); David R. Tillinghast, Taxation of
Electronic Commerce: Federal Income Tax Issues in the Establishment of a Software
Operation in a Tax Haven, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 339, 341-42 (1999).
22.
See Kole, supra note 14, at 50 ("[Tjhe United States international tax law is
currently unmanageable, unwieldy, and, at best, an area fraught with many
unnecessary complexities."); Sheldon D. Pollack, Tax Complexity, Reform, and the
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a questioning of the continued viability of the 1920s compromise upon
which the regime was built.2 3 Increasing globalization, 24 which has
both accentuated the complexity of the U.S. international tax regime
and, according to some, rendered the 1920s compromise obsolete, has
25
only added to the urgency of these calls.
B. The TraditionalDebate over Reform
The ensuing debate over how to reform the ailing U.S.
international tax regime has largely been shaped by the traditional
concerns of efficiency, fairness, and simplicity.2 6 Each of these

Illusions of Tax Simplification, 2 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 319, 336 (1994) ("There is
little doubt that in international taxation, tax complexity caught up to international
business practices with a vengeance of its own."); supra note 2 and accompanying text.
See also HUFBAUER, supra note 18, at 47 ("Beginning with the Revenue Act of 1962, the
US system of taxing international income has grown enormously complex." (footnote
omitted)).
23.
Avi-Yonah, Proposalfor Simplification, supra note 11, at 1303-04 (referring
to the 1920s compromise as a "flawed miracle"); Thomas F. Field, International Tax
Policy Conference in New York Focuses on "Flawed Miracle," LEXIS 2000 WTD 221-3
(Nov. 12, 2000); Roin, supra note 6, at 1754 (calling for a re-evaluation of the 1920s
compromise in light of (i) our treaty partners' integration of corporate and shareholder
taxation and (ii) the decrease in U.S. corporate income tax rates); Alvin C. Warren, Jr.,
Income Tax DiscriminationAgainst International Commerce, 54 TAX L. REV. 131, 16869 (2001) ("[T]he time has come for a fundamental reexamination of the international
income tax system, along the lines undertaken by the League of Nations more than 70
years ago. Subsequent developments, including the GATT and WTO, as well as
corporate tax integration, threaten to render the old regime obsolete, if it is not already
SO.").

24.
"Globalization" is an ambiguous term, the meaning of which often depends
on the writer who employs it. See Maxwell 0. Chibundu, Globalizing the Rule of Law:
Some Thoughts at and on the Periphery, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 79, 80 (1999)
('Much has been written about globalization ....Yet, if any sense is to be made of the
vast literature that this highly ambiguous term is generating, the reader deserves
some kind of reference point from the vantage of the writer."). See also Gordon R.
Walker & Mark A. Fox, Globalization: An Analytical Framework, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 375, 380 (1996) ("globalization means 'different things in different
contexts;' it is a portmanteau word" (footnote omitted)); Adelle Blackett, Globalization
and Its Ambiguities: Implications for Law School Curricular Reform, 37 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 57, 60-66 (1998) ("At the heart of the ambiguity of globalization lies one
simple question: "What is it?"). Here, the term globalization is used to "describe[ ] the
growing irrelevance of borders in international financial transactions." Walker & Fox,
supra,at 380.
25.
See Avi-Yonah, Proposalfor Simplification,supra note 11, at 1304.
26.
Michael J. Graetz, Paint-by-Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
609, 609 (1995) ("Although their meaning and contours have long been controversial,
the general criteria for evaluating changes in tax law enjoy both stability and
consensus. At least since Adam Smith, there has been virtually universal agreement
that the nation's tax law should be fair, economically efficient, and simple to comply
with and to administer."). See also OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, DEP'T OF TREASURY, THE
DEFERRAL OF INCOME EARNED THROUGH U.S. CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS: A
POLICY STUDY 82 (2000) [hereinafter TREASURY REPORT ON SUBPART F]; STAFF OF
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concerns is described more fully below because an understanding of
the traditional terms of the reform debate is a prerequisite to
understanding why simplification has proved such an elusive goal.
These concerns will be discussed in descending order of the
importance that has been accorded to them by commentators
participating in the reform debate.
Of the three traditional concerns, efficiency has by far dominated
the reform debate. 27 A tax system is considered "efficient" if it
promotes economic welfare by allowing "resource allocation decisions
[to be] based solely on which investments are expected to be the most
productive."2 8 Discussions of a tax system's efficiency are normally
cast in terms of its "neutrality. '29 Three competing doctrines of
neutrality exist: capital export neutrality, capital import neutrality,
30
and national neutrality.
Capital export neutrality seeks to eliminate distortions in a
taxpayer's investment decisions by taxing her at the same (domestic)
rate no matter where she invests-whether at home or abroad. 3 1 The
U.S. foreign tax credit is an example of a modified form of capital
export neutrality.3 2 Capital import neutrality seeks to eliminate

JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PUB. No. JCX-13-99, OVERVIEW OF PRESENT-LAw' RULES
AND ECONOMIC ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 38 (1999) [hereinafter JCT
REPORT].

27.
Graetz, supra note 3, at 269-77. See also J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. et al.,
Fairness in International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide
Income, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 299, 302 (2001).
[O]ne would expect tax policy analysts to routinely examine the equity
implications of international income tax rules by applying the fairness criterion
with the same rigor as in the domestic context. But surprisingly, there has
been relatively little discussion in the literature regarding the role of the
ability-to-pay concept in analyzing international tax policy issues.
Id.
28.

TREASURY REPORT ON SUBPART F, supra note 26, at 84.

See also Terrence

R. Chorvat, Taxing InternationalCorporate Income Efficiently, 53 TAX L. REV. 225, 228
(2000); Peroni, supra note 21, at 983; H. David Rosenbloom, From the Bottom up:
Taxing the Income of Foreign Controlled Corporations, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1525,
1526-27 (2001); Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 VA. TAX REV.
39, 43 (1996).
29.

JCT REPORT, supra note 26, at 38.

See also TREASURY REPORT ON

INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM, supra note 2, at 2; Robert L. Palmer, Toward Unilateral
Coherence in Determining Jurisdiction to Tax Income, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 11-12
(1989).
30.
JCT REPORT, supra note 26, at 47-50; HUFBAUER, supra note 18, at 48-49.
31.
JCT REPORT, supra note 26, at 3-4; HUFBAUER, supra note 18, at 49-55.
"Pure" capital export neutrality would not only require a taxpayer to pay
32.
the United States the difference between her U.S. and foreign tax liability when the
foreign tax is lower than the U.S. tax, but would also require the United States to
refund to the taxpayer the difference between her U.S. and foreign tax liability when
the foreign tax is higher than the U.S. tax., Julie A. Roin, The Grand Illusion: A
Neutral System for the Taxation of International Transactions,75 VA. L. REV. 919, 92330 (1989). A refund of the difference between a higher foreign tax and a lower U.S. tax
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competitive distortions by taxing all investments in the same country
at the same rate, regardless of the taxpayer's residence. 3 3 A
territorial tax system, meaning one that exempts foreign source
34
income from tax, is an example of capital import neutrality.
National neutrality seeks to ensure that a country's tax revenue is
the same whether its residents make investments at home or
abroad. 35 Allowing a deduction rather than a credit for foreign taxes
paid is an example of national neutrality. 36 These doctrines are
described as "competing" because it is not possible to implement all of
them simultaneously. 37 Moreover, changes in the world economy
have led some commentators to question the continuing relevance of
38
these doctrines to the task of formulating international tax policy.
In terms of importance, fairness usually follows efficiency. A tax
system is considered "fair" if the tax burden is justly distributed
between taxpayers. 39 Discussions of a tax system's fairness are
usually cast in terms of "equity." In the domestic context, the
following two types of equity are normally considered: horizontal and
vertical equity. 40 Horizontal equity requires that "similarly situated
taxpayers should be treated similarly under the tax laws." 41 Vertical
equity "exists when the tax distinguishes appropriately between
taxpayers who are not equals-when the distribution of the tax
burden reflects the correct degree of progressivity, proportionality, or

would, however, "allow[ I source countries to exploit the United States ... [because] a
source country could raise its taxes on income earned by U.S. investors with impunity."
Id. at 928. To prevent the subsidization of countries with higher tax rates, the United
States limits the foreign tax credit to the amount of U.S. tax on the taxpayer's foreign
source income. See I.R.C. § 904 (2001). For this reason, the U.S. foreign tax credit has
been described as a form of "defensive" capital export neutrality. Roin, supra, at 929.
33.
JCT REPORT, supra note 26, at 4; HUFBAUER, supra note 18, at 57-60.
34.
Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 11, at 1063-64 (citing France, Germany, the
Netherlands, and Canada as examples of countries that have adopted a territorial
system of taxation).
JCT REPORT, supra note 26, at 47-48; HUFBAUER, supra note 18, at 55-57.
35.
National neutrality has been derided as not being a form of "neutrality" at all, but
rather a means of promoting domestic economic growth by creating a disincentive to
foreign investment. HUFBAUER, supra note 18, at 57; Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 11,
at 1041-43.
36.
Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 11, at 1041; Tsilly Dagan, National Interests
in the InternationalTax Game, 18 VA. TAX REV. 363, 366-67 (1998).
37.
JCT REPORT, supra note 26, at 50; Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 11, at 1108.
38.
See HUFBAUER, supra note 18, at 60-61; Daniel J. Frisch, The Economics of
InternationalTax Policy: Some Old and New Approaches, 47 TAX NOTES 581, 586-89
(1990). But cf. John P. Steines, Income Tax Implications of Free Trade, 49 TAX L. REV.
675, 685-87 (1994).
39.
Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness and the Taxation of InternationalIncome, 29
LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 145, 157 (1998).
Id. at 164. See also Zolt, supra note 28, at 87.
40.
Palmer, supra note 29, at 10.
41.
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regressivity. '' 42 In the United States, progressivity has traditionally
been the "appropriate" distinction between taxpayers who are not
equals, and, hence, a goal of our tax system has been to ensure that
the "rate of tax imposed on those with larger incomes should be
'43
higher than that imposed on those with smaller incomes.
In spite of being easily defined, horizontal and vertical equity
have proved difficult to apply. In the case of horizontal equity, there
has been a great deal of discussion about the traits that should be
taken into account in determining whether taxpayers are similarly
situated. In the case of vertical equity, the discussion has centered on
the standards that should be used in determining the differing
amounts that taxpayers who are not similarly situated should be
required to pay. 44 Scholars have also debated the question whether
horizontal and vertical equity have any independent normative
content, 45 leading some to contend that these concepts should be
abandoned because they do not "add anything to the need to analyze
tax changes in terms of basic tax policy objectives and indeed may

conceal problems or lead policymakers astray as particular tax
'4 6
changes are considered.
In the international context, a third type of equity has
surfaced-inter-nation equity.

The concept of inter-nation equity,

42.
Kaufman, supra note 39, at 164.
43.
Palmer, supra note 29, at 10.
44.
Graetz, supra note 26, at 610. Adding foreign taxpayers to the equation
only further complicates the application of these concepts. See Kaufman, supra note
39, at 167. For example, consider the horizontal equity implications of the U.S. foreign
tax credit. Because the United States has chosen to adopt a "defensive" form of capital
export neutrality, two domestic taxpayers with equal worldwide incomes may pay
radically different amounts of tax depending on the source of their income (i.e.,
whether the income is derived from the United States a low-tax foreign jurisdiction, a
high-tax foreign jurisdiction, or some combination of the three). See supra note 32.
The only means of achieving horizontal equity for foreign tax credit purposes would be
for the United States to adopt "pure" capital export neutrality and, in effect, subsidize
the fiscs of other countries. Id. Consider also the vertical equity (i.e., progressivity)
implications raised by the taxation of all foreign persons at the same flat rate on their
U.S. source investment income, regardless of differences in their worldwide income (or
even of differences in their total U.S. source income). See I.R.C. §§ 871, 881, 1441, 1442
(2001).
45.
See Louis Kaplow, HorizontalEquity: Measures in Search of a Principle,42
NAT'L TAX J. 139 (1989); Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 NAT'L
TAX J. 113 (1990); Louis Kaplow, A Note on Horizontal Equity, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 191
(1992); Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity: A Further Note, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 354
(1993); Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The
Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 607 (1993).
46.
McDaniel & Repetti, supra note 45, at 622. See also Peter Westen, The
Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REV. 537, 547 (1982) ("Equality is an empty vessel
with no substantive moral content of its own. Without moral standards, equality
remains meaningless, a formula that can have nothing to say about how we should act.
With such standards, equality becomes superfluous, a formula that can do nothing but
repeat what we already know." (footnote omitted)).
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which was developed by Professor Peggy Musgrave, "relates to the
distribution of the competence to tax among countries, not to the
relative amounts of tax paid by individual taxpayers to their
governments." 47 Although inter-nation equity has been advanced as
48
a more appropriate measure of fairness in the international context,
it appears to suffer from the same defects as horizontal and vertical
49
equity (i.e., difficulty of application and lack of normative content).
In terms of importance, simplicity is the third and last of the
traditional concerns that have shaped the reform debate. A tax
system is considered "simple" if its rules are easily understood by
taxpayers and capable of efficient implementation by tax
Because of its perennial inclusion in the
administrators. 50
triumvirate of concerns that guide the assessment of tax systems,
commentators often acknowledge-the importance of simplicity as a
tax policy goal. Nevertheless, these same commentators almost as
often fail to address the need for simplification when they reach the
point of engaging in substantive discussions of tax policy. 51 Even
when commentators have seriously discussed means for achieving
simplification, their focus has been on the "internal" complexity of the
U.S. international tax regime. In other words, they have viewed the
regime as a closed system, considering only methods of reducing the
complexity of individual U.S. rules or of the interaction of one U.S.
rule with another U.S. rule. By taking such a parochial view of the
problem, commentators have unnecessarily constrained their ability
effectively to address the need for simplification.
The path to any form of simplification is straightforward: first,
the sources of complexity must be identified, and then, appropriate
steps must be taken to eliminate or, at the very least, mitigate them.
Thus far, no difficulty has been encountered in identifying the sources
of the internal complexity of the U.S. international tax regime. As
mentioned above, commentators have attributed the regime's internal
complexity to a number of sources, including (i) its closer reflection of
economic realities, (ii) the multitude of conflicting considerations that
must be taken into account when formulating international tax
policy, and (iii) the failure of Congress to take an integrated approach
52
to formulating international tax policy.
While the sources of internal complexity can be identified with
relative ease, eliminating or mitigating them proves a more difficult

47.
48.
49.

Kaufman, supra note 39, at 153.
Id. at 153-54.
See id. at 188-94.

50.

See TREASURY REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM, supra note 2, at 1;

Palmer, supra note 29, at 12.
51.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
52.
See supra text accompanying notes 14-20.
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task. Efforts to address the first two sources of internal complexity
have been hampered by the fact that they are largely immitigablethe first because it is an unavoidable by-product of the maturation of
the U.S. international tax rules, and the second because it is an
unavoidable concomitant of the domestic legislative process. The
mitigability of the third source of complexity (i.e., the failure of
Congress to take an integrated approach to formulating international
tax policy) is severely limited by its close relationship with the second
source of complexity (i.e., the multitude of conflicting considerations
that must be taken into account when formulating tax policy). At a
superficial level, the third source of complexity could be mitigated by
eliminating redundancy in the U.S. international tax regime 53 and by
promoting better coordination among its provisions. 54 Nonetheless, a
truly integrated approach to formulating international tax policy
would require more than just a lapidary style of legislative drafting.
It would also require that a consistent policy framework be devised in
order to ensure that the various U.S. international tax rules do not
work at cross-purposes.
To develop a consistent policy framework within the confines of
the traditional reform debate, Congress would have to squarely
address both efficiency and fairness concerns. As suggested by the
discussion above, however, addressing these concerns is much more
difficult than articulating them. This difficulty stems, in part, from
the fact that these concerns are mutable: there is (i) no universallyaccepted theory of neutrality, (ii) no consensus concerning the traits
to be taken into account when determining who is similarly situated
for purposes of measuring horizontal equity, and (iii) no consensus
concerning the standards to be applied in determining the differing
contributions of taxpayers who are not similarly situated for purposes
of measuring vertical equity. This difficulty also stems from the fact
that a tax system cannot be perfectly efficient and fair, and, at the
same time, simple enough for taxpayers to follow and revenue
personnel to administer. Rather, a balance must be struck between
53.
For example, are six separate regimes (viz., personal holding company,
foreign personal holding company, controlled foreign corporation, foreign investment
company, passive foreign investment company, and accumulated earnings tax) really
necessary to curtail the abusive deferral of taxation through the use of foreign
corporations? See 2 JCT SIMPLIFICATION REPORT, supra note 2, at 411-18 (advocating
the elimination of the foreign personal holding company and foreign investment
company regimes and the exclusion of foreign corporations from the application of the
personal holding company rules); Robert J. Peroni et al., Getting Serious About
CurtailingDeferral of U.S. Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU L. REV. 455, 512-14

(1999) (advocating the adoption of a single "pass-through" regime in place of the six
existing regimes).
54.
For example, is it really necessary to employ several different definitions of
the term "resident"? Compare I.R.C. § 865(g) (2001) (income tax), and I.R.C. § 7701(b)
(2001) (income tax), with Treas. Reg. § 20.0-1(b)(1) (2001) (estate tax), and Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2501-1(b) (2001) (gift tax).
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simplicity because "[c]onflict among these
efficiency, fairness, and
55
concerns is inevitable.
Compounding the difficulty inherent in developing a consistent
policy framework is the fact that international tax policy-making
involves much more than just a balancing of efficiency and fairness
concerns. The traditional focus on these concerns may stem from the
fact that they lend themselves to the theoretical analysis preferred by
commentators. On a more practical level, however, U.S. international
tax policy must also take into account a number of other concerns,
including the expected impact of tax provisions on (i) the
competitiveness of U.S. multinationals,5 6 (ii) political relations with
58
foreign countries, 57 (iii) the need to raise revenue, (iv) the fostering
of economic growth, 59. and (v) the prevention of tax avoidance and
60
evasion.
Thus, to devise a consistent policy framework that would enable
real strides to be made toward the mitigation of the third source of
complexity, policymakers would have to address each of these
separate considerations, reconcile them to the extent that they
conflict, and ultimately, conflate them into a unified whole. The
sheer number of these separate considerations-and the number of
competing viewpoints that they often mask-render this task
It is no wonder, then, that
impracticable, if not impossible.
"simplicity has proven ... to be an elusive goal" in tax policymaking, 61 and that it has been called the "forgotten stepchild of
62
income tax policy."
C. A Shift in Perspective
The parochial view of complexity embraced by commentators
does not, however, comport with reality. Experienced taxpayers,
recognize that the U.S.
practitioners, and administrators

Graetz, supra note 26, at 610. See also Fleming et al., supra note 27, at
55.
330-31, 350; Rosenbloom, supra note 28, at 1528-29 ("[N]ot only are efficiency, equity,
and simplicity all abstract concepts subject to considerable doubt and interpretation
when applied in the evaluation of specific provisions, but the factors actually conflict
with one another when any of them is pursued with a single mind.").
56.

TREASURY REPORT ON SUBPART F, supra note 26, at 82, 86; TREASURY

REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM, supranote 2, at 2.
Palmer, supra note 29, at 20-21.
57.
See Dagan, supra note 36, at 387-88. Cf. Nolan, supra note 21, at 324.
58.
JCT REPORT, supra note 26; at 38.
59.
60.

TREASURY REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM, supra note 2, at 1-2;

Kole, supra note 14, at 51-52.
61.

TREASURY REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM, supra note 2, at 1. See

also Graetz, supra note 26, at 610 ("The pursuit of' simplicity is frequently a
bystander.").
Graetz, supra note 3, at 310.
62.
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international tax regime applies only to cross-border movements of
capital and labor-movements that involve one or more other
countries and that will almost invariably implicate those countries'
international tax regimes. 6 3 As sovereign states, these countries are
able to devise their own international tax rules, which are free to
conflict with those of the United States (as well as with those of other
countries). Globalization has only served to ensure that this potential
for conflict is realized with increasing frequency.
Conflicts between international tax regimes foment complexity
that may impede the free flow of international commerce. Consider,
for example, the situation faced by a U.S. corporation that, to date,
has performed its services only domestically, but is considering a
request for technical and administrative assistance from a Costa
Rican enterprise. Assume for purposes of this example that, should
the project be undertaken, all services will be performed in the
United States, the gross amount to be charged for the services is USD
150,000,64 and the net income expected to be received from rendering
the services is USD 60,000.65 Since this project has contacts with
both the United States and Costa Rica, it will implicate both
countries' international tax regimes.
Under its international tax rules, Costa Rica subjects
nonresidents to income tax on their Costa Rican source income. 66 For
this purpose, Costa Rican source income is defined to include
payments made for technical, financial, or administrative assistance
rendered from abroad to Costa Rican domiciliaries.6 7 Because Costa
Rica sources the income from performing these particular services to
the place where the services are used, the U.S. corporation in this
example will be subject to tax in Costa Rica on the income derived
from the Costa Rican project even though none of the services is
actually performed in Costa Rica. Costa Rica imposes a gross-basis

See generally 1 JCT SIMPLIFICATION REPORT, supra note 2, at 93-97.
63.
64.
Please note that the three-letter alphabetic codes developed by the
International Organization for Standardization are used in this Article to designate the
See INT'L ORG. FOR
currency in which a monetary amount is expressed.
STANDARDIZATION, ISO NO. 4217, CODES FOR THE REPRESENTATION OF CURRENCIES AND

FUNDS (6th ed. 2001).
These figures were arbitrarily chosen simply for purposes of illustration.
65.
The "net income" figure is intended to take into account all allowable U.S. federal

income tax deductions that are either directly or indirectly allocable to the performance
of the services for the Costa Rican enterprise-including the deduction for foreign taxes
paid, which is available under I.R.C. § 164 (because the U.S. corporation is unable to
avail itself of the benefits of the foreign tax credit) and will alleviate the burdens of
double taxation to a limited extent. For the sake of simplicity, it will be assumed that
the Costa Rican enterprise contracted to pay to the U.S. corporation in U.S. currency a

specified amount that was denominated in U.S. currency.
Income Tax Law, Law No. 7092, Apr. 21, 1988, arts. 52-53 (Costa Rica).
66.
67.
Id. art. 55(h).
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68
withholding tax on such income at a rate of twenty-five percent.
The Costa Rican tax on the payment for the services rendered by the
U.S. corporation will, therefore, be USD 37,500 (25% x USD 150,000)
and the net payment made to the U.S. corporation will be USD
112,500 (USD 150,000 - USD 37,500).
Under its international tax rules, the United States subjects
domestic corporations to income tax on their worldwide income (i.e.,
regardless of its source). 69 Nonetheless, in an effort to alleviate the
burden of double taxation, the United States permits domestic
corporations to claim a credit for foreign taxes paid on their foreign
source income. 70 For purposes of determining the amount of the
foreign tax credit, income from the performance of services is sourced
to the place where the services are performed, 71 which, in the instant
example, is the United States. Thus, although the U.S. corporation in
this example has paid foreign (i.e., Costa Rican) taxes on a portion of
its worldwide income, it will not be entitled to claim those taxes as a
credit against its U.S. federal income tax liability because the United
States considers the corporation as having paid those taxes with
respect to U.S. source income. Assuming that the highest marginal
corporate income tax rate will apply, the U.S. corporation will be
required to pay USD 21,000 (35% x USD 60,000) in tax to the United
States on the net income from performing these services.
Because the United States and Costa Rica have adopted
conflicting rules for sourcing income from the performance of services,
the U.S. corporation in this example will be required to pay tax twice
on the same income. 72 The total tax on this transaction will be USD
58,500 (USD 37,500 + USD 21,000) leaving an after-tax profit of only
USD 1,500. Assuming the U.S. corporation is well advised, it will
have to decide in advance whether the burden imposed by double
taxation renders the project economically unfeasible. This example
concretely demonstrates how conflicts between international tax
regimes can create complexity that may render cross-border
movements of capital and labor more difficult, or even impossible as a
practical matter.

68.
Id. arts. 58-59.
69.
I.R.C. § 11 (2001) ("A tax is hereby imposed for each taxable year on the
taxable income of every corporation."); Treas. Reg. § 1.11-1(a) (2001) (for purposes of
I.R.C. § 11, "[it is immaterial that a domestic corporation ... may derive no income
from sources within the United States"). A "domestic" corporation is one that is
"created or organized in the United States or under the law of the United States or of
any State." I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4) (2001).

70.

I.R.C. §§ 901, 904 (2001).

71.
I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(3), 862(a)(3) (2001).
72.
There is no income tax treaty between the United States and Costa Rica
that might coordinate these conflicting source rules. See Gordon et al., supra note 13.
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Contrasting this -international perspective, with the more
traditional national perspective, one might refer to the complexity
created by the conflicts between international tax regimes as
"external" complexity. The United States has made an effort to
mitigate the external complexity of its international tax regime by

taking steps to coordinate its international tax rules with those of
other countries. Most notably, the United States has entered into a
broad network of bilateral income tax treaties that attempt to
coordinate the international tax rules of the United States, with those
of each of its treaty partners:.
Double taxation agreements (tax treaties) are an essential, element in
facilitating economic relations between States and encouraging flows of
capital and labor. They form a firm and reliable basis for tax relations
between States. They limit and regulate the taxing jurisdiction of the
States entering into them so as to ensure the orderly application of the
domestic tax laws of what are often quite different systems. Their
importance is underlined by the large numbers that are currently in
force and the fact that, international organizations and the business
community repeatedly recommend the enlargement and improvement
73
of the treaty network.

Despite playing an important role in mitigating external
complexity, 74 bilateral income tax treaties have by no means
eliminated the problem. First, tax treaties are effective only between
the contracting states. Though broad, the U.S. network of income tax
treaties is not comprehensive; indeed, it embraces less than one-third
of the countries in the world. 75 Second, revising and extending the
tax treaty network can only be accomplished by undertaking a "slow
and arduous" negotiating process with each current or potential
treaty partner. 76 Third, the tax treaties that do exist are not

73.
COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., TAX
TREATY OVERRIDES 1 (1990) (footnote omitted), available at LEXIS 90 TNI 7-13. See
also Tax Treaties: Hearing on Various Tax Treaties Before the S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 97th Cong. 7-8 (1982) (statement of John E. Chapoton, Assistant Secretary
of the Treasury,, Tax Policy) ("Among the major impediments to free capital and
technology flows are the rules of national tax systems and their interaction with the
systems of other countries. Tax treaties seek to eliminate, or at least mitigate, the
impact of these impediments.").
74.
See infra text accompanying notes 116-27.
75.
At present, the United States has income tax treaties in force with more
than sixty countries.
See Gordon et al., supra note 13, at 114.
There are
approximately 190 countries in the world. BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH,
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FACT SHEET: INDEPENDENT STATES IN THE WORLD (2001), at
http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls4250.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2002). See Fleming et al.,
supra note 27, at 339 ("Moreover, the United States does not have bilateral tax treaties
with most of the world's nations. Thus, the United States must adopt a unilateral
measure to mitigate double taxation of its residents' international income when a
treaty does not apply.").
76.
AM. LAW INST., supra note 5, at 12.
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intended to be exhaustive attempts at coordination. 77 Fourth, the
United States inserts a "saving clause" into each of its income tax
treaties, which severely limits the extent to which those treaties can
alter the U.S. federal income taxation of U.S. persons with crossborder activities. 78 Finally, the coordination that is achieved through
tax treaties is routinely undermined by Congress through the passage
of legislation that is intended to override inconsistent treaty
79
provisions.
Viewing the problem of complexity from a more realistic
international perspective and acknowledging the shortcomings of
negotiated efforts at tax coordination, the remainder of this Article
explores the viability of adopting tax coordination as a framework
within which the U.S. international tax regime might be reformed. In
theory, by pursuing coordination at both the national and
international levels-through both the domestic legislative process
and treaty-making-the United States should more effectively be able
to alleviate the burdens imposed by external complexity. In practice,
by adopting a more holistic approach to the problem, the United
States may also be able to reduce the internal complexity of its
international tax regime. The application below 80 of the proposed
framework to the Internal Revenue Code provisions governing the
deductibility of charitable contributions demonstrates the proposed
framework's potential to serve as a restraint on the multitude of
conflicting considerations that must be taken into account when
By restraining these
formulating U.S. international tax policy.
conflicting considerations, the proposed framework may open the way
to the development of a more internally consistent policy framework
and, in turn, to a measure of internal simplification. 8 '

III.

REFINING THE RELEVANT CONCEPTS

Because the legal academic literature has overwhelmingly
focused on the internal complexity of the U.S. international tax

See Lee Burns, Commentary, 53 TAX L. REV. 39, 43 (1999).
77.
Subject to enumerated exceptions, the saving clause reserves to the United
78.
States the right to tax its citizens and residents as if the treaty had never entered into
force. See, e.g., UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION, art. 1, para. 4 (1996),
reprinted in 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) 214.01 (1998).
See Anthony C. Infanti, CurtailingTax Treaty Overrides: A Call to Action,
79.
62 U. PITT. L. REV. 677, 681-83 (2001).
See infra Part V.E.
80.
This notion that complexity may be reduced through the adoption of a
81.
framework within which legislative changes must be made is consistent with the view
taken by some that simplification is not "a tax policy goal at all," but rather "an
effective limitation" on competing policy concerns. Palmer, supranote 29, at 12.
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regime, tax coordination (and the related concept of tax
harmonization) has received scant attention as an independent
82
means of guiding the formation of U.S. international tax policy.
Most of the discussions of tax coordination (and tax harmonization)
that can be found in the legal academic literature occur in the context
of assessing the impact on the United States of regional economic
arrangements such as the North American Free Trade Area and the
European Union.83 Nevertheless, whether they occur in the context
of the reform debate or of considering the impact of regional economic
arrangements, these discussions have generally been marked by a
failure precisely to define the concepts of tax coordination and tax
harmonization.8 4 Due to the lack of precision in defining these
concepts, it is necessary to give some content to the terms "tax

coordination" and "tax harmonization" before proceeding to explore
the viability of adopting tax coordination as a framework within
which the U.S. international tax regime might be reformed.

In spite of being largely ignored by legal academics, tax
coordination and tax harmonization have received considerable
attention from public-finance economists, who for some time now
have been debating the relative desirability of tax coordination and
tax harmonization on the one hand and of tax competition on the
other.8 5 Given their greater depth of experience in this area, it is only

82.
See, e.g., Green, supra note 21, at 63-66 (brief discussion of harmonization);
Warren, supra note 21, at 609-10 (same). Of late, increasing awareness of "harmful"
tax competition and the tax issues raised by electronic commerce have, however,
engendered debate over the need for coordinated, multilateral solutions to common
international tax problems. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., HARMFUL
TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE 37-59 (1998); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,

Globalization,Tax Competition,and the Fiscal Crisisof the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 1573 (2000); Julie Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective on
International Tax Competition, 89 GEO. L.J. 543 (2001); Charles E. McClure, Jr.,

Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Economic Objectives, Technological Constraints, and
Tax Laws, 52 TAX L. REV. 269 (1997); Clayton W. Chan, Taxation of Global ECommerce on the Internet, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 233 (2000).
83.
See, e.g., Brian J. Arnold & Neil H. Harris, NAFTA and the Taxation of
CorporateInvestment: A View from Within NAFTA, 49 TAX L. REV. 529, 577-92 (1994);

Tracy A. Kaye, European Tax Harmonizationand the Implicationsfor U.S. Tax Policy,
19 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 109 (1996); Paul R. McDaniel, FormularyTaxation in the
North American Free Trade Zone, 49 TAX L. REV. 691, 698-702 (1994); Stephen G. Utz,

Tax Harmonizationand Coordinationin Europe and America, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 767
(1994).

84.
See, e.g., Arthur J. Cockfield, Tax Integration Under NAFTA: Resolving the
Conflict Between Economic and Sovereignty Interests, 34 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39, 60 n.108
(1998); Paul R. McDaniel, Trade and Taxation, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1621, 1639-40
(2001); Roin, supra note 82, at 544, 548-49; Miranda Stewart, Commentary, 54 TAX L.
REV. 111, 116-18 (2000).

85.
Julian S. Alworth, Taxation, FinancialInnovation, and Integrated Markets:
Some Implicationsfor Tax Coordinationin the European Union, in THE ECONOMICS OF
GLOBALIZATION: POLICY PERSPECTIVES FROM PUBLIC ECONOMICS 187, 187 (Assaf Razin
& Efraim Sadka eds., 1999); A. Lans Bovenberg, International Coordination of Tax

2002]

SPONTANEOUS TAX COORDINA TION

natural that public-finance economists have more precisely refined
the concepts of "tax coordination" and "tax harmonization." For this
reason, recourse will be had to the public-finance economics literature
in order to synthesize definitions for the terms "tax coordination" and
"tax harmonization," and thereby forge a working vocabulary for use
in the remainder of this Article.
A. "Tax Harmonization"
Tax harmonization "is generally understood as a process of
adjusting [the] tax systems of different jurisdictions in the pursuit of
a common policy objective." 86 "Complete" tax harmonization would
result in each country having exactly the same tax system; in other
words, each country would have the same types of taxes, and those
87
taxes would be imposed on the same tax base at the same tax rates.
Tax
harmonization
necessarily, involves
high
levels
of
intergovernmental cooperation and "may require agreement on
regional standards or world standards.18 8
Consequently, "tax
harmonization in some sense presupposes the process of establishing
a wider regional economic grouping which may be based on factors
other than comparable economic strength such as geographic
'8 9
proximity.
The best-known example of a regional economic grouping that
has attempted tax harmonization is the European Union (EU). 90 The
EU has endeavored to harmonize both its Member States' direct and
indirect taxes. 9 1 While the EU has been able to make some progress
toward the harmonization of indirect taxes, it has been much less
successful in its attempts at harmonizing direct taxes. 92 But even at

Policies, in THE REALITY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY COORDINATION 127,

141-42 (H.J. Blommestein ed., 1991).
86.
George Kopits, Overview, in TAX HARMONIZATION IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY: POLICY ISSUES AND ANALYSIS 1, 3 (George Kopits ed., 1992).
87.
Simon James, Can We Harmonise Our Views on European Tax
Harmonisation?,54 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 263, 264 (2000); RICHARD
A. MUSGRAVE, FISCAL SYSTEMS 238-39 (1969); VITO TANZI, TAXATION IN AN
INTEGRATING WORLD 9 (1995).

88.
Henry J. Aaron et al., Preface to TANZI, supra note 87, at xi, xxii.
89.
Angelo G.A. Faria, Tax Coordination and Harmonization, in TAX POLICY
HANDBOOK 229, 229 (Parthasarathi Shome ed., 1995).
90.
Id.
91.
An example of a "direct" tax is the income tax, and an example of an
"indirect" tax is a sales tax on goods and services.
92.
See John Hawksworth, The Slow Process of Business Tax Harmonization in
the New Europe, 10 J. INT'L TAX'N 36 (1999).
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its most successful, the EU has managed to achieve only a partial
93
harmonization of its Member States' taxes.
With respect to the harmonization of indirect taxes, the EU's
signal achievement was the establishment of "a common system of
value-added taxation" in place of the Member States' pre-existing
turnover taxes. 94 As described above, complete tax harmonization
would not only require the EU Member States to adopt the same type
of tax, but would also require them to adopt the same tax base and
the same tax rates. The EU's common system of value-added
taxation has fallen far short of this definition of complete tax
harmonization because, when that system was implemented, each EU
Member State was permitted to devise its own value-added tax
regime. 95 Thus, although the EU Member States each adopted the
same type of tax (i.e., a value-added tax in place of a turnover tax),
they did not adopt either the same tax rates or the same tax base. 96
With respect to the harmonization of direct taxes, the focus in
the EU has been on corporate income taxes, rather than on personal
income taxes. 97 After discussing the complete harmonization of
corporate income taxes for nearly thirty years, the EU "abandoned
the idea of comprehensive corporate tax harmonization" in 1990 in
favor of an approach that "emphasized ... the coordination and

93.

H. Onno Ruding, Tax Harmonization in Europe: The Pros and Cons, 54 TAX

L. REV. 101 (2000).
94.
Utz, supra note 83, at 791.

Riecker,

See also Jan E. Brinkmann & Andreas 0.

European Company Taxation: The Ruding Committee Report Gives

Harmonization Efforts a New Impetus, 27 INT'L LAW. 1061, 1062-63 (1993). The
Member Countries' turnover taxes were "levied on gross sales each time the goods

turned over." Alan Schenk, Value Added Tax: Does This Consumption Tax Have a
Place in the Federal Tax System?, 7 VA. TAX REV. 207, 229 (1987). The turnover taxes
"therefore encouraged vertical integration of operations to reduce the total tax burden
on goods that proceeded through multiple stages of production and distribution." Id.
"In contrast, the additive and subtractive methods of calculating [value-added tax]
provide tax neutrality between the nonintegrated and integrated firms by eliminating
from the tax base the value added that already was taxed at previous stages." Id.
95.
Brinkmann & Riecker, supra note 94, at 1062-63; Utz, supra note 83, at
791.
96.
The potential for divergence in EU value-added tax rates was partially
mitigated by the establishment in 1693 of a standard minimum rate and a floor on
reduced rates for specified categories of goods and services. Brinkmann & Riecker,
supra note 94, at 1062-63; Utz, supra note 83, at 791. The Council of the European
Union recently extended the applicability of the standard minimum rate through
December 31, 2005. Council Directive 2001/4/EC' of 19 January 2001 Amending the
Sixth Directive (77/388/EEC) on the Common System of Value Added Tax, with Regard
to the Length of Time During which the Minimum Standard Rate Is to Be Applied, art.
1, 2001 O.J. (L22) 17, 17, as corrected at 2001 O.J. (L26) 40, 40. For a recent
compilation of the varying value-added tax rates in EU Member States as well as an
argument against harmonizing value-added tax rates, see ALFRED Boss, Do WE NEED
TAX HARMONIZATION IN THE EU? 2, 5-10 (The Kiel Inst. of World Econ., Working Paper
No. 916, 1999).
97.
Kaye, supra note 83, at 116.
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approximation
of tax policies
rather than
a systematic
harmonization." 98 To date, the EU has made only limited progress in
The
coordinating its Member States' corporate income taxes.
coordination measures that have been adopted thus far are the
Parent-Subsidiary Directive,99 the Mergers Directive, 10 0 and an
Arbitration Convention.'0 1
*

The Parent-Subsidiary Directive "is designed to eliminate
double taxation of profits distributed in the form of dividends by
a subsidiary in one Member State to' its parent company
10 2
established in another Member State."'

"

The Mergers Directive "defer[s] or eliminat[es] gains at the
corporate level in mergers, divisions, transfers of assets, or
exchanges of shares involving corporations from multiple [EU]
10 3
countries."'
The Arbitration Convention is "designed to eliminate the double
taxation resulting from adjustments made by one tax authority
that are not accompanied by a corresponding adjustment by the

98.
Brinkmann & Riecker, supra note 94, at 1065.
The subject of tax
coordination in the EU has, however, recently resurfaced in light of (among other
things) increasing globalization, the rise in electronic commerce, increasing sensitivity
to the problems created by "harmful" tax competition, and the advent of the monetary
union of certain EU Member States. See, e.g., Communication from the Commission to
the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee:
Towards an Internal Market Without Tax Obstacles-A Strategy for Providing
Companies with a Consolidated Corporate Tax Base for their EU-wide Activities,
COM(2001) 582 final, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lexlen/com/cnc/2001/
com2001_0582en01.pdf; Communication from the Commission to the Council, the
European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee: Tax Policy in the
European Union - Priorities for the Years Ahead, 2001 O.J. (C 284/03) 6; Frits
Bolkestein, Taxation and Competition: The Realization of the InternalMarket, 40 EUR.
TAX'N 401 (2000); W.J. Bos, The Changing World of European Tax Policy, 40 EUR.
TAX'N 409 (2000); John Chown, Monetary Union and Tax Harmonization,28 INTERTAX
102 (2000); Barbara Hendricks, A View on Tax Harmonization and the Code of
Conduct, 40 EUR. TAX'N 413 (2000); Sylvain R.F. Plasschaert, Comprehensive
Approaches to EU Company Taxation: To Which Companies Should They Apply?, 42
EUR. TAX'N 7 (2002); H. Onno Ruding, The Long Way to Removing Obstacles in
Company Taxation in Europe, 42 EUR. TAX'N 3 (2002).
99.
Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the Common System of
Taxation Applicable in the Case of Parent Companies and Subsidiaries of Different
Member States, 1990 O.J. (L 225) 6.
100.
Council Directive 90/434/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the Common System of

Taxation Applicable to Mergers, Divisions, Transfers of Assets and Exchanges of
Shares Concerning Companies of Different Member States, 1990 O.J. (L 225) 1.
101.
Convention on the Elimination of Double Taxation in Connection with the
Adjustment of Profits of Associated Enterprises (90/436/EEC), 1990 O.J. (L 225) 10.
102.
Brinkmann & Riecker, supra note 94, at 1065.
103.
Kaye, supra note 83, at 137.
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other Member State's tax authority, for example, in the area of
10 4
transfer pricing."
As this brief description demonstrates, "[t]he experience with
10 5
regional tax harmonization has been only modestly encouraging.
The difficulty encountered by the EU in achieving tax harmonization
has been attributed to the differing approaches that its Member
States have taken to taxation (as well as to the need for each of the
Member States to agree to tax measures). 10 6 In turn, the Member
States' differing approaches to taxation have been attributed to their
unique political, economic, and social structures.10 7
The
disappointing record of regional tax harmonization may, therefore, be
explained by reference to the general incompatibility of tax
harmonization with the recognition and preservation of the
underlying cultural norms of the countries that comprise the relevant
geographic region.
In fact, this incompatibility has led some
economists to argue generally against tax harmonization and in favor
of tax coordination, which, as described below, is better capable of coexisting with heterogeneity both in public-sector choices and in
choices regarding the social and economic policies to be implemented
08
through the tax laws.'
B. "Tax Coordination"
Like tax harmonization, tax coordination implies the adjustment
of national tax policies; 0 9 however, tax coordination encompasses a
much broader range of adjustments than does tax harmonization.
Strictly viewed, tax coordination includes any adaptation of one
country's tax system to that of another, so long as "the objective is not

104.
Id. at 139.
105.
Faria, supra note 89, at 229. See also TANZI, supra note 87, at 9 ("Even the
European Union has not been very successful in pushing forward the process of tax
harmonization in its member countries.").
106.
Kaye, supra note 83, at 129.
107.
See Bovenberg, supra note 85, at 141; ARTHUR DALE, TAX HARMONIZATION
IN EUROPE 24 (1963); Green, supra note 21, at 65; Richard J. Vann, Improving Tax Law
Improvement: An InternationalPerspective, 12 AUSTL. TAX F. 193, 201-03 (1995). See
generally Burns, supra note 77, at 39-40.
108.
See Bovenberg, supra note 85, at 141-43; James, supra note 87, at 266-69;
Kopits, supra note 86, at 4.
See also MUSGRAVE, supra note 87, at 238-39
(characterizing complete tax harmonization as an approach that throws the baby out
with the bath water, and adopting the view that tax coordination is more appropriate
because it provides "a framework within which individual countries are permitted
maximum freedom in arranging their own tax structures"); Hans-Werner Sinn, Tax
Harmonization and Tax Competition in Europe, 34 EUR. ECON. REV. 489, 489, 500-02
(1990) (eschewing both complete harmonization and unfettered competition in favor of
"a collectively planned harmonization" that would allow Europe to retain "its social
achievements").
109.
See Aaron, supra note 88, at xxii.
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to increase the overall tax burden."110 Thus, in contrast to tax
harmonization, tax coordination "does not imply uniformity of
individual taxes between countries, much less uniformity of their tax
systems.""' Because tax coordination does not embrace a single level
of adaptation, it may be conceptualized as a gradation that begins at
one end with unfettered tax competition (i.e., the complete absence of
tax coordination) and that eventually leads up to complete tax
1 12
harmonization (i.e., the complete absence of tax competition).
Tax coordination may be subdivided into the following two
general categories based on the genesis of the coordination:
"concerted" tax coordination and "spontaneous" tax coordination."13
1. "Concerted" Tax Coordination
"Concerted" tax coordination is a cooperative endeavor in which
"bargaining occurs and governments agree to behave differently from
the ways they' would have behaved without the agreement." 114 A now
familiar example of concerted tax coordination is the bilateral tax
treaty. Notwithstanding the development of model tax treaties that
have led to a standardization of general format, the particular terms
of bilateral tax treaties are by no means uniform and are generally
the product of a "slow and arduous" negotiating process."l 5 Bilateral
tax treaties have been employed to coordinate tax systems in a
number of ways. 116 Four of these ways are discussed below.
a. Resolving Residence Conflicts
Bilateral income tax treaties may resolve conflicts between the
contracting states with regard to the residence of an individual
taxpayer, and, in some cases, a corporate taxpayer as well. If an
individual is considered a resident of both contracting states under
their respective domestic tax laws, then the individual may be subject
to tax on her worldwide income in both countries. For example, if an
individual who is a lawful permanent resident of the United States
spends part of the year abroad, she may be considered a resident both
of the United States (by virtue of her status as a lawful permanent

110.
Faria, supranote 89, at 229.
111.
Id.
112.
James, supra note 87, at 264-65 (containing a graphic depiction of the
potential degrees of tax coordination, from the complete absence of tax coordination to
the complete harmonization of tax systems). See also Faria, supra note 89, at 229.
113.
Kopits, supranote 86, at 4-5. See also TANZI, supra note 87, at 8.
114.
Aaron, supra note 88, at xxii.
115.
AM. LAW INST., supra note 5, at 2-4, 12 (1992).
116.
See id. at 5-11.
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resident) 117 and of the foreign country in which she spends a portion
of the year (by virtue of her presence there). If so, then she may be
subject to tax on her worldwide income both in the United States and
in the foreign country. Most income tax treaties contain a set of "tiebreaker" rules that resolve this conflict by allocating the jurisdiction
118
to tax on the basis of residence to one contracting state alone.
b. Resolving Source Conflicts
Bilateral income tax treaties may resolve conflicts between the
source rules of the contracting states. Source rules are relevant in
determining (i) the extent to which a contracting state can exercise its
jurisdiction to tax the income of nonresidents (because nonresidents
are normally subject to tax only on items of income that are
considered to be derived from sources within the contracting state)
and (ii) whether a contracting state is required to cede all or a portion
of its jurisdiction to tax the income of its residents (because the
alleviation of double taxation through the provision of either an
exemption or a tax credit is normally confined to items of income that
are considered to be derived from sources without the contracting
state). Absent a treaty, both contracting states .might consider the
same item of income to be derived from different sources, which
might cause the taxpayer to be subject to tax on that item of income
in both countries-without any alleviation of this double taxation by
the residence country through the provision of an exemption or a tax
credit. 119 Many income tax treaties contain provisions that are
120
designed to resolve these and other source conflicts.
c. Prohibiting Discrimination
Bilateral income tax treaties may attempt to establish a level
playing field on which residents of the two contracting states can
compete. 121 To this end, many income tax treaties contain a provision
that prohibits each contracting state from imposing on nationals of
the other contracting state, or on businesses of the contracting state
owned by residents of the other contracting state, taxes or
requirements that are other or more burdensome than the taxes or

117.
118.

I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(i) (2001); Treas. Reg. § 1.1-1(b) (2001).
See, e.g., MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL, art. 4,

paras. 2-3 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. 1997), reprinted in 1 Tax Treaties (CCH)
191.04 (2000); U.S. MODEL INCOME TA

CONVENTION, art. 4, paras. 2-4 (1996),

reprinted in 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) 214.04, at 10,601 (1999).
119.
See supra Part II.C. for an example of this problem.
120.

PETER H. BLESSING, INCOME TAX TREATIES OF THE UNITED STATES

(1996).
121.

See AM. LAW INST., supra note 5, at 253.

18.02
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requirements imposed on nationals or similar businesses of that
contracting state. 122 It is worth noting, however, that, although
treaty nondiscrimination provisions will negate the application of
blatantly discriminatory taxes and other requirements, they may
prove difficult to apply in less obvious cases. 123 The ambiguity of
nondiscrimination provisions also opens them up to manipulation by
contracting states that wish to enact tax provisions that have
discriminatory effects on nonresidents, but that do not wish to admit
124
the existence of those effects.
d. Unique Domestic Law
Bilateral income tax treaties may address the application of
unique provisions in the domestic laws of one of the contracting states
to residents of the other contracting state. For example, the income
tax treaty between the United States and Mexico addresses the
application of the permanent establishment threshold for taxing
business profits to maquiladoras; 125 the income tax treaty between
the United States and China permits China, in the case of specific
industries, to attribute profits to a permanent establishment on the
basis of deemed profits; 126 and the income tax treaty between the
United States and Israel contains a provision that accords favorable
U.S. tax treatment to certain cash grants7 made by the government of
12
Israel to promote investment in Israel.

See, e.g., MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL, art. 24
122.
(Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. 1997), reprinted in 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) 191.24
(2000); U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION, art. 24 (1996), reprinted in 1 Tax
The desirability of treaty nondiscrimination
214.24 (1999).
Treaties (CCH)
provisions is not, however, universally recognized. For example, Australia, Canada,
and New Zealand have reserved their positions on the nondiscrimination article in the
Model Tax Convention prepared by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development. MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL, art. 24 cmt. 64
(Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. 1997).
123.
AM. LAW INST., supra note 5, at 11, 253-83; Sanford H. Goldberg & Peter A.
Glicklich, Treaty-Based Nondiscrimination:Now You See It Now You Don't, 1 FLA. TAX
REV. 51 (1992).
BLESSING, supra note 120, 20.01[1]; Goldberg & Glicklich, supra note 123,
124.
at 73-81, 93-97.
Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and
125.
the Government of the United Mexican States for the Avoidance of Double Taxation
and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Sept. 18, 1992,
U.S.-Mex., art. 5, para. b, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-7, at 10 (1993).
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
126.
the Government of the People's Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double Taxation
and the Prevention of Tax Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Apr. 30, 1984,
U.S.-P.R.C., art. 7, para. 4, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 98-30, at 5 (1984).
Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and
127.
the Government of Israel with Respect to Taxes on Income, Nov. 20, 1975, U.S.-Isr.,
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2. "Spontaneous" Tax Coordination
The other general category of tax coordination is "spontaneous"
tax coordination.
Spontaneous tax coordination is unilateral in
nature.
In other words, unlike concerted tax coordination,
spontaneous tax coordination does not involve negotiations between,
or overt cooperation among, different nations. 128 As described more
fully below, spontaneous tax coordination can result from either (i)
tax competition (STC/Tax Competition), 12 9 (ii) employing comparative
law as an aid to legislation (STC/Comparative Law), 130 or (iii)
1 1
coincidence (STC/Coincidence). 3
An example of an event that gave rise to STC/Tax Competition is
the enactment of the "portfolio interest exemption" by the United
States. Under its domestic laws, the United States normally imposes
a thirty percent withholding tax on payments, of U.S. source passive
income (e.g., interest) made to foreign persons. 132 In 1984, the United
States abolished this withholding tax insofar as it applies to "portfolio
interest."1 33
Following the enactment of the portfolio interest
exemption, "[o]ne after another, all the major economies.., abolished
their withholding taxes on interest for fear of losing mobile capital
flows to the United States."'1 34 Thus, as a result of competitive forces,
the United States' abolition of its withholding tax on portfolio interest
led to the spontaneous coordination of developed countries'
withholding tax rates on interest income.
An example of coordination that may be the product of STC/Tax
Competition and/or STC/Coincidence is the widespread lowering of
marginal corporate income tax rates and broadening of the corporate
income tax base that took place from the mid-1980s through the early
1990s. Economists began to document this spontaneous coordination
shortly after the United States enacted the Tax Reform Act of
1986,135 and its existence was later confirmed in a retrospective piece

art. 10, S. EXEC. DOC. C, 94-2, at 10 (1976), Protocol, art. VII, S. EXEC. DOC. M, 96-2, at
3 (1980).
128.
See Bovenberg, supra note 85, at 142-43; Faria, supra note 89, at 229;
Kopits, supra note 86, at 4.
129.
See Bovenberg, supra note 85, at 142; Kopits, supra note 86, at 4.
130.
See DALE, supra note 107, at 23.
131.
See infra note 137 and accompanying text. See also Vann, supra note 107,
at 206.
132.
I.R.C. §§ 871(a), 881(a) (2001).
133.
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 127, 98 Stat. 494, 64853 (1984) (codified as amended at LR.C. §§ 871(h), 881(c) (2001)). For a definition of
portfolio interest, see I.R.C. § 871(h).
134.
Avi-Yonah, supra note 82, at 1581.
135.
See WORLD TAX REFORM: A PROGRESS REPORT (Joseph A. Pechman ed.,
1988); John Bossons, InternationalTax Competition: The Foreign Government Response
in Canadaand Other Countries, 41 NAT'L TAX J. 347 (1988); John Bossons, The Impact
of the 1986 Tax Reform Act on Tax Reform in Canada, 40 NAT'L TAX J. 331 (1987); Vito
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building on this earlier work. 136 There has been some question,
however, about whether this coordination can be ascribed to
competitive forces, to common intellectual influences that were
connected with a change in the political environment, or to some
1 37
combination of the two.
An example of STC/Comparative Law is the recent proliferation
of "anti-deferral regimes." Anti-deferral regimes are enacted to
combat the erosion of a country's tax base that may occur when its
residents defer taxation by earning income through a controlled
foreign corporation. Tax may be deferred in this way by exploiting
the differences between the taxation of domestic and foreign persons.
Many countries, including the United States, tax their residents on a
worldwide basis, but tax foreign persons only on their income from
domestic sources. 138 Because these countries also respect the status
of corporations as separate legal entities, resident taxpayers are able
to reduce their domestic tax liability by interposing a foreign
corporation between them and assets or businesses that produce
foreign source income. 139 For example, if a U.S. person were to create
a foreign corporation to hold assets that produce foreign source
income or to operate a foreign business, the U.S. person would be able
to defer U.S. tax on the income generated by those assets or that
business until the controlled foreign corporation paid a dividend.
This deferral would redound to the U.S. person's benefit so long as
the tax imposed by the foreign jurisdiction of incorporation was lower
than that imposed by the United States, and, naturally, the value of
deferral would be maximized if the controlled foreign corporation
140
were incorporated in a low- or no-tax jurisdiction (i.e., a tax haven).
Moreover, due to the time value of money, the longer the U.S. person
could defer repatriation of income from the foreign corporation, the

Tanzi, The Response of Other Industrial Countries to the U.S. Tax Reform Act, 40 NAT'L
TAX J. 339 (1987).
136.
Haroldene F. Wunder & Stephen R. Crow, InternationalTax Reform Since
1986: An Update, 14 TAX NOTES INT'L 1163 (1997).
137.
Harry Grubert et al., Country and MultinationalCompany Responses to the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, 49 NAT'L TAX J. 341 (1996); Tanzi, supra note 135, at :339-40;
John Whalley, Foreign Responses to U.S. Tax Reform, in DO TAXES MATTER 286 (Joel
Slemrod ed., 1990).
138.
TREASURY REPORT ON SUBPART F, supra note 26, at ix-x; BRIAN J. ARNOLD,
THE

TAXATION

OF

CONTROLLED

FOREIGN

CORPORATIONS:

AN

INTERNATIONAL

COMPARISON 3 (Can. Tax Found. Paper No. 78, 1986). The United States also taxes its
citizens on their worldwide income, whether they reside within or without the United
States. Treas. Reg. § 1.1-1(b) (2001).
139.
TREASURY REPORT ON SUBPART F, supra note 26, at 1-3.
140.
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., STUDIES IN TAXATION OF FOREIGN
SOURCE INCOME: CONTROLLED FOREIGN COMPANY LEGISLATION 10-12, 16 (1996)
[hereinafter OECD, CFC REPORT]; ARNOLD, supra note 138, at 5-6.
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greater the reduction that would be achieved in the U.S. tax
burden.141
To counter the potentially harmful effects of such deferral, the
United States enacted its "foreign personal holding company" regime
in 1937142 and its "controlled foreign corporation" regime, also
referred to as "Subpart F," in 1962.143 These regimes eliminate
deferral with respect to certain types of income earned through
foreign corporations that are closely-held by U.S. persons. 144 Both
regimes generally eliminate deferral with respect to passive income
such as interest, dividends, rents, and royalties. 145 Subpart F further
eliminates deferral with respect to income from mobile business
operations that are easily transferred to low- or no-tax
jurisdictions. 146 Following the example set by the United States, a
number of countries have taken steps to eliminate what they perceive
to be the abusive deferral of tax on income earned through controlled
foreign corporations; however, the details of such legislation vary
widely by country 147 Nonetheless, with the exception of the United
States, the countries that have enacted anti-deferral regimes have

considered-and

borrowed

from-the

extant

148
formulating their own responses to this problem.

regimes

when

141.
OECD, CFC REPORT, supranote 140, at 16; ARNOLD, supra note 138, at 6.
142.
Revenue Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-377, § 201, 50 Stat. 813, 818-24 (1937)
(currently codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 551-58 (2001)). For a description of the
events leading up to the enactment of the foreign personal holding company regime,
see TREASURY REPORT.ON SUBPART F, supra note 26, at 4-7.
143.
Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 12, 76 Stat. 960, 1006-31 (1962)
(currently codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 951-64 (2001)). For a description of the
events leading up to the enactment of Subpart F, see TREASURY REPORT ON SUBPART F,
supra note .26, at 8-9, 12-22.
144.
I.R.C. §§ 552, 957 (2001).
145.
I.R.C. §§ 552-53, 954(c) (2001).
146.
I.R.C. § 954(d), -(e) (2001). Note that neither regime is intended to
eliminate deferral with respect to most "active" business income. Deferral with respect
to active business income was retained for fear that its elimination would put U.S.
multinational corporations at a competitive disadvantage. TREASURY REPORT ON
SUBPART F, supra note 26, at 22; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, U.S. Notice 98-11 and the Logic
of Subpart F: A ComparativePerspective, 16 TAx NOTES INT'L 1797 (1998); Peroni et al.,
supra note 53, at 476-77.
147.

TREASURY REPORT ON SUBPART F, supra note 26, at 58-61; ARNOLD, supra

note 138, at 12, 127-31. Most recently, the U.S. Department of the Treasury put at
twenty the number of countries with such legislation, and it indicated that another
country has expressed its intention to enact such legislation. TREASURY REPORT ON
SUBPART F, supra note 26, at 58 n.10.

148.
RICHARD A. GORDON, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, TAx HAVENS AND THEIR USE
BY UNITED STATES TAXPAYERS: AN OVERVIEW 24-26 (1981); OECD, CFC REPORT, supra
note 140, at 21-29; ARNOLD, supra note 138, at 406; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Comment on
Shay and Summers: Selected International Aspects of Fundamental Tax Reform
Proposals, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1085, 1087 (1997).
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IV. THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK IN THEORY
With these refined concepts of tax coordination and tax
harmonization in mind, this Part explores the viability of adopting
tax coordination as a framework within which the U.S. international
tax regime might be reformed. The analysis below will proceed as
follows: In Subpart A, the appropriate method of tax coordination will
be determined. In Subpart B, the manner in which the proposed
framework is expected to operate in theory will be detailed. Finally,
in Subpart C, the costs and benefits of the proposed framework will
be considered.
A. The AppropriateMethod of Coordination
Before delving into a discussion of the appropriate method of
coordination to be used as a basis for the framework, it is necessary to
make a distinction' between "levels" and "methods" of tax
coordination. As described above, tax coordination may be thought of
as a continuum, with unfettered tax competition at one extreme and
complete tax harmonization at the other. 149
This continuum
conceptualizes the many possible "levels" of tax coordination, which
range from little or no coordination to a high degree of coordination
and include the infinite number of gradations that lie in between.
Concerted and spontaneous tax coordination, on the other hand, are
"methods," and not levels, of coordination. In the case of concerted
tax coordination, the desired level of coordination is achieved through
bilateral or multilateral action. In the case of spontaneous tax
coordination, the desired level of coordination is achieved through
unilateral action. Consequently, insofar as the appropriate "method"
of coordination is concerned, the choice must be made between
concerted and spontaneous tax coordination-neither unfettered tax
competition nor complete tax harmonization is a possible choice
because they are each levels, and not methods, of coordination.
Of these two possible methods of coordination, spontaneous tax
coordination proves the more appropriate for adoption as a basis for
the framework. All that is required to reform the U.S. international
tax regime is the enactment of legislation that either eliminates,
modifies, or augments existing international tax rules. As a result,
only methods of coordination that involve unilateral action on the
part of the United States will be congruent with the task of reforming
the U.S. international tax regime. For this 'reason, concerted tax
coordination, which presupposes action by the United States in
concert with one or more other nations, may be eliminated from

149.

See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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consideration. 150 In contrast, spontaneous tax coordination, which
presupposes only unilateral action on the part of the United States, is
congruent with the task of reforming the U.S. international tax
regime.
Of the three types of spontaneous tax coordination described
above, STC/Comparative Law is best suited for adoption as a basis for
the framework. Neither STC/Coincidence nor STC/Tax Competition
is particularly well-suited to this task-STC/Coincidence because it
relies on happenstance to achieve coordination, and STC/Tax
Competition because, like concerted tax coordination, it presupposes
action not only on the part of the United States but also on the part of
STC/Comparative Law proves to be the most
other countries.
appropriate method of coordination because it involves only unilateral
action on the part of the United States in reviewing and evaluating
the international tax rules adopted by other countries.
B. The ProposedFramework in Operation
Having determined that STC/Comparative Law is the most
appropriate method of coordination for use as a basis for the
framework, the manner in which STC/Comparative Law is expected
to operate in theory will now be detailed. In a departure from current
legislative practice, STC/Comparative Law would require U.S.
policymakers to make a conscious, unilateral effort to ascertain the
international tax rules in force in other countries and then to
compare and contrast those rules in order to determine the most
suitable rule for enactment by the United States. For some time now,
other countries have employed such a comparative analysis in the
formation of their tax legislation. 15 1 The United States, which
generally views itself as a leader rather than a follower in
international tax matters, 152 has not, however, devoted much
attention to foreign tax systems when developing its domestic tax

150.
It is also worth noting that the United States already engages in concerted
tax coordination through the negotiation and renegotiation of bilateral income tax
treaties. The United States' success in its efforts at concerted tax coordination have,
however, been undermined by Congress, which has with increasing frequency been
enacting legislation that is intended to override inconsistent provisions in bilateral
income tax treaties. See Infanti, supra note 79, at 681-83.
151.
See, e.g., text accompanying notes 138-148; DALE, supra note 107, at 23.
Avi-Yonah, Proposalfor Simplification, supra note 11, at 1352; Ross, supra
152.
note 17.
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laws. 153 Moreover, at the academic level, comparative tax law has
154
been "slighted" by U.S. scholars.
Because comparative analysis lies at the heart of the proposed
framework but has been neglected by U.S. tax academics and
policymakers, a brief discussion of the comparative method will be
necessary before proceeding further. Comparative law scholars have
found it difficult precisely to define the methodology of comparative
analysis; 155 indeed, many scholars have simply avoided addressing
the question at all. 1 56 Nevertheless, "[t]he closest attempt by a
recognised text at providing some guidance on method remains that
of Zweigert and K6tz."'1 57 Professors Zweigert and K6tz "advocate a

153.
See Charles I. Kingson, The Coherence of International Taxation, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 1151 (1981) (arguing that U.S. international tax policy has not
sufficiently taken into account other countries' reactions to its tax laws).
Michael A. Livingston, Reinventing Tax Scholarship: Lawyers, Economists,
154.
and the Role of the Legal Academy, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 365, 426 (1998) ("Comparative
law is slighted by American scholars, receiving less attention than in European or
other smaller countries. Comparative tax is no exception: legal scholars only rarely
discuss foreign precedents in addressing domestic tax issues."). But see HUGH J. AULT
ET AL., COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS (1997);
CHRISTOPHER H. HANNA, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAX DEFERRAL: THE UNITED STATES
AND JAPAN (2000); COMPARATIVE TAX SYSTEMS: EUROPE, CANADA, AND JAPAN (Joseph
A. Pechman ed., 1987); William B. Barker, A Comparative Approach to Income Tax
Law in the United Kingdom and the United States, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 7 (1996);
Ernest R. Larkins, Double Tax Relief for Foreign Income: A Comparative Study of
Advanced Economies, 21 VA. TAX REV. 233 (2001); Ann F. Thomas, Square Wheels: U.S.
Pass-ThroughTaxation of Privately Held Enterprisesin a ComparativeLaw Context, 17
N.Y.L.SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 429 (1997).
See, e.g., Hiram E. Chodosh, Comparing Comparisons: In Search of
155.
Methodology, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1025, 1030 (1999) ("comparative legal studies has not
explained adequately what the comparative method is or should be"); John Henry
Merryman, Comparative Law Scholarship, 21 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 771,
771 (1998) ("Most comparative lawyers know that their field enjoys, or endures, what
generous observers might praise as a healthy scholarly pluralism but more
knowledgeable people decry as the sort of scholarly confusion that results from a
paradigm crisis."); John C. Reitz, How to Do ComparativeLaw, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 617,
617-18 (1998) (asserting that, while there is no "official canon of great works for
writing in the field to emulate," there is "really a large degree of consensus about the
essentials of the comparative method"); Annelise Riles, Wigmore's Treasure Box:
Comparative Law in the Era of Information, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 221, 224 (1999) ("a
collective crisis of methodological confidence is something of a defining genre of
comparative legal scholarship").
156.
Chodosh, supranote 155, at 1044-57.
157.
PETER DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 233 (1999). See
also Vivian Grosswald Curran, Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in U.S.
ComparativeLaw, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 43, 66 (1998) (indicating that Professors Zweigert
and Kitz's book on comparative law is "much used in the United States"); Ahmed A.
White, Max Weber and the Uncertainties of Categorical Comparative Law, in
RETHINKING THE MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 40, 54 (Annelise Riles ed., 2001)
(describing Professors Zweigert and Kotz's book on comparative law as "the main
introductory treatise in the field").
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functionalist perspective for comparative legal studies":15 8 "The basic
methodological principle of all comparative law is that of
functionality. From this basic principle stem all the other rules which
determine the choice of laws to compare, the scope of the
undertaking, the creation of a system of comparative law, and so
on." 159 Viewing comparative law from this functionalist perspective,
Professors Zweigert and K6tz have broken down the comparative
method of analysis into a series of five steps.
160
First, the comparatist must identify the problem to be studied.
Professors Zweigert and Kotz remind us that "[i]ncomparables cannot
usefully be compared, and in law the only things which are
comparable are those which fulfil the same function."'1 61 Thus, the
problem to be studied "must be posed in purely functional terms ...
1 62
without any reference to the concepts of one's own legal system."'
Second, the comparatist must choose the legal systems to be
compared. 163 Which legal systems are ultimately chosen will depend
in large part on the problem to be studied. 16 4 Illustrating the
sensitivity of the choice of legal systems to the problem to be studied,
Professors Zweigert and Kotz have indicated that the comparatist
may generally limit herself to the parent systems of the great legal
families 165 if she is to compare only the style of different families of
law; may follow the rule of thumb of studying only the significant
legal systems in certain legal families 166 if she isto study a "classical"

Curran, supra note 157, at 66.
158.
159.
KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN K6TZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 34
(Tony Weir trans., 3d rev. ed. 1998).
160.
Id.
161.
Id.
162.
Id.
Id. at 40-41.
163.
Id. at 41.
164.
'The notion of the legal family has served as the organisational linchpin for
165.
the analysis of legal systems of the world." DE CRUZ, supra note 157, at 26. A variety
of criteria have been proposed by comparative law scholars for dividing the legal
systems of the world into different families, leading to a number of different groupings.
Id. at 34, 36; ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 159, at 63-65. Professors Zweigert and
Kotz have divided the legal systems of the world into five families: (i) Romanistic, (ii)
Germanic, (iii) Nordic, (iv) Common Law, and (v) others (e.g., People's Republic of
China, Japan, Islamic Law, and Hindu Law). ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 159, at 73.
The division of legal systems into legal families may not be the same for all areas of the
law; "[flor example, it is quite possible that a system is to be put in one family for
private law purposes, and in another for purposes of constitutional law." Id. at 65.
Bearing this in mind, the income tax laws of the world have been divided into eight
families: (i) British, (ii) French, (iii) American, (iv) Latin American, (v) transition
countries (i.e., former socialist countries), (vi) Northern European, (vii) Southern
European, and (viii) miscellaneous (e.g., Iran, Japan, and Korea). 2 TAX LAW DESIGN
AND DRAFTING, at xxiv (Victor Thuronyi ed., 1998).
For example, Professors Zweigert and Kotz suggest the U.S. and English
166.
legal systems in the common law family, the French and Italian legal systems in the
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problem of private law; and may need to include smaller countries
where the problem she is to study is not a "classical" one, but rather
is a "quite topical [one] with which legislators and judges all over the
167
world are currently grappling."'
Third, the comparatist must prepare a separate report describing
the relevant laws of each of the legal systems chosen for study. 168
These reports should delve as deeply as possible into the chosen legal
systems, and should take into account the cultural, economic, and
legal context of each of the systems. 169 The reports should also be
"objective, that is, free from any critical evaluation, though containing
170
all significant qualifications or modifications.'
Fourth, the comparatist must compare and contrast the legal
systems chosen for study in an effort to identify similarities among
and differences between them. 171 To compare and contrast the
solutions described in the separate reports prepared in step three,
each legal system's solution to the problem being studied must be
freed from its conceptual context and reduced to "its functional form,"
so that it can "be seen purely in the light of [its] function, as an
1 72
attempt to satisfy a particular legal need."'
Finally, the comparatist must critically evaluate what she has
discovered through her comparisons. 173 This evaluation may result
in the conclusion that one of the approaches to the problem is clearly
better than the others, or the comparatist "may be able to fashion a
new solution, superior to all others, out of parts of the different
national solutions.' 74
Professors Zweigert and Kotz believe that this functionalist
approach to comparative analysis will generally lead to the conclusion
that different legal systems approach the same problems in the same
or similar ways:
But if we leave aside the topics which are heavily impressed by moral
views or values, mainly to be found in family law and in the law of
succession, and concentrate on those parts of private law which are
relatively 'unpolitical', we find that as a general rule developed nations
answer the needs of legal business in the same or in a very similar
way.

1 75

Romanistic family, and Germany and Switzerland in the Germanic family. ZWEIGERT
& KOTZ, supra note 159, at 41.

167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

171.

Id.

172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

42.
43.
36, 40.
43.

at 43-44.
at 46-47.
at 47.
at 40.
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Based on this belief, Professors Zweigert and Kbtz assert that the
"point of departure for the comparative enterprise [is] a 'praesumptio
similitudinis,' which they define as 'a presumption that the practical
results are similar.""' 176 Professors Zweigert and Kdtz further assert
that the presumed similarity among legal systems can be used as a
177
means of confirming the validity of the comparative analysis:
[A]t the end of the study the same presumption acts as. a means of
checking our results: the comparatist can rest content if his researches
through all the relevant material lead to the conclusion that the
systems he has compared reach the same or similar practical results,
but if he finds that there are great differences or indeed diametrically
opposite results, he should be warned and go back to check again
whether the terms in which he posed his original question were indeed
purely functional, and whether he has spread the net of his researches
1 78
quite wide enough.

The functionalist approach to comparative analysis has been
criticized by commentators on the ground that it focuses on the law as
a set of rules and fails initially to place the law in its wider cultural
context. 179 This criticism rings particularly true in the area of

Curran, supra note 157, at 67.
176.
177.
Id.
178.
'ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 159, at 40.
179.
See Curran, supra note 157, at 51-54; Ginter Frankenberg, Critical
Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 HARv. INT'L L.J. 411, 434-40 (1985);
Mark Van Hoecke & Mark Warrington, Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal
Doctrine: Towards a New Model for ComparativeLaw, 47 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 495, 49596 (1998). See also William Ewald, ComparativeJurisprudence(I): What Was It Like to
Try a Rat?, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1889, 1894-98 (1995) (arguing that "the primary object of
study for comparative law should be the philosophical principles that lie behind the
surface of the rules" rather than a merely textualist or contextualist study of the rules
themselves); Merryman, supra note 155, at 775-84 (predicting that much future
academic scholarship in comparative law will be rule-based, but also predicting that
"the opportunities for resuscitation of academic comparative law scholarship lie in the
humanistic and/or scientific study of legal systems and their components and related
social-legal conversion questions"); Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic
Approach to Comparative Law (pt. 1), 39 AM. J. COMP.L. 1, 21-34 (1991) (arguing that
attempting to identify "the" legal rule in a country as a first step in comparative
analysis is a "misleading simplification" because the "living law contains many
different elements such as statutory rules, the formulations of scholars, and the
decisions of judges," which may, in fact, conflict).
In practice, Professors Zweigert and Kitz do, in fact, place the legal rules in a wider
context. See Joachim Zekoll, Kant and Comparative Law - Some Reflections on a
Reform Effort, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2719, 2747-49 (1996). See also Curran, supra note 157,
at 53.
If the current generation has begun to feel obliged to articulate the necessity of
a contextual or cultural immersion approach to comparative legal analysis, it is
not because such a methodology would be an innovation. On the contrary, it is
because the generation of 6migr6 comparatists is retiring and dying, leaving
comparative law in the United States to be taught by stop-gap, short-term
visiting professors from abroad or by native-born American professors generally
bereft of effective foreign-language skills. The scope of native-born American
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taxation. As mentioned above, a country's approach to taxation often
18 0
reflects its unique political, social, and economic structures.
Bearing this criticism in mind, the comparative analysis in this
Article will not adhere to Professors Zweigert and Kdtz's rigid
functionalist approach. Instead, the comparative analysis of the tax
treatment of cross-border charitable contributions, which is
undertaken in Part V of this Article, will consist of three general
phases: (i) a descriptive phase, (ii) an identification phase, and (iii) an
The descriptive phase will consist of a
explanatory phase.18 '
description of the relevant legal rules in their historical and cultural
context. The identification phase will consist of an identification of
similarities among and differences between the approaches adopted
by the countries included in the study. Finally, the explanatory
phase will take into account these similarities and differences in
attempting to formulate a proposal for reforming the U.S. tax rules
governing the treatment of cross-border charitable contributions.
Professors Zweigert and Kdtz's functionalist approach has also
been criticized on the ground that it "privilege[s] findings of sameness
This
and underestimate[s] the significance of differences." 18 2
criticism also rings true in the area of taxation. Tax policy is
determined by balancing a number of conflicting considerations,
many of which themselves embrace a number of competing
viewpoints. As changes occur in the political, social, and economic
landscape of the country, the considerations that tip the balance in
favor of one tax rule or another often can fluctuate. The inherently
undulating nature of tax policy militates strongly against the
conclusion that there are absolute tax rules that may be ascertained
simply by comparing the systems of different countries. Bearing this
criticism in mind, STC/Comparative Law will not be employed as a
vehicle for achieving tax harmonization. Such a high degree of

comparatists' cultural, literary, historical, social and political knowledge of civil
law systems generally pales in comparison with the vast background of the
classically educated European 6nigr6s [sic] who, to borrow a phrase George
Steiner once used in tribute to Robert Musil, so often seemed to carry all of
Western civilization in their minds.

Id.
See supranote 107 and accompanying text.
180.
See generally W.J. Kamba, ComparativeLaw: A Theoretical Framework, 23
181.
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 485, 511-12 (1974); DE CRUZ, supra note 157, at 233 ( "many
comparatists have written copiously on what a proper comparative method should
consist of, but, of the published literature, only Kamba has actually suggested some
'objective' practical comparative techniques, in the sense that they make no
assumptions as to ideology, culture or political persuasion").
Curran, supra note 157, at 53. See also Frankenberg, supra note 179, at
182.
436-38. Professor Curran interestingly hypothesizes that this search for similarities
(and the concomitant discounting of differences) has its roots in the Nazis' use of law as
a tool for legitimizing exclusion and discrimination. Curran, supra note 157, at 66-78.
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coordination would only be a suitable goal if comparative law could be
expected to produce a single set of invariably correct international tax
rules. Instead, STC/Comparative Law will serve as no more than a
framework for reforming the U.S. international tax regime.
By
reforming the regime within the confines of a framework constructed
with the aid of comparative analysis, a measure of coordination, and,
in turn, simplification, should be a realistically attainable goal.
With this revised comparative analysis as a starting point, the
path to reform is relatively straightforward. Comparative analysis
will first aid policymakers in identifying the rules currently in place
in other countries -along with any trends in the rules being adopted
or abandoned by them. In this regard, comparative analysis will
provide a much richer range of model solutions than a legal science
devoted to a single nation, simply because the different systems of the
world can offer a greater variety of solutions than could be thought up
in a lifetime by even the most imaginative jurist who was corralled in
1 88
his own system.
Policymakers will then be able to compare and contrast these rules to
determine which, if any, is superior to the others.
Finally,
policymakers will be able to determine whether, in light of all of the
considerations that normally inform U.S. international tax policymaking, the superior rule, an amalgamation of existing rules, or a
different rule is the most "appropriate" rule for enactment by the
United States. 184 The degree of coordination ultimately achieved by
employing this framework will depend on how closely this
"appropriate" rule approximates the rules in place in other countries.
The broad definition of "coordination" articulated above-which
embraces any adaptation of one tax system to another-will imbue
the framework with a great deal of flexibility and allow policymakers
to vary the desired level of coordination as necessary to accommodate
18 5
domestic political, economic, and social norms.
C. Assessing the Proposed Framework
Having explained the manner in which the proposed framework
is expected to operate in theory, an analysis of the costs and benefits

183.
ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 159, at 15.
184.
See Reitz, supra note 155, at 624-25 ("Thus comparative studies may
uncover interesting ideas for domestic law reform, but in the end the case'for adoption
of a foreign model cannot rest on the fact that many other countries have the rule or
legal institution. The argument for domestic law reform has to be made in terms of
normative claims acceptable within the domestic legal system, and probably the foreign
transplant will have to be modified in significant ways precisely because each legal
system reflects an at least partially unique legal system.").
185. ' Cf. Graetz, supra note 3, at 311-12 (summarily rejecting coordination as a
guide for the formation of U.S. international tax policy, except where it happens to
coincide with national interests).
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of its adoption will now be undertaken. The analysis will proceed as
follows: first, viewing the proposed framework from a legal
perspective, its anticipated benefits will be inferred from the U.S.
domestic experience in coordinating state commercial laws through
the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code; then, shifting from a
legal to an economic perspective, its anticipated costs will be inferred
from the longstanding debate among public-finance economists over
the relative merits of tax competition and tax coordination.
1. Benefits: The Legal Perspective
Because the United States has yet to experiment with
spontaneous coordination in formulating its international tax policy,
an analogous Situation must be adduced from which the benefits of
adopting the proposed framework may be inferred. A convenient
analogy exists here in the United States, where the several states
have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in an effort to
coordinate their commercial laws. Despite having occurred at the
domestic rather than the international level, the adoption of the UCC
is actually closely analogous to the adoption of STC/Comparative Law
as a framework for reform, both in terms of the manner in which the
laws being coordinated are normally adopted and in terms of the level
of coordination sought.
Due to the fact that most nations jealously guard their fiscal
sovereignty, 8 6 international tax rules are adopted at the individual
state level.
There are no supranational bodies governing
international tax matters, and the only constraints on the ability of a
state to develop or alter its international tax rules are self-imposed,
taking the form of treaty obligations.
In the United States,
commercial law has also historically been developed at the state
level.1 8 7 Furthermore, absent federal preemption, each state is a
sovereign entity that is free to adopt its own set of commercial

186.
See Cockfield, supra note 84, at 50; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND TAX
ADMINISTRATIONS T 4.35 at IV-12 (1995) (stating that the "non-mandatory nature" of
corresponding adjustments between nations in transfer pricing disputes "is important
to maintaining the fiscal sovereignty of each OECD Member country"); COMM. ON
FISCAL AFFAIRS, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., TRANSFER PRICING AND
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: THREE TAXATION ISSUES
115(c) (1984), available at
LEXIS 86 TNI 7-19 (rejecting compulsory arbitration in transfer pricing disputes
between nations on the ground that it "would represent an unacceptable surrender of
fiscal sovereignty").
187.
David M. Phillips, Secured Credit and Bankruptcy: A Call for the
Federalizationof Personal Property Security Law, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 67
(1987); Norman Silber, Why the U.C.C. Should Not Subordinate Itself to Federal
Authority: Imperfect Uniformity, Improper Delegation and Revised Section 3-102(c), 55
U. PITT. L. REV. 442, 443 (1994).
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laws. 188 Thus, the U.S. domestic commercial law context is rather
similar to the international tax context. In both cases, most laws are
formulated at the level of the individual state, and each state has
generally been unrestrained in its ability to adopt laws that differ
from those of other states.
The level of coordination achieved through the adoption of the
UCC is also similar to the level of coordination that may be achieved
through the adoption of the proposed framework. The UCC, which
was the product of drafting by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law
Institute-with input from bar associations, law firms, business
concerns, and various states' 8 9-has been adopted by all fifty U.S.
states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands. 190 The UCC has "standardiz[ed] and streamlin[ed] the
process by which commercial parties negotiate, conclude, and enforce
contracts," but has by no means resulted in the adoption of a
completely uniform set of commercial laws. Indeed, the UCC itself
contains alternative formulations of certain rules from which states
can choose. In addition, the UCC has been the subject of local
variation, sometimes referred to as "nonuniform" amendment, by the
adopting states. 191 This flexible approach to "uniformity" is closer to
the notion of spontaneous tax coordination examined in this Article
than the title of the UCC would suggest.
Given the similarities between the UCC and spontaneous tax
coordination, one might expect that the benefits that have flowed
from the adoption of the UCC will also flow from the adoption of the
proposed framework. The adoption of uniform laws in general, and
the UCC in particular, is said to produce a number of benefits,
including the following:
*

Increased certainty with regard to the legal treatment accorded to
a transaction that involves more than one state;

*

Simplification of transactions;

*

Reduction of transaction costs and delays;

*

Promotion of economic development by enabling business to be
conducted across state lines in the framework of familiar and
uniform laws; and

188.
Phillips, supra note 187, at 64.
189.
Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code:
1940-49, 51 SMU L. REV. 275, 277 (1998); Charles W. Mooney, Introduction to the
Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey: Some Observations on the Past, Present,
and Future of the U.C.C., 41 Bus. LAw. 1343, 1344-45 (1986).
190.
Fred H. Miller, Modernizing the UCC for the New Millennium: Introduction
to a Collection on the New UCC, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 189, 190 n.2 (2000).
191.
George A. Hisert, Uniform Commercial Code: Does One Size Fit All?, 28
LOy. L.A. L. REV. 219, 220-24 (1994); Phillips, supra note 187, at 62-63.
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Assisting individuals who regularly travel and move from one state
to another and enter into family transactions or own property
192
across state lines.

Similar benefits have been cited in discussions of concerted
193
coordination at the international level in the areas of taxation,
1 95
194
and intellectual property rights.
commerce,

192.
Daniel A. Gecker & Kevin R. Huennekens, Waiving Goodbye to the UCC: A
Proposalto Restrict the Continuing Erosionof Rights Under an Imperfect Code, 28 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 175, 175 (1994); Hisert, supra note 191, at 219; Frederick H. Miller et al.,
Introduction to Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey: The Centennial of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 46 BUS. LAW. 1449,
1451 (1991).
193.
See Tax Treaties: Hearing on Various Tax Treaties Before the S. Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 97th Cong. 7-8 (1982) (statement of John E. Chapoton, Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury, Tax Policy) ("Among the major impediments to free capital
and technology flows are the rules of national tax systems and their interaction with
the systems of other countries. Tax treaties seek to eliminate, or at least mitigate, the
impact of these impediments."); S. EXEC. REP. NO. 87-11, app. at 25 (1961) (statement
of Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs), reprinted in 4
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES TAX CONVENTIONS at Canada 93B (Sidney I.
Roberts ed., 1993).
Estate tax treaties ... help to bring about adjustments in two tax systems in
such a way that movements of trade and investment between two countries
may be facilitated and that conflicts in tax policy are substantially reduced or
The elimination of double taxation in connection with the
eliminated ....
settlement in one country of estates in which nationals of another country have
interests contributes also toward greater international understanding by
removing a deterrent to the movement of individuals between countries.
Id.; COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., TAX TREATY
OVERRIDES
1 (1990), available at LEXIS 90 TNI 7-13 ("(tax treaties) are an essential
element in facilitating economic relations between States and encouraging flows of
capital and labor ... [tihey limit and regulate the taxing jurisdiction of the States
entering into them so as to ensure the orderly application of the domestic tax laws of
what are often quite different systems" (footnote omitted)). See also Tsilly Dagan, The
Tax Treaties Myth, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POLY 939, 983-86 (2000).
194.
Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in
International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 743, 743-48 (1999); Rod N.
Andreason, MCC-Marble Ceramic Center. The ParolEvidence Rule and Other Domestic
Law Under the Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods, 1999 BYU
L. REV. 351, 351 (1999); Robert Howse, The Labour Conventions Doctrine in an Era of
Global Interdependence: Rethinking the Constitutional Dimensions of Canada's
External Economic Relations, 16 CAN. BUS. L.J. 160, 178 (1990); Bradley J. Richards,
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Applicability of the United Nations
Convention, 69 IOWA L. REV. 209, 209 n.7 (1983).
Pauline Newman, On Global Patent Cooperation,8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
195.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 3, 8 (1997); Anthony D. Sabatelli & J.C. Rasser, Impediments to
Global Patent Law Harmonization,22 N. KY. L. REV. 579, 588-90, 594-96 (1995); Kevin
Cuenot, Perilous Potholes in the Path Toward Patent Law Harmonization, 11 J.L. &
POL'Y 101, 106 (1999); Vito J. DeBari, InternationalHarmonization of Patent Law: A
Proposed Solution to the United States'First-to-FileDebate, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 687,
692-93 (1993).
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In addition to producing direct benefits similar to those that
have flowed from the adoption of the UCC, the proposed framework
can be expected to produce collateral benefits. For example, a great
deal of attention has recently been focused on international tax
arbitrage, which occurs when taxpayers exploit the discontinuities
between national tax systems in order to minimize. the taxes paid to
one or more countries. 196 Since international tax arbitrage thrives on
external complexity, spontaneous tax coordination can be expected to
reduce the opportunities for arbitrage involving the United States
because it will diminish the level of external complexity in the U.S.
international tax regime. Spontaneous tax coordination may also
alleviate the impact of information asymmetries on less wealthy
taxpayers. Information asymmetry exists when some taxpayers have
better access to information than others. 197 As the level of complexity
of the U.S. international tax regime has risen, taxpayers have
increasingly found it necessary to seek the help of legal counsel when
making cross-border investments. 198 Wealthy taxpayers naturally

196.
See, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-220, at 573-74 (1997), reprinted in 1997
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1129, 1385-86 (addressing the exploitation of differences between the
U.S. and Canadian treatment of U.S. limited liability companies to reduce U.S. and
Canadian taxes under the income tax treaty concluded between the United States and
Canada); Treaty Guidance Regarding Payments with Respect to Domestic Reverse
Hybrid Entities, 66 Fed. Reg. 12,445 (proposed Feb. 27, 2001) (to be codified at Treas.
Reg. § 1.894-1) (addressing the exploitation of differences between the U.S. and foreign
characterization of entities to reduce U.S. and, possibly, foreign taxes); Notice 98-11,
1998-6 I.R.B. 18, withdrawn by Notice 98-35, 1998-27 I.R.B. 35 (addressing the
exploitation of differences between the U.S. and foreign characterization of entities to
reduce foreign tax without triggering current U.S. tax under Subpart F); Reuven S.
Avi-Yonah, Commentary, 53 TAX L. REV. 167 (2000); H. David Rosenbloom,
International Tax Arbitrage and the "InternationalTax System," 53 TAX L. REV. 137
(2000).
197.
John Azzi, Tax Law Design and Drafting (Vol. 2): Comparing Income Tax
Laws of the World, 18 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 196, 203 (2000). See also Fleming et al.,
supra note 27, at 315-16.
A more fundamental problem with this 'self-inflicted wound' analysis, however,
arises from its critical assumption that opportunities to earn foreign-source
business income are freely and equally available to all U.S. residents. This is
plainly not correct. There are barriers of distance, language, custom and
unfamiliar and complex legal regimes that exclude numerous U.S. residents
from the opportunity to earn foreign-source business income with anything
approaching the foreign income earning facility of other U.S. residents.
Id. For a survey of the economics literature on the effects of asymmetric information,
see John G. Riley, Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling, 39 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 432 (2001).
198.
Because this complexity stems from both internal and external sources, a
taxpayer will need to retain more than one (and possibly several) tax attorneys in
planning a cross-border transaction. The taxpayer will need to consult a domestic tax
attorney to address the problems created by the internal complexity of the U.S.
international tax regime, and then will need to have that domestic attorney consult
with tax attorneys in each of the foreign countries that has a contact with the

2002]

SPONTANEOUS TAX COORDINA TION

have had a competitive advantage over less wealthy taxpayers in
obtaining this help because they have "better access to expensive tax
advice." 199
By decreasing external complexity, spontaneous tax
coordination would reduce the need to seek such advice, and would
thereby contribute to a leveling of the playing field between wealthy
and less wealthy taxpayers when it comes to engaging in
international business transactions.
To gauge the anticipated benefits of the proposed framework
more precisely, however, its flexibility must be taken into account. As
described above, the term "tax coordination" embraces an infinite
number of degrees of adaptation between the extremes of unfettered
tax competition and complete tax harmonization. It can be expected
that the level of benefits produced by tax coordination will likewise
vary, and that the difference between the benefits that are produced
and the full measure of achievable benefits will be roughly
proportionate to the difference between the coordination that is
achieved and complete tax harmonization. In other words, it can be
expected that the full measure of the benefits of coordination will be
realized only if complete tax harmonization is achieved, and that to
the extent the level of coordination achieved falls short of complete
tax harmonization, the benefits attendant to coordination will be
proportionately diminished.
Even so, this anticipated correlation does not necessarily militate
in favor of pursuing complete tax harmonization and against
pursuing more modest tax coordination; in fact, by striving for less
than perfect uniformity in national tax laws, tax coordination may
arguably produce even greater benefits than complete tax
harmonization.
Returning to the example of the UCC, some
commentators have proposed federal codification of the UCC as a
means of achieving the full measure of the benefits described
above.2 00 Opponents of federal codification have countered that the

transaction in order to address the problems created by the regime's external
complexity.
199.
Azzi, supra note 197, at 203.
200.
See, e.g., Donald B. King, Major Problems with Article 2A: Unfairness,
"Cutting Off' Consumer Defenses, Unfiled Interests, and Uneven Adoption, 43 MERCER

L. REV. 869, 885 (1992); Phillips, supra note 187, at 53-54. See also William J.
Woodward, Jr., Private Legislation in the 'United States: How the Uniform Commercial
Code Becomes Law, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 451, 452 n.5 (1999) (containing a list of
contributions to this "long-running debate"). Along with nearly perfect uniformity,
these commentators have also cited in support of federal codification (i) the greater
authority of federal law, (ii) the ease with which federal law can be amended (as
compared to amending the law of fifty individual states, the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands each time significant changes are proposed to
the UCC), and (iii) the general impression that the UCC revision process is
undemocratic (because it is the captive of business interests). Phillips, supra note 187,
at 58-70; Woodward, supra, at 454, 465-66.
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benefits of uniformity are outweighed by its costs. 20 1 They view the
individual U.S. states as laboratories in which experiments in law
can be undertaken. 20 2 If an experiment is successful, then the results
If, on the other hand, the
can be replicated in other states.
experiment is unsuccessful, then the damage is limited to one state,
in lieu of being inflicted on all of them, as would be the case if the
experimentation occurred at the federal level. In short, opponents of
federal codification of the UCC view less than perfect uniformity as a
benefit in itself. They believe that 'rough' uniformity has resulted in
greater efficiency without either eliminating the responsiveness of
the law to changing local conditions or diminishing the wellrecognized potential of the states as 'laboratories' in the federal
system." 20 3 From this vantage point, tax coordination may produce
greater benefits than complete tax harmonization.
To summarize, tax coordination can be expected to (i) simplify
transactions with multinational contacts, (ii) increase the certainty of
their legal treatment, and (iii) reduce the costs of undertaking them.
The effect of these benefits should be to facilitate, or, at the very
least, to reduce the tax impediments to, the cross-border flow of
capital and labor. Tax coordination can also be expected to produce
collateral benefits by reducing opportunities for international tax
arbitrage and by ameliorating the negative effects of information
asymmetries between taxpayers. Even the choice to pursue tax
coordination rather than complete tax harmonization may be viewed
as a benefit, because allowing for diversity among national tax
systems will leave the way open to experimentation in international
tax rules. Such experimentation will ultimately redound to the
benefit of all countries that adopt a comparative approach to
formulating domestic tax legislation.

Silber, supra note 187, at 456-57; Hisert, supra note 191, at 231-32;
201.
Giuseppe Tucci, The Adequacy and Efficiency of American Commercial Law, 29 LoY.
L.A. L. REV. 1137, 1137-38 (1996). They have also countered the additional arguments
mentioned in note 200. See Neil B. Cohen & Barry L. Zaretsky, Drafting Commercial
Law for the New Millennium: Will the Current Process Suffice?, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
551, 557-62 (1993) (assessing the alleged benefits of federal codification of the UCC and
concluding that it is unclear that federal codification would be preferable to the current
process); Fred H. Miller, The Future of Uniform State Legislation in the Private Law
Area, 79 MINN. L. REV. 861, 861-69 (1995) (making the case for uniform legislation at
the state level, and arguing that Congress is not up to the task of drafting legislation
similar to the UCC); Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of
Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 133, 187 (containing an economic analysis
of uniform state laws, and concluding that "a more drastic federalization of the law in
order to achieve efficient uniformity would be both unnecessary and perverse" and
that, "[a]t best, federal law would not create more efficient laws, but simply a different
set of winners and losers").
Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 201, at 140-41; Silber, supra note 187, at
202.
456.
203.
Silber, supra note 187, at 456. See also Hisert, supra note 191, at 219.
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2. Costs: The Economic Perspective
Thus, viewing the matter from a legal perspective, there are a
number of benefits that may be associated with engaging in
spontaneous coordination. In the context of the UCC, these benefits
are thought to be of such importance that lawyers generally do not
debate the question whether to coordinate, but rather the desirable
degree of coordination. 20 4 When shifting from a legal to an economic
perspective, however, the terms of the debate change. As mentioned
earlier, public-finance economists have for some time debated not the
appropriate degree of tax coordination, but rather the propriety of
engaging in any tax coordination at all. 205 Accordingly, in contrast to
lawyers and legal academics, public-finance economists have focused
more of their energy on analyzing the costs associated with engaging
in tax coordination than on its benefits.
Contributions to this economic debate can be separated into the
following two opposing groups: the Tiebout literature and the tax
competition literature.20 6 In the Tiebout literature, tax competition is
considered to be welfare-enhancing and, therefore, beneficial, while
tax coordination, which dampens tax competition, is considered to be
harmful. In the tax competition literature, the model underlying the
Tiebout literature is critically examined in an effort to reveal its
inherent efficiency problems, and some form of tax coordination is
normally advocated as a solution. For purposes of this Article, a
discussion of the Tiebout literature will be used to highlight the costs
associated with tax coordination, and a discussion of the tax
competition literature will serve as a vehicle for exploring whether
these costs outweigh the expected benefits of adopting
STC/Comparative Law as a framework for reform.
a. The Tiebout Literature
The assertion in the Tiebout literature that tax competition is
beneficial, and, conversely, that tax coordination is harmful, is based
on two underlying premises. The first premise is that government is

See, e.g., King, supra note 200, at 885 ("everyone agrees that commercial
204.
law ... should be uniform"); Phillips, supra note 187, at 64 ("Admittedly, the problem
of uniformity is largely a matter of degree. It is better to have a Uniform Commercial
Code, even with ... variations, operating in all fifty states, the District of Columbia,
and United States territories, than to have instead fifty-odd more disparate versions of
commercial law.").
205.
See supra note 85. As indicated in the discussion of tax coordination in
Part III.B. above, the alternative to tax coordination is a state of unfettered tax
competition.
John Douglas Wilson, Theories of Tax Competition, 52 NAT'L TAX J. 269,
206.
270-71 (1999).
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a "Leviathan. ' 20 7 A Leviathan government is one that is composed of
politicians and bureaucrats who wish to maximize the size of the
public sector because of their ability to benefit from the budget that
they control (by, for example, maintaining their employment, salary,
and perquisites). 208 The Leviathan model of government2 0is9 commonly
associated with Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan.
The second premise is that tax competition can restrain the
growth of a Leviathan government. This premise is derived from the
economic model set forth in Charles Tiebout's seminal article, A Pure
Theory of Local Expenditures.210 In this Article, Tiebout took issue
with the notion that "a rather large portion of our national income [is]
allocated in a 'non-optimal' way when compared with the private
sector" because "no 'market type' solution exists to determine the
level of expenditures on public goods."2 11 Tiebout theorized that, at
the local level, a market for public goods would be created if: (i) people
are fully mobile; (ii) a large number of communities offer different,
fixed packages of public services at different prices (i.e., levels of
taxation) from which people can choose; and (iii) ' people are fully
2 12
aware of the differences between these tax and service packages.
Under these circumstances, individuals would effectively be able. to
shop the market and relocate to the community that offers the tax
and service package that most closely suits their respective

207.
See Charles E. McLure, Tax Competition: Is What's Good for the Private
Goose Also Good for the Public Gander?, 39 NAT'L TAX J. 341, 345 (1986); Wilson, supra
note 206, at 296-97.
208.
McLure, supra note 207, at 345; Wilson, supra note 206, at 296-97.
See GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX:
209.
ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION 1-33 (1980). See also Avi-Yonah,
supra note 82, at 1614 n.181; McLure, supra note 207, at 346 n.2.
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON.
210.
416 (1956).
211.
Id. at 416.
Id. at 418. Tiebout also assumes that the public services provided by each
212.
of the local governments result in no externalities (i.e., they have neither positive nor
negative spillover effects on other communities). Id. at 419. An example of a negative
externality is water pollution that affects downstream communities. See Hans-Werner
Sinn, Comments on: L. Bovenberg, "InternationalCoordinationof Tax Policies," in THE
REALITY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY COORDINATION 147, 148 (H.J.
Blommestein ed., 1991). An example of a positive externality is locally-financed
medical research that seeks to remedy a problem common to all communities (e.g.,
cancer). See McLure, supra note 207, at 343.
Tiebout further assumes that local governments levy only non-distorting benefits
taxes. Tiebout, supra note 210, at 418-19. In the case of a benefits tax, the taxpayer is
charged an amount equal to the cost of providing the public goods that he has
consumed. WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 128 (1972). Benefits taxes are nondistorting because "Itihere is no way the consumer can avoid payment for the public
goods he consumes; he must pay directly the cost of the resources he absorbs in
consuming the local public good." Id. at 130. The taxpayer, therefore, has no incentive
for inefficient behavior, and the result is allocative efficiency. Id..
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preferences. 213 By "voting with their feet," people in a Tiebout world
would implicitly reveal their preferences for public goods, thereby
promoting the efficient allocation of resources. 2 14 Tiebout therefore
concluded that, for a "substantial portion of collective or public
goods," 2 15 there is in fact a conceptual solution to the problem of
developing a "decentralized pricing system to determine optimally...
2 16
levels of collective consumption.
The notion that tax competition can restrain the growth of a
Leviathan government is extrapolated from Tiebout's contention that
217
the public sector is not entirely different from the private sector.
In the private sector, economic welfare is expected to suffer whenever
competition is restrained-whether due to monopolistic practices,
collusion within oligopolies, or other causes. 218 Economic welfare
suffers because enterprises in non-competitive sectors feel no
pressure "to provide the goods and services that consumers want [or]
to produce them in the most efficient way, in order to minimize
19
Managers and employees in non-competitive sectors resist
costs." 2
attempts to. increase competition because they are often able to
appropriate to themselves a portion of the surplus that results when
competition is restrained.2 2 0 If, as Tiebout contends, the public sector
is not entirely different from the private sector, then it can be
expected that, absent competition from other governments, politicians
and bureaucrats in a Leviathan government will lack the incentive to
Instead, their
maximize the welfare of their constituents.2 21
incentive will be to maximize the size of the public sector for their
own personal benefit. Tax competition serves as a check on the
growth of a Leviathan government because it places downward
pressure on tax rates, which, in turn, leads to downward pressure on
governmental expendittres. 222 Politicians and bureaucrats are then
forced to rethink expenditure policies with an eye toward (i) achieving
greater efficiency by reducing costs and increasing productivity and

Tiebout, supra note 210, at 418. The greater the number of local
213.
governments to choose from, the closer the individual would be able to get to his own
set of tax and service preferences. Id. .
214.
OATES, supra note 212, at 127.
215.
Tiebout, supra note 210, at 424.
216.
Id. (quoting Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures, 36
REV. ECON. & STAT. 387, 388 (1954) (emphasis in original omitted)).
217.
Wilson, supra note 206, at 298.
218.
McLure, supra note 207, at 344.
219.
Id.
220.
Id. at 344-45.
221.
Id. at 345.
Faria, supranote 89, at.229.
222.
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(ii) responding to the desires of their constituents rather than to their
223
own self-interest.
Consequently, the perceived benefit of tax competition is
increased efficiency-both in terms of the amount of taxes collected
and in terms of the allocation of that tax revenue among
governmental expenditures.
The idea that tax coordination is
harmful follows naturally from this view of tax competition. Tax
coordination has been likened to private sector "cartelization," which
is a form of restraint on competition. 224
By restraining tax
competition, tax coordination can be expected to cause economic
welfare to suffer because it will reduce the efficiency gains that may
be achieved under tax competition. Thus, from the perspective of the
Tiebout literature, the cost of adopting STC/Comparative Law as a
framework for reform would be inefficiency-both in terms of the
amount of taxes collected and in terms of the allocation of that tax
revenue among governmental expenditures.
b. The Tax Competition Literature
Because its contributors critically examine the conclusions
reached in the Tiebout literature, a discussion of the tax competition
literature is an apposite vehicle for exploring whether the anticipated
efficiency costs of adopting the proposed framework would actually
materialize and, if so, whether those costs would outweigh the
framework's potential benefits. At the outset, it is worth noting that
the contributors to the tax competition literature share a view of
government that is fundamentally different than the one shared by
contributors to the Tiebout literature.2 i 5
The first premise
underlying the assertion in the Tiebout literature that tax
competition is beneficial is that government is a Leviathan composed
of politicians and bureaucrats who wish to maximize the size of the
public sector at the expense of their constituents. 22 6 In contrast, the
economic models in the tax competition literature presuppose that
government is akin to a benevolent dictator that acts to maximize the
welfare of its residents. 227 Proceeding from this divergent view of
government, the tax competition literature critically examines the
assumptions underlying the conclusions reached in the Tiebout

223.
McLure, supra note 207, at 345. See also Bovenberg, supra note 85, at 14142; Faria, supra note 89, at 229.
224.
"Cartelization is a process whereby independent industrial enterprises form
a syndicate to secure a monopoly in a specific world market." Sijbren Cnossen, Tax
Harmonization Issues in the European Community, 8 AM. J. TAX POLY 259, 259 (1990).
225.
See TANZI, supra note 87, at 7.
226.
See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
227.
See, e.g., George R. Zodrow & Peter Mieszkowski, Pigou, Tiebout, Property
Taxation, and the Underprovisionof Local Public Goods, 19 J. URB. ECON. 356, 359
(1986).
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literature in "an attempt to understand the potential efficiency
problems associated with. competition for capital by local
governments." 228 Wallace Oates has articulated the problem as
follows:
The result of tax competition may well be a tendency toward less than
efficient levels of output of local public services. In an attempt to keep
tax rates low to attract business investment, local officials may hold
spending below those levels for which marginal benefits equal marginal
costs, particularly for those programs that do not offer direct benefits to
229
local business.

In the 1980s, economists began to build formal models to test
Oates' ideas.2 30 In an early paper, 23 ' George Zodrow and Peter
Mieszkowski formulated a basic tax competition model in which a
national economy is composed of a large number of identical
jurisdictions, with each resident owning an equal share of the land-a
fixed factor-and of the national capital stock-a mobile factor. In a
departure from the Tiebout model, which assumes that local
governments impose only non-distorting benefits taxes, 23 2 Zodrow
and Mieszkowski assumed that local public goods are financed either
by a non-distorting lump-sum head tax, a distorting tax on mobile
capital (in this case, a property tax), or some combination of the two.
Based on these assumptions, Zodrow and Mieszkowski concluded
that, if local jurisdictions choose to rely on distorting property taxes
rather than on Tieboutian benefits taxes, tax competition will create
efficiency problems in the form of an underprovision of public
goods. 233
Zodrow and Mieszkowski attribute these efficiency
problems to a "negative 'fiscal externality,"' namely the perception
that raising property taxes will drive mobile capital out of the
23 4
jurisdiction.
Other early contributions to the tax competition literature build
on this work. David Wildasin further developed the notion that "the
inefficiency associated with tax competition can be understood as a
kind of externality. '23 5 Like Zodrow and Mieszkowski, Wildasin
attributed tax competition's efficiency problems to the perception that

Wilson, supranote 206, at 269.
228.
229.
OATES, supra note 212, at 143. See DIETMAR WELLISCH, THEORY OF PUBLIC
FINANCE IN AFEDERAL STATE 18, n.12 (2000); Wilson, supra note 206, at 269.
230.
Wilson, supra note 206, at 273.
231.
See Zodrow & Mieszkowski, supra note 227.
232.
See supra note 212.
233.
Zodrow & Mieszkowski, supra note 227, at 368-69. See also John D.
Wilson, A Theory of Interregional Tax Competition, 19 J. URB. ECON. 296, 308-09 (1986)
(reaching a similar conclusion based on a more complicated model).
234.
Zodrow & Mieszkowski, supra note 227, at 369 n.8.
David E. Wildasin, InterjurisdictionalCapital Mobility: Fiscal Externality
235.
and a Corrective Subsidy, 25 J. URB. ECON. 193, 194 (1989).
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an increase in the tax rate in one jurisdiction will cause mobile
capital to flow out of that jurisdiction and into other, lower-tax
jurisdictions. 23 6 The result of such an outflow of mobile capital would
be an increase in the lower-tax jurisdictions' tax bases and, implicitly,
their tax revenues.23 7 Faced with this negative fiscal externality,
each jurisdiction has "an incentive to undertax capital, or,
equivalently, to underspend on local public goods. '238 Wildasin
suggested corrective subsidies, presumably to be2 39paid by a higher
level of government, as a remedy for this problem.
Sam Bucovetsky and John Douglas Wilson extended this
analysis to a situation in which a tax on immobile labor is also
available, relaxing the assumption in Zodrow and Mieszkowski's
basic tax competition model that public goods are financed with a tax
on mobile capital. 240 Yet, even relaxing this assumption, Bucovetsky
and Wilson still reach the conclusion that tax competition would
result in the underprovision of public goods. 24 1 They attribute this
inefficiency to a fiscal externality similar to the one attendant to a tax
on mobile capital: if a jurisdiction raises its tax rate on wage income,
its labor supply will decline; this decline in the labor supply will lead
to a decline in the jurisdiction's demand for capital; and this decline
in the demand for capital will make more capital available for other
jurisdictions and, ultimately, lead to a rise in their wages and labor
242
supplies.
To this day, academic interest and research in the area of tax
competition "continues unabated. '243 Despite the evolving nature of
the tax competition literature, it has become well-settled in this
literature that tax competition has the deleterious effect of driving
tax rates to the lowest common denominator, which results in the
undertaxation of mobile capital, the overtaxation of immobile labor,
and a general underprovision of public goods. 244 A possible solution
to this efficiency problem that has often been considered in the
literature "is for the tax authorities to engage in some kind of ...tax

Id. at 194.
236.
237.
Id.
238,
Id. at 196.
239.
Id. at 196-97.
240.
Sam Bucovetsky & John Douglas Wilson, Tax Competition with Two Tax
Instruments, 21 REGIONAL ScI. & URB. ECON. 333, 333 (1991).
241.
Id. at 334.
242.
Id. at 342-43. See also Wilson, supra note 206, at 283.
Wilson, supra note 206, at 269. See also Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal
243.
Competition or Harmonization? Some Reflections, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 507 (2001).
244.
See Clemens Fuest, The Political Economy of Tax Coordination as a
BargainingGame Between Bureaucrats and Politicians,103 PUB. CHOICE 357, 357-58
(2000); Bernd Huber, Tax Competition and Tax Coordinationin an Optimum Income
Tax Model, 71 J. PUB. ECON. 441, 441-42 (1999); Michael Keen & Maurice Marchand,
Fiscal Competition and the Pattern of Public Spending, 66 J. PUB. ECON. 33, 33-34
(1997).
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Because the conclusions reached in the tax
coordination. '245
competition literature about the relative costs and benefits of tax
competition and tax coordination are quite the opposite of those
reached in the Tiebout literature, they cast in doubt the notion that
the cost of engaging in tax coordination is reduced efficiency.
Notably, even contributors to the Tiebout literature have
acknowledged that the asserted benefits of tax competition may not
extend to the international setting. 246 Extending the conclusions of
the Tiebout literature beyond the domestic setting of a federal
government such as the United States proves problematic because
two of the key assumptions that underpin the Tiebout model do not
hold true in the international setting. First, although it may be
reasonable to assume that individuals are fully mobile "when it comes
to the choice among suburban local governments grouped around a
central place of employment," it is not quite so reasonable an
assumption in the international setting, where individual mobility is
247
much more limited due to immigration and emigration restrictions.
Similarly, although it may be reasonable to assume that sub-national
jurisdictions will impose only benefits taxes, it is not quite so
reasonable an assumption at the national level where "[t]axation in
line with ability to pay is called for and distributional considerations
248
cannot in practice be separated from the choice of public services."
c. The Middle Road
The diametrically opposed conclusions of the Tiebout and tax
competition literatures concerning the relative costs and benefits of
tax competition and tax coordination emanate, at least in part, from

245.

Bo SANDEMANN

RASMUSSEN,

PARTIAL VS. GLOBAL

COORDINATION

OF

CAPITAL INCOME TAX POLICIES 2 (Univ. of Aarhus, Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No.
2001-3, 2001). See, e.g., Roger H. Gordon, Can Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open
Economies?, 47 J. FIN. 1159 (1992); Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, International Tax
Competition and Gains from Tax Harmonization,37 ECON. LETTERS 69 (1991).
See, e.g., INFLUENCE OF TAX
246.
OF THE
PROCEEDINGS
COMPETITIVENESS:
(1990)
TAXATION
100-02
INTERNATIONAL

DIFFERENTIALS ON INTERNATIONAL
ON
MUNICH
SYMPOSIUM
VIIITH
TAX
INFLUENCE OF
[hereinafter

DIFFERENTIALS] (comments of Charles E. McLure, Jr.); Charles E. McLure, Jr.,
International Considerations in United States Tax Reform, in id. at 3, 20; Michael
Rauscher, Leviathan and Competition Among Jurisdictions: The Case of Benefit
Taxation, 44 J. URB. ECON. 59, 66 (1998).
247.
Peggy B. Musgrave & Richard A. Musgrave, Fiscal Coordination and
Competition in an International Setting, in INFLUENCE OF TAX DIFFERENTIALS, supra
note 246, at 61, 64 (critiquing the application of the Tiebout model to the international
context).
Id. See generally WELLISCH, supra note 229, at 20, 137-51.
248.
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their diametrically opposed views of government. 249 In the Tiebout
literature, government is presumed to be a Leviathan that wishes to
maximize the size of the public sector at the expense of its residents.
In the tax competition literature, government is presumed to be akin
to a benevolent dictator that wishes to maximize the welfare of its
residents. Jeremy Edwards and Michael Keen have characterized
these two viewpoints as "extreme cases of a more general-and

presumably more plausible-formulation in which policymakers
attach some value both to the welfare of their citizens and to the
surplus that they are able to extract from the citizenry and put to
'2 50
their own uses.
Using Zodrow and Mieszkowski's basic tax competition model,
Edwards and Keen have examined the relative costs and benefits of
tax competition and tax coordination where the policymakers in the
country are assumed to be "neither wholly benevolent nor wholly selfserving. '251 Edwards and Keen did not set out unambiguously to
resolve the conflict between the Tiebout and tax competition
literatures; instead, their objective was "to identify relatively welldefined conditions upon which, in particular circumstances, the
balance of truth between them turns. 2 52
Edwards and Keen
ultimately concluded that
the central issue can be reduced to the comparison between two
numbers for which commentators might reasonably be asked to produce
their best guesses. The first is the marginal excess burden of taxation
(deadweight loss per dollar of revenue, at the margin); the second is the
amount by which unproductive public expenditure would increase if the
policy-maker were given an additional dollar of lump-sum revenue.
Some degree of tax coordination is desirable if and only if the former
exceeds the latter (the efficiency gain then being sufficient to outweigh
2 53
the policy-maker's tendency to waste).

Hence, as one might expect when moving away from extremes, there
may be situations in which tax coordination will be desirable and
2 54
others in which tax competition will be desirable.

249.
See Oates, supra note 243, at 510 ("The basic point here is that whether or
not fiscal competition is a good thing depends in important ways on one's view of the
public sector ...").
250.
Jeremy Edwards & Michael Keen, Tax Competition and Leviathan, 40 EUR.
ECON. REV. 113, 115 (1996).
251.
Id. at 117.
252.
Id. at 130.
253.
Id. at 130-31 (citation omitted).
Notwithstanding the ambiguity of
Edwards and Keen's conclusion, Peter Birch Sorensen has indicated his belief that it is
"unlikely" that conditions will be such that unfettered tax competition will prove to be
desirable under this model. Peter Birch Sorensen, The Case for International Tax
CoordinationReconsidered, 15 ECON. POL'Y 431, 433 (2000).
254.
For a similarly ambiguous result, see Fuest, supra note 244, at 372-74,
where the Edwards and Keen model is refined by reconceptualizing government as
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Hewing to this more realistic middle road, several economists
have advocated engaging in coordination in an effort to minimize taxinduced distortions in economic decision-making, while, at the same
time, endeavoring to maintain the diversity of national tax systems to
the extent possible. 2 55
This middle road represents a practical
balancing of the costs and benefits of tax competition against those of
tax coordination, with the scales apparently tipping somewhat in
favor of tax coordination and away from tax competition. This
practical balance between tax competition and tax coordination is
entirely consistent with the description in this Article of the flexible
manner in which the proposed framework for reforming the U.S.
256
international tax regime is expected to operate in theory.

V. THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK IN PRACTICE
Having reviewed the operation of the proposed framework in
theory and considered its costs and benefits, it will now be useful to
consider the manner in which the proposed framework will operate in
practice. As mentioned at the outset of this Article, the application of
the proposed framework to the task of reforming the entire U.S.
international tax regime is well beyond the scope of this Article. For
this reason, a single, concrete example has been chosen for study
here: the tax treatment of contributions made by domestic taxpayers
to foreign non-governmental, nonprofit organizations that operate for
the public benefit (NGOs).
This area was chosen for study because it suffers from both the
excessive complexity and the failure to keep pace with a changing
economy that generally plague the U.S. international tax regime.
The U.S. rules governing the tax treatment of contributions made to
foreign NGOs have been described as "ancient and bizarre." 257 The
current rules date back to the 1930s, and they have not been changed
since that time. 258 While these rules have remained static, the U.S.
nonprofit sector 259 has grown dramatically. During the period from

being composed of politicians and bureaucrats with diverging interests (rather than as

being a monolithic entity).
255.
See, e.g., Cnossen, supra note 224, at 278-79; HUFBAUER, supra note 18, at
16-17, 39-46; Musgrave & Musgrave, supra note 247, at 71-76. See also supra note 108.
256.
See supra Part IV.B.
257.
Harvey P. Dale, Foreign Charities,48 TAX LAW. 655, 657 (1995).
258.
Id. at 659-61.
259.
The nonprofit sector is also sometimes referred to as the "voluntary,"
"independent," or "third" sector or as "civil society." See STEPHEN HASELER, THE
POLITICAL CULTURE OF GIVING: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 15 (Capital Research

Center, Studies in Philanthropy No. 10, 1991); Lester M. Salamon et al., Civil Society
in Comparative Perspective, in LESTER M. SALAMON ET AL., GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY:
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1975 through 1995 alone, the number of charitable organizations
filing information returns with the Internal Revenue Service more
than doubled, and the assets and revenues reported by those
organizations more than quadrupled-far outpacing real growth in
gross domestic product of only seventy-four percent during the same
26 0
period.

The U.S. rules governing the tax treatment of contributions
made to foreign NGOs also suffer from an onerous level of
complexity. 2 61 As described more fully below, these rules contain
geographic limitations of differing severity, with the level of severity
depending both on the nature of the donor-whether individual,
corporation, or estate or trust-and the tax that is being paid. In
addition, a taxpayer's total deduction for charitable contributions
may be subject to an overall limitation calculated as a percentage of
the taxpayer's income, with the applicable percentage depending on
the nature of the donor, the type of property being contributed, and
the tax that is being paid.
Using the proposed framework, this Part will develop a proposal
for reforming the rules governing the tax treatment of contributions
made by U.S. persons to foreign NGOs. Because comparative law lies
at the heart of the proposed framework, the comparative analysis
described in Part IV(B) will be used to develop this reform proposal.
This analysis will proceed in the following three phases: (i) the
descriptive phase, (ii) the identification phase, and (iii) the
explanatory phase.
In the descriptive phase, each country's rules governing the tax

treatment of contributions made by domestic taxpayers to foreign
NGOs will be described in their historical and cultural context. To
obtain a moderately global perspective, 262 at least one legal system

DIMENSIONS
SOCIETY].

OF THE NONPROFIT

SECTOR 3, 3 (1999)

[hereinafter

GLOBAL CIVIL

260.
Alicia Meckstroth & Paul Arnsberger, A 20- Year Review of the Nonprofit
Sector 1975-1995, STAT. INCOME BULL., Fall 1998, at 149, 151 fig. A, 153.
261.
See Dale, supra note 257, at 696 ("It is impossible to justify the incredible
complexity, inconsistency, and impenetrability of the relevant statutory, regulatory,
and other authorities bearing on foreign charities. There can be no reason - and there
is certainly no rhyme - to the current pattern.").
262.
2 TAx LAW DESIGN & DRAFTING, supra note 165, at xxv. Past attempts at
categorizing the legal systems of the world into distinct families have been criticized for
"trivializ[ing] the nuances and subtleties among legal families" and for "being largely
Euro-American centric." Ugo Mattei, Three Patternsof Law: Taxonomy and Change in
the World's Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 5, 10 (1997); White, supra note 157, at
55. See also P.G. Monateri, "Everybody's Talking": The Future of Comparative Law, 21
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 825, 839 (1998) ("the projects to draw a 'map' of legal
systems and to build a common core of European and Western law are really biased,
non-neutral political projects of governance supported by the use of the academic
discipline of comparative law"); Mathias Reimann, Stepping out of the European
Shadow: Why Comparative Law in the United States Must Develop Its Own Agenda, 46
AM. J. COMP. L. 637, 638-39 (1998) (generally describing the domination of Western
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from each of the eight families of income tax laws 263 has been chosen
for inclusion in this study. The countries included in the study,
grouped according to legal family, are: (i) the United States, (ii)
England and Wales, (iii) New Zealand, (iv) France, (v) Costa Rica, (vi)
the Czech Republic, (vii) the Netherlands, (viii) Spain, and (ix) Japan.
In the identification phase, the rules described in the descriptive
phase will be compared and contrasted in an effort to identify any
similarities among them and differences between them. If possible,
any trends in the adoption or abandonment of rules will also be
identified.
In the explanatory phase, the results of the analysis performed
in the identification phase will be employed as a framework for
developing an appropriate rule for enactment by the United Statesbearing in mind the considerations that normally influence the
formulation of U.S. international tax policy. In developing this
reform proposal, the potential of STC/Comparative Law both to
coordinate the U.S. rules with those of other countries and to
constrain the tendency of domestic tax policy considerations to
produce internal complexity will be analyzed.
A. Descriptive Phase
1. The United States
a. Development of the Nonprofit Sector
The nonprofit sector has a deep-rooted history in the United
States. The U.S. nonprofit sector dates back to "at least ...the early
1800s, when Alexis de Tocqueville declared it to be the major factor
explaining how America was able to avoid the dangers of tyranny and
barbarism despite its highly individualistic culture. '26 4 The early
diffusion of voluntary associations in the United States has been

European influence on U.S. comparative law).
Because the development of an
improved taxonomy for the income tax systems of the world is beyond the scope of this
Article, Victor Thuronyi's taxonomy has been adopted for purposes of this study. See
infra note 263.
263.
As mentioned above, the income tax laws of the world have been divided
into eight families: (i) American, (ii) British, (iii) French, (iv) Latin American, (v)
transition countries (i.e., former socialist countries), (vi) Northern European, (vii)
Southern European, and (viii) miscellaneous (e.g., Iran, Japan, and Korea). See supra
note 48. I have re-ordered the list so that it will match the order in which the
descriptions appear in the text below.
264.
Lester M. Salamon, The United States, in LESTER M. SALAMON & HELMUT
K. ANHEIER, DEFINING THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS 280, 280

(Johns Hopkins Nonprofit Sector Series No. 4, 1997) [hereinafter DEFINING THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR].
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attributed to a combination of the colonists' hostility to centralized
authority and to a spirit of individualism. 6 5 Voluntary associations
met the colonists' needs by providing them "a way to confront
common problems while still retaining a significant measure of
individual initiative." 266 During the mid- to late-nineteenth century,
a new set of common problems arose as immigrants began to arrive,
and voluntary associations were once again formed to help these
immigrants "acclimatize themselves to the American scene and cope
with the challenges of urbanization and industrialization that were
newly overtaking American life. '26 7 However, at the same time that
Americans were forming voluntary associations to confront common
problems, they were resisting the institutionalization of the nonprofit
sector by "denying [associations] corporate status and restricting
their ability to assemble self-perpetuating assets without a
corresponding guarantee of their 'public' character and dedication to
'26 8
public purposes.
It was not until the late nineteenth century that the concept of a
nonprofit sector distinct from the public sector emerged in the United
States. 269 During the period between the Civil War and the end of
World War I, the nonprofit sector shed its image as a mere
supplement to governmental action in meeting public needs and came
2 70
to be viewed as the "superior vehicle" for meeting those needs.
This so-called "myth" of voluntarism, which created expectations that
the nonprofit sector was unable to meet, was not broken until the
27 1
1930s when the New Deal social welfare programs were enacted.
With the advent of the war on poverty, the 1960s and 1970s
witnessed a return to the partnership between the public and
nonprofit sectors that had existed before the late nineteenth
century. 272
This renewed partnership was accompanied by a
dramatic expansion of the nonprofit sector. 273 By the late 1970s, the
nonprofit sector was "delivering a larger share of government2 74
financed human services than all levels of government combined,"
and public sector financial support "accounted for more than 30
percent of the overall operating revenue of nonprofit charitable
service agencies; and in some fields, such as social services, it reached
' 275
almost 50 percent.

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. at 282.

Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

285.
285-88.
286.
288.
288-89.
289.

Id.
Id. at 305.
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During the 1980s, the Reagan Administration "proposed to help
276
the nonprofit sector chiefly by getting government out of its way.
This policy shift resulted in a significant drop in federal financial
support for NGOs. 277 To make up for this drop in public sector
financial support, NGOs have increasingly turned to "commercial
sources for support, chiefly in the form of fees and charges for the
sector's services. '278 A 1995 survey of the U.S. nonprofit sector
indicates that service fees were the dominant source of revenue in
279
This
that year, accounting for 56.6% of all revenue in the sector.
percent
sixty-two
for
accounted
fees
service
that
survey also indicates
of the growth in nonprofit revenue from 1990 to 1995.280
Nevertheless, the pendulum may now be swinging back in the
direction of increased public sector support for NGOs. Since taking
office, the Bush Administration has focused on expanding the role of
religious NGOs in the provision of federally-financed social services,
and has made this "faith-based initiative" a "core element" of its
281
domestic agenda.
b. NGO Tax Relief
In the United States, the activities of a variety of organizations
are encouraged through a general exemption from the federal income
tax.282 Included in this rather eclectic list of exempt organizations
283
and
are corporations, community chests, funds (including trusts),
foundations that are organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational
purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports
284
competition, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals.
The term "charitable" in this list of exempt purposes is not limited in
its scope by the other more specific purposes, and it has been broadly
defined to include

Id.
276.
277.
Id. at 305-06.
Id. at 306.
278.
S. Wojciech Sokolowski & Lester M. Salamon, The United States, in
279.
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 259, at 261, 272.
Id. at 278.
280.
Amy Goldstein, Hailing Faith'sInfluence: Bush Urges End to Bias Against
281.
the Religious, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2001, at A2. See also Juliet Eilperin, Faith-Based
Initiative Wins House Approval, WASH. POST, July 20, 2001, at Al; Dana Milbank &
Thomas B. Edsall, Faith Initiative May Be Revised: Criticism Surprises
Administration,WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2001, at Al; Patti Mohr, Bush Renews Action on
Faith-BasedInitiative, 93 TAX NOTES 1131 (2001).
I.R.C. § 501(a) (2001) (incorporating by reference organizations listed in
282.
§§ 401(a) and 501(c)-(d)).
Fifth-Third Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 56 F.2d 767 (6th Cir. 1932).
283.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2001).
284.

1162

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 35"1105

[rielief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged;
advancement of religion; advancement of education or science; erection
or maintenance of public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening of
the burdens of Government; and promotion of social welfare by
organizations designed to accomplish any of the above purposes, or (i)
to lessen neighborhood tensions; (ii) to eliminate prejudice and
discrimination; (iii) to defend human and civil rights secured by law; or
28 5
(iv) to combat community deterioration and juvenile delinquency.

To be considered as organized exclusively for exempt purposes, a
NGO's Articles of organization must limit its purposes to one or more
exempt purposes and must not empower the NGO to engage in
activities that are in themselves not in furtherance of one or more
exempt purposes, other than as an insubstantial part of the NGO's
activities. 28 6 In addition, the NGO's assets must be dedicated to one
or more exempt purposes upon its dissolution, either by reason of a
provision in its Articles of organization or by operation of law. 28 7 To
be considered as operated exclusively for exempt purposes, a NGO
must engage "primarily" in activities that accomplish one or more
exempt purposes. 288 Furthermore, a NGO will not be considered as
organized or operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes
"unless it serves a public rather than a private interest.'' 28 9 In
addition to these organizational and operational requirements, a
NGO must satisfy three further requirements: (i) no part of the
NGO's net earnings may inure to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual, (ii) no substantial part of the NGO's
activities may consist of lobbying, and (iii) the NGO may not
participate or intervene in any political campaign on behalf of or in
opposition to any candidate for public office. 290 NGOs that meet all of
these requirements are often collectively referred to as "Section
501(c)(3)" or "charitable" organizations.
Charitable organizations have been exempted from the federal
income tax since its enactment in 1913,291 and are entitled to this
exemption without regard to their place of organization-so long as
they meet the requirements described above. 292 Nonetheless, to
obtain the benefit of this exemption, domestic charitable
organizations must generally apply to the Internal Revenue Service

285.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(2) (2001).
286.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(b)(1)(i) (2001).
287.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4) (2001).
288.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (2001).
289.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (2001). It has been further held that "an
institution seeking tax-exempt status must ...not be contrary to established public
policy." Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983) (upholding the
revocation of the tax-exempt status of an educational institution with a racially
discriminatory admissions policy).
290.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2001).
291.
Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(G)(a), 38 Stat. 166, 172 (1913).
292.
Rev. Rul. 66-177, 1966-1 C.B. 132.
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for recognition of their exempt status. 293 Even organizations that are
not required to apply for recognition will sometimes submit an
application in order to confirm their exempt status and obtain the
imprimatur of the Internal Revenue Service. 294 Foreign charitable
organizations are only required to apply for recognition of their
exempt status if, from the date of their creation, they have received
fifteen percent or more of their support from sources within the
295
United States.
Notwithstanding their general exemption from income tax,
charitable organizations are liable to tax on their income from any
trade or business that they regularly carry296 on and that is
substantially unrelated to their exempt purposes.
c. Donor Tax Relief
The United States also encourages the activities of charitable
organizations by permitting donors to these organizations to claim a
tax deduction for their contributions. Deductions for charitable
contributions are allowable for federal income, estate, and gift tax
purposes; however, the rules governing the deductibility of such
contributions vary depending on the identity of the donor and the tax
being paid. The discussion below will first examine the deductibility
of charitable contributions for income tax purposes and then will
examine their deductibility for estate and gift tax purposes.
(i) Income Tax Deduction
The extent to which charitable contributions are deductible for
income tax purposes depends on the identity of the donor-whether
individual, corporation, or estate or trust. The provisions governing
the deductibility of charitable contributions made by individuals and
corporations will be discussed first, followed by a discussion of the
provisions governing the deductibility of charitable contributions
made by estates and trusts.

See I.R.C. § 508 (2001); Treas. Reg. § 1.508-1(a) (2001). Churches and
293.
charitable organizations with gross receipts below a specified threshold are exempted
from this requirement. I.R.C. § 508(c) (2001); Treas. Reg. § 1.508-1(a)(3) (2001).
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1024: APPLICATION FOR
294.
RECOGNITION OF EXEMPTION UNDER SECTION 501(A), at 1 (Sept. 1998).

295.
Treas. Reg. § 1.508-1(a)(2)(vi) (2001); I.R.C. § 4948(b) (2001); Treas. Reg.
§ 53.4948-1(b) (2001). But cf. Dale, supra note 257, at 690 (indicating that the Internal
Revenue Service has on occasion narrowly read this provision, but arguing that 'this
reading is flawed).
I.R.C. §§ 511-14 (2001).
296.
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(a) Individuals and Corporations
The income tax deduction for charitable contributions was first
introduced for individuals in 1917,297 and was later extended to
corporations in 1935.298 At present, Section 170(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code provides, with respect to both, individuals and
corporations, that "[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction any
charitable contribution (as defined in subsection (c)) payment of
which is made within the taxable year." 299 A deduction is allowed
whether the contribution is made in cash or in kind. In the case of inkind contributions, the general rule is that the deduction is equal to
the fair market value of the contributed property, but, under certain
circumstances, the deduction may be reduced.3 00 The total deduction
for charitable contributions made during the taxable year cannot
exceed a specified percentage of the donor's income. The specified
percentage is either fifty percent, thirty percent, twenty percent, ten
percent, or some combination thereof, depending on the nature of the
property, and
donee organization, the nature of the contributed
30 1
whether the donor is an individual or corporation.
For purposes of Section 170, the term "charitable contribution" is
defined, in pertinent part, as a contribution or gift to a corporation,
trust, community chest, fund, or foundation that meets the following
four requirements:
1.

2.

3.

The donee organization must be created or organized in the
United States or a U.S. possession, or under the law of the
United States, any state, the District of Columbia, or a U.S.
possession;
The donee organization must be organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or
educational purposes, or to foster national or international
amateur sports competition, or for the prevention of cruelty
to children or animals;
No part of the net earnings of the donee organization may
inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual;
and

297.
War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917).
298.
Revenue Act of 1935, ch. 829, § 102, 49 Stat. 1014, 1016 (1935).
299.
I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (2001).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(1) (2001); I.R.C. § 170(e)(1) (2001). A donor of
300.
appreciated property will generally not be liable for income tax on the gain inherent in
the property. Palmer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 684, 693-95 (1974). Cf. Rev. Rul. 60370, 1960-2 C.B. 203.
301.
See I.R.C. § 170(b) (2001).
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20021
4.

The donee organization must not be disqualified from tax
by
exempt status under Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3)
302
activities.
campaign
political
or
reason of lobbying

In- the case of contributions to foreign NGOs, the first of these
four requirements is determinative-no income tax deduction is
currently 'allowed for a contribution by either an individual or a
corporation: that is made directly to a foreign NGO. This place-oforganization limitation was introduced into the Internal Revenue
Code in 1935 in connection with the extension of the deduction for
30 3
It was not, however, until
charitable contributions to corporations.
1938 that this limitation was also applied to contributions made by
individuals; 30 4 thus, from 1917 until 1938, there was no geographic
limitation on the income tax deduction for charitable contributions
Extending the place-of-organization
made by individuals.3 0 5
by Congress on the following
justified
was
limitation to individuals
grounds:
The bill provides that the deduction allowed to taxpayers other than
corporations be also restricted to contributions made to domestic
institutions. The exemption from taxation of money or property
devoted to charitable and other purposes is based upon the theory that
the Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from
financial burden which would otherwise have to be met by
appropriations from public funds, and by the benefits resulting from the
promotion of the general welfare. The United States derives no such
benefit from gifts to foreign institutions, and the proposed limitation is
consistent with the above theory. If the recipient, however, is a
domestic organization the fact that some portion of its funds is used in
other countries for charitable and other purposes (such as missionary
306
and educational purposes) will not affect the deductibility of the gift.
In addition to this place-of-organization limitation, charitable
contributions made by corporations-but not those made by
individuals-are subject to a place-of-use limitation: "[a] contribution
or gift by a corporation to a trust, chest, fund, or foundation shall be
deductible by reason of this paragraph only if it is to be used within
°7
the United States or any of its possessions. 30 Whether intentionally
or through careless drafting, incorporated charitable organizations
are noticeably absent from the enumeration of donee organizations

302.

I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (2001).

303.

See supranote 87 and accompanying text.

304.

Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 23(o), 52 Stat. 447, 463 (1938).

305.
Joannie Chang et al., Cross-Border Charitable Giving, 31 U.S.F. L. REV.
563, 568 (1997).
306. H.R. REP. No. 75-1860, at 19-20 (1938), reprintedin 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 728,
742. This justification for extending the place-of-organization restriction to individuals
has been criticized as the product of "bad history," "bad philosophy," and "bad logic."
Dale, supranote 257, at 660-61.
I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (2001) (flush language).
307.
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that are subject to this limitation. 30 8 In fact, the Internal Revenue
Service has confirmed that the place-of-use limitation does not apply
to donations made to incorporated charitable organizations, thereby
allowing corporate donors to make deductible contributions to these
organizations without regard to the foreign or domestic use of their
309
funds.
In practice, these geographic limitations have made it more
difficult, but not impossible, for U.S. individuals and corporations to
obtain tax relief for contributions that are meant to benefit foreign
NGOs. To circumvent the place-of-organization limitation, U.S.
individuals and corporations need only make their contributions to a
domestic charitable organization, which can then pass those
contributions on to the intended foreign recipient. The contribution
to the domestic intermediary NGO will be respected so long as it is
not "earmarked" for the foreign NGO, which means that the domestic
intermediary must exercise discretion and control as to the use of the
Conversely, the place-ofcontributions that it receives. 310
organization restriction will not be circumvented if the contribution
merely comes "to rest momentarily in a qualifying domestic
organization." 311 If the tax-exempt status of the foreign NGO has not
been recognized by the Internal Revenue Service, then the domestic
intermediary must, in order to protect its own tax-exempt status,
either (i) make a determination that the foreign NGO satisfies the
requirements for tax-exempt status, or (ii) ensure that the grant to
the foreign NGO is expended for exempt purposes.3 12 This practice of
funneling contributions to foreign NGOs through domestic
intermediaries has spawned the widespread creation of "friends of'
organizations, such as "American Friends of the Vienna State Opera"
and "American Friends of the London Business School. ' 313 A cursory
review of the list of tax-exempt organizations published by the
Internal Revenue Service reveals more than five hundred "American
Friends of' organizations, most, if not all, of which appear to be
associated with foreign NGOs. 314 To circumvent the place-of-use

308.
Dale, supra note 257, at 672.
309.
Rev. Rul. 69-80, 1969-1 C.B. 65.
310.
Rev. Rul. 75-65, 1975-1 C.B. 79; Rev. Rul. 63-252, 1963-2 C.B. 101,
amplified by Rev. Rul. 66-79, 1966-1 C.B. 48.
311.
Rev. Rul. 63-252, 1963-2 C.B. 101, 104, amplified by Rev. Rul. 66-79, 1966-1
C.B. 48.
312.
See I.R.C. § 4942(g)(1)(A) (2001); I.R.C. § 4945(d)(4) (2001); Rev. Proc. 9294, 1992-2 C.B. 507; Rev. Rul. 68-489, 1968-2 C.B. 210; Dale, supra note 257, at 680-85.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. No. 78, 1 CUMULATIVE LIST OF
313.
ORGANIZATIONS DESCRIBED IN SECTION 170(C) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF

1986, at 89 (2000).
Id. at 86-90.
314.
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limitation, corporate donors need only to restrict their contributions
to incorporated charitable organizations. 315
In addition to being easy to circumvent, these geographic
limitations have been superseded by provisions in income tax treaties
concluded by the United States with Canada,3 16 Israel, 317 and
Mexico. 318 The U.S.-Canada Income Tax Treaty allows U.S. persons
a deduction ,for contributions made to Canadian organizations that
are exempt- from tax in Canada and that could qualify to receive
3 19
deductible contributions if they were resident in the United States.
The amount of the deduction is subject to the percentage limitations
that are generally applicable under U.S. law, 320 but with reference to
321
Canadian source. income rather than worldwide taxable income.
The U.S.-Israel Income Tax Treaty also allows U.S. persons a
deduction for contributions made to Israeli organizations that are
exempt from tax in Israel and that could qualify to receive deductible
contributions if they were resident in the United States.3 22 The

315.
Dale, supra note 257, at 673.
316.
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, Sept. 26, 1980, U.S.Can., art. XXI,'para. 5, S. EXEC. Doc. T, 96-2, at 17-18 (1980) [hereinafter U.S.-Canada
Income Tax Treaty].
317.
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Nov. 20, 1975, U.S.-Isr., Protocol, art.
X, S. EXEC. Doc. M, 96-2, at 4 (1980) [hereinafter U.S.-Israel Income Tax Treaty ] .
318.
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Sept. 18, 1992, U.S.-Mex., art. 22,
para. 2, S. TREATY DOC. No. 103-7, at 43-44 (1993) [hereinafter U.S.-Mexico Income
Tax Treaty].
319.
U.S.-Canada Income Tax Treaty, Supra note 316, art. XXI, para. 5, S. EXEC.
DOC. T, 96-2, at 17. In an exchange of notes, the United States and Canada each
agreed to review the other country's procedures and requirements for determining
eligibility to receive tax-deductible charitable contributions, "with a view to avoiding
duplicate application by such organizations to the administering agencies of both
[countries]." Id.; Exchange of Notes, S. EXEd. Doc. T, 96-2, at 28-30. Following this
review, the United States and Canada reached an agreement in 1999 under which one
country's determination as to exempt status will be recognized by the other. Notice 9947, 1999-2 C.B. 391. Accordingly, a Canadian NGO that is recognized by Revenue
Canada as a Canadian registered charity is now eligible to receive tax-deductible
contributions from U.S. persons without applying to the Internal Revenue Service for
recognition of its tax-exempt status. Nevertheless, Canadian NGOs may be required to
furnish the U.S. Internal Revenue Service information to establish the appropriate
percentage limitation applicable under U.S. law (as incorporated in the U.S.-Canada
Income Tax Treaty). Id. See also infra note 321 and accompanying text.
320.
See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
321.
U.S.-Canada Income Tax Treaty, supra note 316, art. XXI, para. 5, S. EXEC.
DOC. T, 96-2, at 18. Nevertheless, in the case of contributions made to a college or
university at which the U.S. person (or a member of his family) was enrolled, the
percentage limitations are applied by reference to worldwide income (and not by
reference to Canadian source income). Id.
322.
U.S.-Israel Income Tax Treaty, supra note 317, Protocol, art. X, S. EXEC.
DOC. M, 96-2, at 4. The United States and Israel have also exchanged notes in which
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amount of the deduction is limited to twenty-five percent of the U.S.
person's Israeli source income. 323 The U.S.-Mexico Income Tax
Treaty allows U.S. persons a deduction for contributions made to
Mexican organizations that qualify under Article 70-B of the Mexican
Income Tax Law (i.e., those that are exempt from tax in Mexico and
are eligible to receive contributions that are deductible for Mexican
tax purposes). 32 4 The amount of the deduction is subject to the
percentage limitations that are generally applicable under U.S.
law,3 25 but with reference 26to Mexican source income rather than
3
worldwide taxable income.
It is unlikely, however, that similar provisions will be included in
future income tax treaties, because the U.S. Senate has voiced
concern about using the treaty process to grant a deduction that is
otherwise disallowed under domestic law.3 27

Indeed, the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee has indicated that it will seriously
consider recommending a reservation on any future provisions
permitting U.S. persons to deduct charitable contributions made to
foreign NGOs.3 25 Prior to making this statement, the Senate had, in
fact, entered a reservation to such a provision in an income tax treaty
concluded with Brazil.3 2 9 After this statement was made, in the
course of treaty negotiations, Barbados requested a provision
allowing U.S. persons a deduction for charitable contributions made
to Barbadian NGOs. In response, the U.S. negotiating delegation
conveyed its inability to agree to such a provision, but indicated that

they each agreed to review the other country's procedures and requirements for
determining eligibility to receive tax-deductible charitable contributions, "with a view
to avoiding duplicate application by such organizations to the administering agencies of
both [countries]." Id.; Exchange of Notes, S. EXEC. Doc. M, 96-2, at 8-10. The United
States and Israel have yet to reach an agreement similar to the one that the United
States reached with Canada. See supra note 319.
323
U.S.-Israel Income Tax Treaty, supra note 317, Protocol, art. X, S. EXEC.
DOC. M, 96-2, at 4.
324.
U.S.-Mexico Income Tax Treaty, supra note 318, art. 22, para. 2, S. TREATY
DOC. NO. 103-7, at 43-44; id., Protocol, para. 17(b), S.TREATY DOC. No. 103-7, at 66-67.
325.
See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
326.
U.S.-Mexico Income Tax Treaty, supra note 318, art. 22, para. 2, S. TREATY
DOC.No. 103-7, at 44.
327.
Tax Conventions with: The Russian Federation, S. TREATY Doc. 102-39;
United Mexican States, S. TREATY Doc. 103-7; The Czech Republic, S. TREATY DOC. 10317; The Slovak Republic, S. TREATY Doc. 103-18; and The Netherlands, S. TREATY Doc.
103-6. Protocols Amending Tax Conventions with: Israel, S. TREATY DOC. 103-16; The
Netherlands, S. TREATY DOC. 103-19; and Barbados, S. TREATY DOC. 102-41; Hearing
Before S. Comm. on Foreign Rel., 103d Cong. 44 (1994) (statement of Senator
Sarbanes); S. EXEC. REP. No. 98-22, at 8-9 (1984); S.EXEC. REP. No. 97-29, at 6 (1981).
328.
S.EXEC. REP. NO. 98-22, at 9 (1984); S.EXEC. REP. No. 97-29, at 6 (1981).
329.
S.EXEC. REP. No. 90-5, at 3 (1968), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
UNITED STATES TAX CONVENTIONS at Brazil 159 (Sidney I. Roberts ed., 1993). This
treaty never entered into force. See Gordon et al., supra note 13; 1 Tax Treaties (CCH)
1567.01 (1990).
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it would be prepared to re-open discussions if U.S. policy were to
330
change in the future.
(b) Estates and Trusts
Estates and trusts were first granted a deduction for charitable
contributions in 1919,331 approximately two years after the deduction
The deductibility of charitable
was granted to individuals.
contributions made by estates and complex trusts is currently
33 2
governed by Section 642(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code.
Section 642(c)(1) allows a deduction for amounts "paid for a purpose
specified in section 170(c)," which is the provision governing the
deductibility of contributions made by individuals and corporations.
Section 642(c)(1) then goes on specifically to provide that the place-oforganization limitation in Section 170(c)(2)(A) does not apply to
contributions made by estates and trusts.3 33 In addition, unlike the
deduction allowed to individuals and corporations, the amount of an
estate's or complex trust's charitable contribution deduction is not
33 4
limited to a percentage of its taxable income.
(ii) Estate and Gift Tax Deduction
Individuals, but not corporations or trusts, are also subject to the
federal estate and gift taxes. 335 Charitable gifts, bequests, and

330.
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Dec. 31, 1984, U.S.-Barb., S. TREATY
DOC. NO. 99-3, at 23-25 (1985).
331.
Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 219(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1071 (1919).
332.
This discussion is confined to the deductibility of charitable contributions
made by estates and complex trusts because simple trusts are not permitted to make
charitable contributions. See Treas. Reg. § 1.651(a)-l(b) (2001) (to qualify as a simple
trust, the governing instrument of the trust cannot permit any amounts to "he paid,
permanently set aside, or used in the taxable year for the charitable, etc., purposes
specified in section 642(c)").
333.
I.R.C. § 642(c)(1) (2001) (allowing a deduction for amounts "paid for a
purpose specified in section 170(c) (determined without regard to section 170(c)(2)(A))");
Treas. Reg. § 1.642(c)-1(a)(2) (2001).
[A]n amount paid to a corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or
foundation otherwise described in section 170(c)(2) shall be considered paid for
a purpose specified in section 170(c) even though the corporation, trust, or
community chest, fund, or foundation is not created or organized in the United
States, any State, the District of Columbia, or any possession of the United
States.
Id. If, however, the trust has "unrelated business income," then the rules of § 170
become applicable and the geographic limitations should apply to the trust's charitable
contribution deduction. Dale, supra note 257, at 678-79.
334.
Alan S. Acker, Income Taxation of Trusts and Estates, Tax Mgmt. (BNA)
No. 852, § IV(B)(2)(k), at A-40 (2001); Dale, supra note 257, at 675.
I.R.C. § 2001 (2001); I.R.C. § 2501 (2001). The estate tax is currently set to
335.
Economic Growth and Tax Relief
be fully phased out by January 1, 2010.
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devises-whether in cash or in kind-are deductible for estate and
gift tax purposes, and there are no percentage limitations on the
deduction similar to those applicable for income tax purposes.336
Furthermore, neither the estate nor the gift tax imposes a geographic
limitation on the deductibility of charitable contributions made by
U.S. individuals.33 7 This lack of a geographic limitation opens the
door to the possibility that an individual's contribution may be
deductible for estate and gift tax purposes, but not for income tax
3 38

purposes.

2. England and Wales
a. Development of the Nonprofit Sector

In England and Wales, both charitable endeavors and the
provision of social services "were the province of the Church" prior to
The enactment in 1601 of the Statute of
the Reformation.3 39
Elizabeth and the Poor Law marked the beginning of the
formalization and secularization of philanthropy in England and
Wales.3 40 From this time until the early twentieth century, the
provision of education and the delivery of social services were
dominated by the nonprofit sector, with the public sector only filling

Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 501(a), 115 Stat. 38, 69 (2001). Even
after the estate tax has .been phased out, however, the gift tax will continue to apply to
individuals. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 107-84, at 191-92 (2001).
336.
Compare I.R.C. § 2055(a)(2)-(3) (2001), and I.R.C. § 2522(a)(2) (2001), with
I.R.C. § 170(b) (2001).
337.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-1(a) (2001) ("The deduction is not limited, in the case
of estates of citizens or residents of the United States, to transfers to domestic
corporations or associations, or to trustees for use within the United States."); Treas.
Reg. § 25.2522(a)-l(a) (2001) ("The deduction is not limited to gifts for use within the
United States, or to gifts to or for the use of domestic corporations, trusts, community
chests, funds, or foundations, or fraternal societies, orders, or associations operating
under the lodge system."). There are, however, geographic limitations on the estate
and gift tax deductions for charitable contributions made by nonresident aliens. See
I.R.C. § 2106(a)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii) (2001); I.R.C. § 2522(b)(2)-(3) (2001).
338.
See Dale, supra note 257, at 668. This inconsistency not only increases the
complexity of the rules applicable to charitable contributions made to foreign NGOs,
but also (i) undermines the "government burden" rationale for imposing geographic
limitations on the income tax charitable contribution deduction and (ii) gives
individuals the rather odd incentive to forego inter vivos charitable contributions to
foreign NGOs in favor of testamentary contributions to these organizations. See
Chang, supra note 305, at 579.
339.
JAMES DOUGLAS & PETER WRIGHT, ENGLISH CHARITIES, PART I: LEGAL
DEFINITION, TAXATION AND REGULATION 4 (Yale University, Institution for Social and

Policy Studies, Program on Nonprofit Organizations, Working Paper No. 15, 1980);
Jeremy Kendall & Martin Knapp, The United Kingdom, in DEFINING THE NONPROFIT
SECTOR, supra note 264, at 249, 262 (Johns Hopkins Nonprofit Sector Series No. 4,
1997).

340.

Kendall & Knapp, supra note 339, at 250.
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in the gaps.3 41 In particular, during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, the pressures resulting from industrialization created an
increasing demand for social services-a demand that the public
sector was either reluctant or unable to fulfill-leaving "the way open
for the development of formal voluntary organizations at [the] local
and national level. '342 The organizations created to fill this demand
not only provided social services, but also played the role of advocate,
"highlighting new needs and bringing old injustices to public
343
attention."
With the advent of the welfare state in the early part of the
twentieth century, the roles played by the nonprofit and public
sectors reversed.3 44 This reversal was due, at least in part, to the
failure of the nonprofit sector to meet "rapidly growing social and
individual needs." 345 Once the foundations of the welfare state had
been laid in England and Wales in the 1940s, "the public sector came
to dominate the funding and provision of education, health, social
welfare, and income maintenance services." 346 NGOs served as
agents in furnishing these now public sector services, and also
continued to provide services in areas that remained outside of the
347
public sector domain, such as child care and care of the elderly.
During the 1960s and 1970s, the limitations on the ability of the
public sector to provide services, "a desire to combat newly emerging
problems, such as urban decay and racial tension, and enhanced
expectations from the general public prompted public sector bodies
...to fund community-based groups and consumer and service-user
organizations to a much greater extent than before. '348 During the
1980s and into the 1990s,. the focus shifted further toward
privatization (i.e., the replacement "of public sector activity with
nongovernmental activity wherever and whenever" possible), and the
provision of social services by the public sector came to be "defined in
34 9
residual terms for the first time since the early 1940s."

341.
Id. at 262-63; DOUGLAS & WRIGHT, supra note 339, at 4.
342.
Kendall & Knapp, supra note 339, at 250.
Id.
343.
344.
DOUGLAS & WRIGHT, supra note 339, at 4; Kendall & Knapp, supra note
339, at 263-64.
345.
Kendall & Knapp, supra note 339, at 263.
Id. at 252.
346.
347.
Id. at 264.
348.
Id. at 252-53.
349.
Id. at 267.
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b. NGO Tax Relief
In England and Wales, all charities must register with the
Charity Commission unless specifically exempted. 3 50
For -this
purpose, a charity is defined as "any institution, corporate or not,
which is established for charitable purposes and is subject to the
control of the High Court in the exercise of the court's jurisdiction
with respect to charities. '351 The Charities Act leaves the task of
defining the term "charitable purpose" to the courts, 35 2 because "it
was decided that the benefit of flexibility to reflect social changes
35 3
outweighed that of definitional certainty."
The starting point for any judicial discussion of what constitutes
a charitable purpose is the preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth,
which lists the following as charitable purposes: the relief of aged,
impotent, and poor persons; the maintenance of sick and maimed
soldiers and mariners, schools of learning, free schools, and scholars
in universities; the repair of bridges, ports, havens, causeways,
churches, sea-banks, and highways; the education and preferment of
orphans; the relief, stock, or maintenance for houses of correction; the
marriages of poor maids; the supportation, aid and help of young
tradesmen, handicraftmen, and persons decayed; the relief or
redemption of prisoners or captives; and the aid or ease of any poor
inhabitants concerning payments of fifteens, setting out of soldiers,
and other taxes. 3 54 The concept of charity embodied in the Statute of
Elizabeth has evolved over time, and its list of charitable purposes
has been refined substantially by the courts.3 55
The "most
influential"35 6 judicial refinement of the list of charitable purposes in

350.

Charities Act, 1993, c. 10, §§ 1, 3 (Eng.), reprinted in 5 HALSBURY'S

STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 945-46, 947-49 (4th ed. 1998).
351.
Id. § 96(1), reprinted in 5 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES

1051 (4th ed. 1998).
352.
See id. § 97(1), reprinted in 5 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND
WALES 1052-53 (4th ed. 1998) ('charitable purposes' means purposes which are
exclusively charitable according to the law of England and Wales").
353.
Alison Paines, England and Wales, in INTERNATIONAL CHARITABLE GIVING:
LAWS AND TAXATION at England and Wales-i, England and Wales-1 (Carole
Shelbourn George ed., 1999) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL CHARITABLE GIVING]. See
also John J. Dilger, United Kingdom, in INT'L FISCAL ASS'N, 84a CAHIERS DE DROIT
FISCAL INTERNATIONAL: TAXATION OF NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 753, 759 (1999)
[hereinafter TAXATION OF NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS].

354.
An Act to Redress the Mis-employment of Lands, Goods and Stocks of
Money Heretofore Given to Certain Charitable Uses, 43 Eliz., c. 4, preamble (1601)
(Eng.).
355.
Paines, supra note 353, at England and Wales-2.
356.
Id. See also Dilger, supra note 353, at 759; Paul Bater, United Kingdom, in
INT'L BUREAU OF FISCAL DOCUMENTATION, THE TAX TREATMENT OF CROSS-BORDER
DONATIONS: INCLUDING THE TAX STATUS OF CHARITIES AND FOUNDATIONS at United
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the Statute of Elizabeth is that of Lord Macnaghten in Special
Commissioners of Income Tax v. Pemsel: 'Charity' in its legal sense
comprises four principal divisions: trusts for the relief of poverty,
trusts for the advancement of education, trusts for the advancement
of religion, and trusts for other purposes benficial [sic] to the
community not falling under any of the preceding heads." 35 7 Within
these four general categories, the concept of charity has continued to
evolve and embrace new activities that reflect changes in the broader
society. 358 In fact, the Charity Commission has recently undertaken
a review of the register of charities for the purpose of determining
both whether organizations that are currently on the register conform
with the modern concept of charity (and, therefore, should remain on
the register) and whether organizations that are not currently on the
register should be included on it (because the concept of charity has,
over time, come to embrace the purposes for which they were
created).359
Any time that an organization appears on the register of
charities, it is "for all purposes other than rectification of the register
'360
Thus, entry on the
... conclusively presumed to be ... a charity.
register of charities automatically entitles an organization to claim
3 61
any exemptions from taxation to which charities may be entitled.
In England and Wales, charities do not benefit from a general
exemption from income tax; instead, charities are liable to tax unless
they can establish a claim to a particular exemption from tax
collected under one of the several income tax schedules. 3 62 Currently,
charities are exempt from income tax with respect to their real
property income, dividends, interest, royalties, annuities, income
from lotteries, and income derived from donations. 363 Charities are

Kingdom-i, United Kingdom-1 (Paul Bater ed., 2001) [hereinafter CROSS-BORDER
DONATIONS].

357.
Special Comm'rs of Income Tax v. Pemsel, [1891] A.C. 531, 583, 3 T.C. 53,
96 (H.L. 1891) (Eng.).
Dilger, supra note 353, at 760 (indicating that "research into terrorism,
358.
coupled with the dissemination of the research has been held charitable by the charity
commissioners"); Paines, supra note 353, at England and Wales-3 (indicating that, in
1999, "the Charity Commission announced the recognition of two new charitable
purposes, the promotion of urban regeneration and the relief of unemployment").
359.

CHARITY COMM'N FOR ENG. & WALES, THE REVIEW OF THE REGISTER OF

2 (2001), available at http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/
CHARITIES pt. 1,
publications/rr 1.asp.
360.
Charities Act, 1993, c. 10, § 4(1) (Eng.), reprinted in 5 HALSBURY'S
STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 950 (4th ed. 1998).
Paines, supra note 353, at England and Wales-4.
361.
Brighton College v. Marriott, [1926] A.C. 192, 10 T.C. 213 (H.L. 1925)
362.
(Eng.).
Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, c. 1, §§ 9(4), 505-06 (Eng.),
363.
reprinted in 44 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 39, 815-20 (4th ed.
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also exempt from income tax with respect to profits from trades that
they carry on, but only if those profits are applied solely to the
purposes of the charity and either (i) the trade is exercised in the
course of carrying out the charity's primary purpose or (ii) the work in
connection with the trade is mainly carried out by the charity's
beneficiaries.3 64 Additionally, charities are exempt from capital gains
tax so long as the capital gain "is applicable and applied for
charitable purposes.

36 5

Nevertheless, eligibility for these exemptions

may be limited if the charity incurs "non-qualifying expenditures,"
which include certain payments to non-U.K. organizations and any
investments or loans that are not included in a list of "qualifying"
366
investments and loans.
Even though the statutory language is broad enough to embrace
them, it was held in The Camille and Henry Dreyfus Foundation,Inc.
v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue that foreign NGOs are not
eligible to claim the benefit of these tax exemptions. 367 The decision
in that case was primarily reached on the basis of a reading of the
statutory language in the context of the relevant sections of the
Income Tax Act 1918. This geographical limitation was, however,
also explained as a vestige of history-the exemption dates back to
1799, "at which date there was no question of taxing, therefore none
of exempting, non-resident foreigners."3 6 8 It is also worth noting that
the decision in the Court of Appeal eschewed reliance on an argument
put forth by the Crown that the tax exemption was intended to apply
only to charities that benefit the public in the United Kingdom:
Counsel for the Crown propounded the proposition that the reason for
the exemption afforded to charities by Section 37 was that the
Legislature thought fit to forego the tax on income devoted to charitable

1996). See also Paines, supra note 353, at England and Wales-10; Bater, supra note
356, at United Kingdom-6.
364.
Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, c. 1, § 505(1)(e) (Eng.), reprinted
in 44 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 816 (4th ed. 1996).
365.
Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act, 1992, c. 12, § 256(1) (Eng.), reprinted in
43 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 656 (4th ed. 1996).
366.
Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, c. 1, §§ 505(3), 506, sch. 20 (Eng.),
reprinted in 44 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 816, 819-20 (4th ed.
1996).
367.
The Camille and Henry Dreyfus Found., Inc. v. Comm'rs of Inland
Revenue, [19561 A.C. 39, 36 T.C. 126 (H.L. 1955) (Eng.); Comm'rs of Inland Revenue v.
Gull, 4 All E.R. 290, 21 T.C. 374 (H.L. i937) (Eng.). See also 23 HALSBURY's LAWS OF
ENGLAND
1164 ri.1 (Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone ed., 1991). Nevertheless,
England and Wales have by treaty extended the benefit of these exemptions to
charities that are tax residents of the Republic of Ireland. Convention for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to
Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, June 2, 1976, U.K.-Ir., arts. 12-13, (1976) SI
1976/2151 (Eng.); id. Protocol, art. 2, (1976) SI 1976/2152 (Eng.); id. Protocol, art. 2,
(1998) SI 1998/3151 (Eng.).
368.
The Camille and Henry Dreyfus Found., Inc., 36 T.C. at 153 (opinion of
Jenkins, L.J.). See also id. at 156 (opinion of Hodson, L.J.).
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purposes because income spent on those purposes is spent for the
benefit of the public, just as the tax is levied for the benefit of the
public, so that the tax foregone goes to increase the benefit derived by
the public from the furtherance of the charitable purpose. To this they
added the further proposition that the relevant public for the purposes
both of tax and of charity is the public in the United Kingdom, and
invited the conclusion that the exemption afforded by Section 37 should
be held limited to charities in the United Kingdom.... But the
authorities do not bear this out, for ... there are many instances in
which purposes have been recognised as charitable notwithstanding
369
that they were to be pursued wholly abroad.

c. Donor Tax Relief
England and Wales have experienced a decline in charitable
giving over the past two decades.3 70 In an effort "to create a dynamic
environment in which more people will be encouraged to give and in
which charities can do more to raise funds," the British Treasury has
3 71
This
explored a number of options for spurring charitable giving.
review of tax incentives for charitable giving culminated in the
enactment of a new form of tax relief, as well as a number of changes
to existing forms of tax relief, in the Finance Act 2000.
As a result of the changes made by the Finance Act 2000, there
are now generally three types of income tax relief available for
contributions made to registered charities. First, taxpayers who are
employed can make contributions through a payroll giving scheme
Contributions made through
established by their employer.3 72
payroll giving schemes are treated as deductible expenses that offset
the taxpayer's income.37 3 In the case of contributions made on or
after April 6, 2000 and before April 6, 2003, a supplement equal to
ten percent of the taxpayer's contribution is paid by the government
to the charity.3 74 The Finance Act 2000 repealed the maximum

Id. at 150 (opinion of Jenkins, L.J.); 'See also id. at 135-36 (opinion of Sir
369.
Raymond Evershed, M.R.).
HM TREASURY, REVIEW OF CHARITY TAXATION: CONSULTATION DOCUMENT
370.
[ 1.7 (1999), available at http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/consult/rct.pdf.
Id. 1.11.
371.
Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, c. 1, § 202 (Eng.), reprinted in 44
372.
HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 342-43 (4th ed. 1996), amended by
Finance. Act, 2000, c. 17, § 38 (Eng.), reprinted in [E] HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF
ENGLAND AND WALES: CURRENT STATUTES SERVICE at 43 Taxation 777-78 (4th ed.
2001).
Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, c. 1, § 202(2) (Eng.), reprinted in
373.
44 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 342 (4th ed. 1996).
Finance Act, 2000, c. 17, § 38(1)-(4) (Eng.), reprinted in [E] HALSBURY'S
374.
STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES: CURRENT STATUTES SERVICE at 43 Taxation 777-78
(4th ed. 2001).
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annual limit on contributions that can be made through a payroll
375
giving scheme.
Second, under the "gift aid" scheme, an individual's contribution
to charity, of whatever amount, 3 76 is treated as having been made
after deduction of basic rate tax (at a rate of twenty-two percent),
377
which the charity may be able to recover from the Inland Revenue.
A higher rate (i.e., forty percent) taxpayer is entitled to additional tax
relief, which is effected by means of an increase in her basic rate
bracket. 378
To illustrate the operation of both the basic and
additional tax relief under the gift aid scheme, assume that a
taxpayer has income of GBP 300,000 and makes a charitable
contribution of GBP 78,000. 3 79 The taxpayer provides the charity
with a declaration stating that the contribution is being made under
the gift aid scheme and that she has paid an amount of income and/or
capital gains tax equal to the amount that the charity can reclaim
from the Inland Revenue. The contribution is treated as having been
made by the taxpayer after deduction of basic rate tax; thus, the
contribution is grossed-up to GBP 100,000-the amount that, after
paying tax at the basic rate of twenty-two percent, produces a
contribution of GBP 78,000-and the charity is entitled to recover the
difference between the grossed-up and the actual contribution-in
this example, GBP 22,000, which is GBP 100,000 - GBP 78,000-from
the Inland Revenue. Because the taxpayer is a higher rate taxpayer,

375.

Id.

§ 38(5)(b), reprinted in

[E] HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND

WALES: CURRENT STATUTES SERVICE at 43 Taxation 778 (4th ed. 2001) (repealing the
maximum annual limit in Section 202(7) of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act
1988).

376.
The GBP 250 threshold for a donation to qualify for the gift aid scheme has
been eliminated. Finance Act, 2000, c. 17, § 39(1), -(3)(a) (Eng.), reprinted in [E]
HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES: CURRENT STATUTES SERVICE at 43

Taxation 778 (4th ed. 2001) (repealing Section 25(2)(g) of the Finance Act 1990).
377.
Finance Act, 2001, c. 9, § 50 (Eng.), reprinted in [E] HALSBURY'S STATUTES
OF ENGLAND AND WALES: CURRENT STATUTES SERVICE at 43 Taxation 1679 (4th ed.

2001). There are three tax rate brackets in England and Wales: the starting, basic,
and higher rates. For 2001-02, the starting rate, which applies to income up to GBP
1,880, is 10%. Id. §§ 50-51, reprinted in [El HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND
WALES: CURRENT STATUTES SERVICE at 43 Taxation 1679-80 (4th ed. 2001). The basic
rate, which applies to income from GBP 1,881 to GBP 29,400, is 22%, and the higher
rate, which applies to income over GBP 29,400, is 40%. Id. § 50, reprinted in [E]
HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES: CURRENT STATUTES SERVICE at 43
Taxation 1679 (4th ed. 2001); Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, c. 1, § 1(2)(a)(b)
(Eng.), reprinted in 44 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 29 (4th ed. 1996
& Supp. 2001).
378.
Finance Act, 1990, c. 29, § 25 (Eng.), reprinted in 43 HALSBURY'S STATUTES
OF ENGLAND AND WALES 264-66 (4th ed. 1996), amended by Finance Act, 2000, c. 17,
§ 39 (Eng.), reprinted in [El HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES: CURRENT

STATUTES SERVICE at 43 Taxation 778-82 (4th ed. 2001).
379.
This example is taken from Rebecca Shaw, Getting Britain Giving: In
Practice,2 PRIVATE CLIENT BUS. 115, 117 (2001), available at WESTLAW P.C.B. 2001,
2, 115-20.
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she is entitled to additional relief, which takes the form of an increase
in her basic rate bracket. The taxpayer's basic rate bracket, which
normally ends at GBP 29,400,380 is increased by the grossed-up
amount of the charitable contribution-here, GBP 100,000. As a
result, rather than ending at GBP 29,400, the taxpayer's basic rate
bracket in this example will end at GBP 129,400, which is GBP
29,400 + GBP 100,000. This increase in the basic rate bracket affords
the taxpayer additional relief equal to eighteen percent of the
grossed-up contribution, which is the difference between the higher
rate (i.e., forty percent) that would normally apply to this amount of
income and the basic rate (i.e., twenty-two percent) that is actually
applied to it. In this example, the additional relief equals GBP 18,000
(18% x GBP 100,000). Corporations may also make contributions
under the gift aid scheme; however, their contributions are made on a
gross basis and tax relief is claimed when their profits are calculated
381
for corporation tax purposes.
Finally, both individuals and corporations are now afforded tax
relief, for contributions of "qualifying investments" to charity.3 82 For
this purpose, a contribution includes not only an outright gift of the
qualifying investment, but also the sale of the qualifying investment
to a charity for less than fair market value. 38 3
Qualifying
investments include: (i) shares or securities that are listed or dealt in
on a recognized stock exchange, (ii) units in an authorized unit trust,
(iii) shares in an open-ended investment company, and (iv) interests
in offshore funds.3 8 4
If a taxpayer makes a contribution of a
qualifying investment, or sells the qualifying investment to a charity
for less than fair market value, then the taxpayer is entitled to a
deduction equal to (i) the fair market value of the property plus
incidental costs, (ii) less any consideration received, and (iii) less the
value of any benefits received by the donor as a result of making the
385
contribution.
In addition to receiving the various forms of income tax relief
described above, taxpayers in England and Wales who make

380.
Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, c. 1, § 1(2)(b) (Eng.), reprinted in
44 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 29 (4th ed. 1996 & Supp. 2001).
381.
Id. § 339, reprinted in 44 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES
551-53 (4th ed. 1996), amended by Finance Act, 2000, c. 17, § 40 (Eng.), reprinted in [E]
HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES: CURRENT STATUTES SERVICE at 43

Taxation 782-84 (4th ed. 2001).
382.
Finance Act, 2000, c. 17, § 43 (Eng.), reprinted in [E] HALSBURY'S STATUTES
OF ENGLAND AND WALES: CURRENT STATUTES SERVICE at 43 Taxation 785-87 (4th ed.

2001).
383.
384.
385.

Id. (see new § 587B(1)).
Id. (see new § 587B(9)).
Id. (see new § 587B(4)-(7)).
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charitable contributions are also exempt from capital gains tax3 86 and
are generally exempt from inheritance tax387 on their contributions to
registered charities. Taxpayers in England and Wales will not,
however, benefit from any of this tax relief if their contributions are
made to foreign NGOs. 388 To obtain tax relief for contributions made
to foreign NGOs, taxpayers in England and Wales must route those
contributions through English or Welsh registered charities, which
are permitted to make grants to foreign NGOs so long as they take
"such steps as may be reasonable in the circumstances to ensure that
3 89
the payment will be applied for charitable purposes."
390
3. New Zealand

a. NGO Tax Relief
In New Zealand, a NGO can take the form of an incorporated
society, a trust, or an unincorporated association. 39 1 Whether a NGO
will be subject to income tax in New Zealand depends both on the
type of income that it earns (i.e., business or392non-business) and on the
geographic scope of its charitable purposes.
A NGO is generally exempt from tax with respect to its nonbusiness income. 3 93 This exemption applies whether the NGO was
formed as a trust for charitable purposes or as a society or institution
established exclusively for charitable purposes and not carried on for
the private pecuniary profit of any individual.3 94 The availability of

Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act, 1992, c. 12, § 257 (Eng.), reprinted in 43
386.
HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 656-57 (4th ed. 1996).
Inheritance Tax Act, 1984, c. 51, § 23 (Eng.), reprinted in 42 HALSBURY'S
387.
STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 696-97 (4th ed. 1996).
See supra note 367 and accompanying text.
388.
Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, c. 1, § 506(3) (Eng.), reprinted in
389.
44 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 819 (4th ed. 1996). See also Bater,
supra note 356, at United Kingdom-7 to -8.
390.
A description of the development of the nonprofit sector in New Zealand
has been omitted due to a lack of sources exploring this topic. This lack of source
material is likely explained by the fact that study of the nonprofit sector, both here and
abroad, is still in its infancy.
Kevin J. Holmes, New Zealand, in CROSS-BORDER DONATIONS, supra note
391.
356, at New Zealand-i, New Zealand-1.
392.
NGOs also benefit from a partial exemption from fringe benefits tax, which is "a
substitute for the income tax that would be paid by an employee on remuneration received
in monetary form." POLICY ADVICE Div., INLAND REVENUE DEP'T, TAX AND CHARITIES: A
GOVERNMENT DISCUSSION DOCUMENT ON TAXATION ISSUES RELATING TO CHARITIES AND
12.7 (2001), available at http://www.taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/
NON-PROFIT BODIES
publications/files/tax&charitiesdd.pdf [hereinafter INLAND REVENUE, TAX AND CHARITIES].
See Income Tax Act, 1994, § CI 1(m) (N.Z.).
393.
Income Tax Act, 1994, § CB 4(1)(c) (N.Z.); Holmes, supra note 391, at New
Zealand-4, -9.
394.
Income Tax Act, 1994, § CB 4(1)(c) (N.Z.).
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the exemption for non-business income is not affected by the
3 95
geographic scope of the NGO's charitable purposes.
A NGO is also exempt from tax with respect to its business
income, but only if its charitable purposes are limited to New
Zealand. 396 If the NGO's charitable purposes are not so limited, then
its business income may be apportioned between charitable purposes
within and without New Zealand, and only the income allocated to
charitable purposes within New Zealand will benefit from the
exemption. 397 In a recent report on the tax treatment of charities, the
New Zealand Inland Revenue Department proposed to abolish the
current regime for taxing the business income of NGOs. 3 98 In its
place, the Inland Revenue proposed a regime under which all of a
NGO's business income would be taxed, subject to an unlimited
399
deduction for distributions made for charitable purposes.
For purposes of the current tax exemptions, the Income Tax Act
of 1994 has defined the term "charitable purpose" as including "every
charitable purpose, whether it relates to the relief of poverty, the
advancement of education or religion, or any other matter beneficial
to the community. '400 This definition of charitable purpose has its
roots in the English Statute of Elizabeth, 40 1 and reflects "the four
'heads' of charity"40 2 articulated by the English Lord Macnaghten in
Special Commissioners of Income Tax v. Pemsel.40 3 In its recent
report on the tax treatment of charities, the Inland Revenue explored
the possibility of altering or replacing the current definition of
"charitable purpose" in an effort (i) to update it "in light of the needs
of New Zealand in the 21st century," because the definition is based
on law that is up to four hundred years old, and (ii) to ensure that the
income tax exemption for NGOs is not "too widely available," so as to
prevent the exemption from being used by some businesses to gain
40 4
advantages over others.
In New Zealand, NGOs are not required to register either with
the Inland Revenue or with a body generally charged with the
regulation of charitable organizations (like the English Charity
Commission) as a prerequisite to obtaining the benefits of the income

395.
396.
397.

Holmes, supra note 391, at New Zealand-9.
Income Tax Act, 1994, § CB 4(1)(e) (N.Z.).
Id.

398.

INLAND REVENUE, TAX AND CHARITIES, supra note 392,

399.
400.

Id.
Income Tax Act, 1994, § OB 1 (N.Z.).

401.

See supra note 354 and accompanying text.

9.8.

402.
INLAND REVENUE, TAX AND CHARITIES, supra note 392, 4 3.4, 3.9.
403.
Special Comm'rs of Income Tax v. Pemsel, [1891] A.C. 531, 583, 3 T.C. 53,
96 (H.L. 1891) (Eng.).
404.

INLAND REVENUE, TAX AND CHARITIES, supra note 392, 44 4.1-.4, 5.1-.25.
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tax exemptions described above. 40 5 Nonetheless, in practice, most
NGOs "will submit their founding documents to Inland Revenue for
its view as to whether or not the entity is charitable at law"; however,
the views of the Inland Revenue are not binding (unless a binding
ruling is obtained) because "[w]hether an entity is a charity for tax
purposes is ultimately a matter for the courts, 406 Thus, it is-possible
for a NGO to benefit from the various income tax exemptions in New
Zealand without the government being aware of the claim to the
exemptions. 40 7 In its recent report on the tax treatment of charities,
the Inland Revenue sought to rectify this situation by recommending
that each NGO be required "to officially notify the government, by
means of a set procedure, that it considers itself to be a charity for tax
408
purposes."
b. Donor Tax Relief
New Zealand also affords tax relief to donors of contributions
made to NGOs. Individuals are permitted a "rebate," or tax credit,
for cash contributions of at least NZD 5, provided that the
contribution is made to a "donee organization. '40 9 A NGO will qualify
as a donee organization if: (i) it is a domestic NGO; (ii) it is not
carried on for the private pecuniary profit of any individual; and (iii)
its funds are, in the opinion of the Inland Revenue, applied wholly or
principally to charitable, benevolent, philanthropic, or cultural
purposes within New Zealand. 410 The amount of the rebate afforded
to individual donors is equal to the lesser of one-third of the
charitable contributions made during the year or NZD 500.411 In its
recent report on the tax treatment of charities, the Inland Revenue
proposed to increase the maximum rebate from NZD 500 to NZD
600.412
The Inland Revenue also considered, but rejected, the
possibility of (i) permitting donations of property other than money to
qualify for the rebate and (ii) introducing a payroll giving scheme
413
similar to the one that currently exists in England and Wales.

405.
Id.
1.5, 6.3.
406.
Id.
6.3; David Simcock, New Zealand, in INTERNATIONAL CHARITABLE
GIVING, supra note 353, at New Zealand-i, -4.
407.
INLAND REVENUE, TAX AND CHARITIES, supra note 392,
6.3.
408.
Id. 8.4.
409.
Income Tax Act, 1994, § KC 5(1)(aa) (N.Z.); INLAND REVENUE, TAX AND
CHARITIES, supra note 392,
6.4.
410.

Income Tax Act, 1994, § KC 5(1)(aa) (N.Z.); INLAND REVENUE, TAX AND

CHARITIES, supra note 392,
6.4. In practice, many NGOs seek confirmation of this
"donee" status from the Inland Revenue. INLAND REVENUE, TAX AND CHARITIES, supra
note 392, 6.4.
411.
Income Tax Act, 1994, § KC 5(2) (N.Z.).
412.

INLAND REVENUE, TAX AND CHARITIES, supra note 392,

11.8.

413.
Id.
11.9-.10. See supra text accompanying notes 372-75 for a description
of the payroll giving scheme in England and Wales.
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Despite being generally confined to domestic NGOs with
domestic charitable purposes, donee status has been extended by the
New Zealand Parliament to a number of specifically-identified foreign
NGOs (e.g., UNICEF and Amnesty International) and domestic
NGOs with foreign charitable purposes. 414 Both foreign NGOs and
domestic NGOs with foreign charitable purposes must, therefore,
"seek and obtain specific legislative approval" of their donee status. 4 15
For a NGO with foreign charitable purposes to obtain legislative
approval of its donee status, the funds obtained by the NGO must "be
applied towards either: the relief of poverty, hunger, sickness or
ravages of war or natural disaster; or the economy of developing
countries (recognised as such by the United Nations); or raising the
educational standards of a developing country. '416 NGOs with
foreign charitable purposes that have been "formed for the principal
purpose of fostering or administering any religion, cult or political
creed" have, however, been refused donee status. 4 17 Donee status is
restricted in this manner because the tax relief afforded to donors is
viewed by New Zealand as a governmental expenditure that "should
be consistent with [its] overseas aid programme. '418 In its recent
report on the tax treatment of charities, the Inland Revenue proposed
to standardize the tax treatment of NGOs with foreign charitable
purposes by making both their income tax exemption and their donee
status depend on a grant of specific legislative approval from the New
4 19
Zealand Parliament.
In addition to being afforded income tax relief, individuals are
exempted from gift duty, which is imposed at graduated rates ranging
from five percent to twenty-five percent, on their contributions to
NGOs. 4 20 There is no geographic limitation on the exemption from
421
gift duty.

414.
Income Tax Act, 1994, § KC 5(1) (N.Z.). Most recently the Cry for the
World Foundation New Zealand Humanitarian Aid Fund was added to the list of
specifically-identified NGOs afforded donee status. Taxation (Taxpayer Assessment
and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2001, § 140 (N.Z.). In a bill introduced in the New
Zealand Parliament in December 2001, donee status would also be extended to the
Akha Rescue Ministry Charitable Trust. Taxation (Relief, Refunds, and Miscellaneous
Provisions) Bill, 2001, § 40 (N.Z.); Adrian J. Sawyer, New Zealand's December Tax Bill
Contains a Potpourriof Changes, 25 TAx NOTES INT'L 259 (2002).
INLAND REVENUE, TAX AND CHARITIES, supra note 392, 1 6.5. See also id.
415.

1 10.1.
Id. 10.3.
416.
417.
Id. 10.4.
418.
Id. 10.2.
419.
Id. IT 10.6-.10. See supra text accompanying notes 391-396.
420.
Estate and Gift Duties Act, 1968, § 73(1) (N.Z.). Note that the estate duty
has been abolished. Holmes, supra note 391, at New Zealand-6.
421.
Holmes, supra note 391, at New Zealand-9.
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Corporations, other than closely-held corporations, 422 that make
cash contributions to donee organizations are entitled to deduct the
amount of their gifts in calculating their taxable income. 423 The
amount of the deduction is subject to two limitations: (i) a per-donee
Under the per-donee
limitation and (ii) an overall limitation.
limitation, the deduction for contributions to any one donee
organization cannot exceed in a given year the greater of one percent
of the corporation's net income or NZD 4,000.424 Under the overall
limitation, the total deduction for all contributions to donee
organizations made during the year cannot exceed the greater of five
percent of the corporation's net income or NZD 1,000.425 In its recent
report on the tax treatment of charities, the Inland Revenue proposed
to simplify the limitations on corporate charitable contributions by
removing the per-donee limitation as well as the NZD 1,000 portion of
the overall limitation, thereby allowing corporate contributions up to
five percent of the corporation's net income. 42 6 The Inland Revenue
also proposed to extend the deduction for charitable contributions to
closely-held corporations that are listed on a recognized stock
exchange. 42 7 As was the case with the tax relief afforded to
individuals, the Inland Revenue considered, but rejected, the
possibility of allowing a deduction for contributions of property other
428
than money.
4. France
a. Development of the Nonprofit Sector
The nonprofit sector in France dates back to the origins of the
French nation in the fifth century. 429 During the early Middle Ages,
French society was based on feudalism and the central state was
weak. 430 While feudal lords provided protection to the peasantry, it
was the Catholic Church that tended to social concerns. 4 31 The
Church owned a great deal of real estate and collected a tithe from
the populace; this property was considered the "patrimony of the

422.
See Income
423.
424.
425.

A closely-held corporation is one that is controlled by five or fewer persons.
Tax Act, 1994, § OB 1 (N.Z.).
Id. § DJ 4.
Id. § DJ 4(a).
Id. § DJ 4(b).

426.

INLAND REVENUE, TAX AND CHARITIES, supra note 392,

427
428.

Id.
Id.

429.

EDITH

11.14-.15.

11.16.
11.13.
ARCHAMBAULT, THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN

Hopkins Nonprofit Sector Series No. 3, 1997).
430.
Id.
431.
Id.

FRANCE 20 (Johns
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poor," who were entered on a list-the matricule-and were entitled
'43 2
"to receive one third of the gifts to the parishes.
During the climax of the Middle Ages, power shifted from the
feudal lords to the king, and although the Church continued to play
an important role, a rise in giving by the king, nobles, and the newlycreated .bourgeoisie marked the beginning of the secularization of
French philanthropy. 4 33 During the late Middle Ages, the political
and economic turmoil of The Hundred Years War and the decimation
caused by the Plague were accompanied by a "rise of extreme poverty
434
and [a] decrease of resources ... for charitable organizations."
This caused the Church to try to "shift the responsibility of some
charities to laymen and to the emerging central state. '435 During the
Renaissance, the secularization of charities continued as "King
Franiois I created a .'great agency for the poor' and "the royal
chaplains were commissioned to control every hospital in the
kingdom. '436 By the time of the Enlightenment, the nonprofit sector
had become very active, and there were "early examples of nearly
every kind of nonprofit organization[ ]."437
The French Revolution dealt a severe blow to this flourishing
nonprofit sector. In 1791, as part of the effort to wipe out all vestiges
of the ancien rdgime, the Ddcret dAllarde suppressed the medieval
guilds, which were the ancestors of trade unions and professional
associations and which had provided the only source "of mutual
assistance outside the family. '438
Concomitantly, the Loi Le
Chapelier outlawed "any voluntary association except political
clubs. '439 The impetus for both of these laws was "a Rousseauian
concept of the state as the achievement of the collective interest of the
French people: 'No one is allowed to incite citizens to have an
intermediary interest [between their own and the State's], to separate
them from the Nation by a spirit of cooperation."' 440 Beginning in
1810, however, the Loi Le Chapelier was somewhat relaxed. From
that time through the end of the nineteenth century, only the
formation of associations of more than twenty persons was

432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
same fate
1795. Id.
440.

Id.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 28.
Id. Despite their initial exemption, political associations soon suffered the
as other voluntary associations; they became subject to the prohibition after
at 29.
Edith Archambault, France, in DEFINING THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra

note 264, at 103, 104.
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restricted. 44 1
Such associations could not be created without
government approval, which Was "sparingly granted," 442 and leaders
443
of unauthorized associations were subject to criminal punishment.
444
The French nonprofit sector did not begin to "shed its illegality"
until the late nineteenth century-when the crime of coalition was
abolished in 1864, labor unions were legalized in 1884, and voluntary
445
associations were legalized in 1901.
"[W]ith the growing importance of the Red Cross and other
emergency and relief organizations," World War I proved to be a
turning-point for the French nonprofit sector.4 46 Between the two
world wars, mutual benefit societies grew along with government
social welfare programs, and then adapted to fill in the gaps left by
the comprehensive social security system established in France after
World War I1 4 47 Later, during the 1960s and 1970s, voluntary
associations began to grow rapidly as a result of "[n]ew concerns"
(e.g., the environment, feminism, and international development and
Third World countries) "a more active 'civil society,' financial public
encouragement, and favorable regulations. ''44 8 This trend continued
in the 1980s with the institution of a policy of decentralization by the
Socialist government of Franqois Mitterand, "which was further
developed
and
implemented
by
successive
Socialist
administrations. '449
Use of the nonprofit sector was strongly
encouraged as a part of this policy of decentralization, and lower
levels of government "delegated some economic or social local policies
to associations or shared their new responsibilities with the nonprofit sector. '450 Nevertheless, a vestigial mistrust of NGOs persists
45 1
in France even today.

441.
442.
443.
444.
445.

ARcHAMBAULT, supra note 429, at 29.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 29.
Archambault, supra note 440, at 104.
Id. at 104-05.

446.

ARCHAMBAULT, supra note 429, at 37-38.

447.
448.
449.
450.

Archambault, supra note 440, at 105.
ARCHAMBAULT, supra note 429, at 44-45.
Archambault, supra note 440, at 106.
ARCHAMBAULT, supra note 429, at 46.

451.

Yann Kergall, France, in TAXATION OF NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra

note 353, at 389, 393 ("Nevertheless, the mistrust of associations continues. Since the
Law of 1901, periodic legislative intervention has evidenced the same preoccupations:
assuring liberty while at the same time maintaining a measure of government
control.") (translation by author).
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b. NGO Tax Relief
In France, NGOs generally take one of two legal forms: the
association or the foundation. 452 The number of associations in
France far outstrips, the number of foundations. 453 This disparity has
been attributed to the existence of a hundred-year-old legal
framework regulating associations and the absence of a framework
454
regulating foundations until a little more than a decade ago.
An association is broadly defined as an agreement under which
two or more persons come together on a permanent basis to conduct
activities for a purpose other than sharing profits. 455 Associations are
either "declared" or "undeclared." Only declared associations are
456
vested with legal personality and the ability to receive donations.
An association becomes declared if it makes its existence public,
which is accomplished by filing a declaration with the appropriate
prefecture (i.e., local representative of the central government) and
then having an abstract of that declaration included in the Journal
officiel published by the French government. 457 Once declared, an
association may apply for recognition as an association of public
benefit ("recognized associations"). This status is granted by decree of
the Minister of the Interior after review by the Council of State,
which is the highest administrative body in France. 458 Obtaining this
status is advantageous because recognized associations benefit from a
"greater capacity to receive gifts and inheritances." 45 9 A foreign NGO
that operates in France and duly declares itself to the appropriate

452.
Antoine Valat et al., France,in CROSS-BORDER DONATIONS, supra note 356,
at France-i, France-1 to -2; Patrick Froti~e & Ren6 de Monseignat, France, in
INTERNATIONAL CHARITABLE GIVING, supra note 353, at France-i, France-1 to -2;
Kergall, supra note 451, at 389.
453.
Kergall, supra note 451, at 391, 394 (placing the number of associations at
more than 700,000 and the number of foundations at only 500).
See Law No. 87-571 of July 23, 1987, J.O., July 24, 1987, p. 8,255 (Fr.)
454.
(regulating foundations), available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/texteconsolide/
ACEDD.htm (consolidated version) [hereinafter Law No. 87-5711; Law of July 1, 1901,
J.O., July 2, 1901, p. 4,025 (Fr.) (regulating associations), available at
version)
(consolidated
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/texteconsolide/AAEBG.htm
[hereinafter Law of July 1, 1901]; Decree of Aug. 16, 1901, J.O., Aug. 17, 1901, p. 5,249
(Fr.) (regulating associations), available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/texteconsolidel
AAHBN.htm (consolidated version) [hereinafter Decree of Aug. 16, 1901]; Kergall, supra
note 451, at 394.
Law of July 1, 1901, supranote 454, art. 1.
455.
456. Id. art. 2 ; Froti6e & de Monseignat, supra note 452, at France-5.
Law of July 1, 1901, supra note 454, art. 5;Decree of Aug. 16, 1901., supra
457.
note 454, art. 1.
Lawof July 1, 1901, supra note 454, art. 10; Decree of Aug. 16, 1901, supra
458.
note 454, arts. 8 to 13-1; Froti6e & de Monseignat, supra note 452, at France-2 n.2.
459.
Valat et al., supranote 452, at France-1.
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governmental authorities is generally treated in the same fashion as
a declared association, and it may also apply for recognition as an
460
association of public benefit.
A foundation is defined as "an irrevocable assignment of property
or rights for a nonprofit purpose of public benefit. '46 1 There are two
types of foundations: foundations of public benefit and business
foundations. 462 A foundation of public benefit does not come into
existence until the Minister of the Interior issues a decree recognizing
its public benefit status after review by the Council of State, and that
decree is published in the Journal officiel.463 A foundation of public
benefit has the same capacity to receive gifts and inheritances as a
recognized association.4 64 A business foundation may be formed by
civil and commercial companies, public establishments of an
industrial or commercial character, or cooperative or mutual
entities. 465 A business foundation must also be formed for a nonprofit
purpose of public benefit.466 The existence of a business foundation
may not be perpetual, but must be for a fixed period of not less than
five years subject to renewal for a similar period. 4 67 A business
foundation does not come into existence until the publication of an
administrative decree in the Journalofficiel.4 6s The request for the
administrative decree is made to the Ministry of the Interior, which is
deemed to have granted the request four months after its submission
A business
if no action has been taken before that time.4 69
foundation is prohibited from soliciting donations from the general
4 70
public.
As this description of associations and foundations indicates, the
ability of a NGO in France to receive contributions from the public
Neither undeclared associations nor
depends upon its status.
business foundations are permitted to solicit donations from the
general public. 471 Declared associations that are not recognized to be
of public benefit are permitted to receive dons manuels, which are
"hand-to-hand gift[s] made without a registered deed. '472 Only
movable property such as cash or bearer shares may be the subject of

460.
461.
art. 18.
462.
463.
464.
465.

466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
454, art. 6.

Id. at France-9; Kergall, supra note 451, at 401.
Valat et al., supra note 452, at France-i; Law No. 87-571, supra note 454,
Law No. 87-571, supra note 454, arts. 18, 19.
Id. art. 18; Froti6e & de Monseignat, supra note 452, at France-3 to -4.
Valat et al., supra note 452, at France-1.
Law No. 87-571, supra note 454, art. 19.

Id.
Id. art. 19-2.
Id. art. 19-1.
Id.; Froti6e & de Monseignat, supra note 452, at France-4.
Law No. 87-571, supra note 454, art. 19-8.
See supra notes 456 and 470 and accompanying text.
Valat et al., supra note 452, at France-7; Law of July 1, 1901, supra note
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a don manuel.4 73 Recognized associations and foundations of public
benefit are eligible to receive any contribution; 474 however, if the
contribution does not qualify as a don manuel, then the organization
must request and receive approval from the appropriate
475
governmental authorities before accepting it.

The extent to which a .NGO, whether domestic or foreign, is
subject to income tax in France depends on whether it is engaged in
profit-making or nonprofit activities. 4 76 Whether a NGO's activities
are classed as profit-making or nonprofit depends, in turn, on the
facts of the particular situation. 4717 The factual nature of this inquiry
has led to differing interpretations by the courts and the tax
authorities, and has caused the tax treatment of NGOs to be
described as "one of the most uncertain areas" of French tax law. 478

In an effort to introduce a modicum of certainty into this area, the tax
authorities issued a guideline in 1998 containing a new three-step
approach for determining whether the activities of a NGO are profit479
making or nonprofit in nature.
The first step of this approach consists of determining whether
the management of the NGO is "disinterested. '48 0 The management
of a NGO is considered disinterested if: (i) the persons who influence
the direction of the organization do not, directly or indirectly, benefit
financially from the NGO's operations; (ii) the NGO does not
distribute its profits, directly or indirectly, in any form that is not
logically related to the purposes for which it was formed; and (iii)
neither the members of the NGO nor its beneficiaries have an
interest in the assets of the NGO, with the exception of the right to
the return of assets contributed by the members. 48 1
If the

473.
Valat et al., supra note 452, at France-7.
474.
Id. at France-8; Kergall, supra note 451, at 395.
475.
CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 910 (Fr.). In the case of gifts of up to FRF 5
million, the local prefecture must approve the contribution, and in the case of gifts
exceeding FRF 5 million, the Minister of the Interior must approve the contribution.
Valat et al., supra note 452, at France-8; Frotide & de Monseignat, supra note 452, at
France-6."
476.
Kergall, supra note 451, at 401; Valat et al., supra note 452, at France-3,
France-9 to -10. Because they lack legal personality, undeclared associations cannot
benefit from any relief from taxation. Froti6e & de Monseignat, supra note 452, at
France-3.
477.
Valat et al., supra note 452, at France-3.
478.
Id.
479.
Instruction of Sept. 15, 1998, Bull. Officiel des Imp6ts 4 H-5-98, Sept. 15,
1998 (Fr.), available at http://www.impots.gouv.fr/documentationlreglementaire/
boi/instructionl5_9_98.htm [hereinafter 1998 Guideline].
The 1998 Guideline was
clarified in certain respects by Instruction of Feb. 16, 1999, Bull. Officiel des Imp6ts 4 H-199, Feb. 19, 1999 (Fr.), available at http://www.impots.gouv.fr/documentation/
reglementaire/boilinsl9299.html [hereinafter 1999 Guideline].
480.
1998 Guideline, supra note 479, ch. 1, § 1.
481.
Id.
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management of the NGO is not disinterested, then the NGO is
considered to be engaged in profit-making activities. If, however, the
management is disinterested, then the analysis proceeds to the
second step of the new approach.
The second step consists of determining whether the NGO is
To make this
competing with profit-making enterprises. 48 2
determination, the activities of the NGO must be examined in order
to ascertain whether the NGO is offering goods and services that are
similar to those offered by profit-making enterprises in the same
market. 483 If members of the public can obtain the relevant goods or
services equally from the NGO or a profit-making enterprise, then the
484
NGO is considered to be competing with profit-making enterprises.
If the NGO is not found to be competing with profit-making
enterprises, then the NGO is not considered to be engaged in profitmaking activities. If, however, the NGO is found to be competing
with profit-making enterprises, then the analysis proceeds to the
third, and final, step of the new approach.
The third step consists of determining whether the NGO
conducts its activities in a fashion similar to a profit-making
enterprise. 485 This is referred to as the "rule of the four Ps" because
the benchmarks for this determination are product, public, price, and
publicity. 486 Each of these "four Ps" is not, however, of equal
importance; instead, they have been listed-and will be discussed-in
487
descending order of importance:
Product and public. Under the rubric of the first two Ps, the
social benefit of the NGO's activities must be assessed by reference to
the product being furnished and the targeted sector of the public. An
activity will be considered socially beneficial either if the product
being furnished meets a need that is not being met by the private
sector or if the activity is undertaken to meet the needs of a sector of
the public that deserves special treatment because of its social or
488
economic situation, such as the unemployed or handicapped.
Price. Under the rubric of the third P, the terms on which the
goods or services are provided to the public must be examined.
Normally, access to goods or services provided for the public benefit is
facilitated by offering those goods or services at a net price that is
lower than the market price. 489 In some cases, this condition may be

482.

Id. § 2(1).

483.

Id.

484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.

Id.
Id. ch. 1, § 2(2); Valat et al., supra note 452, at France-5.
Valat et al., supra note 452, at France-5.
1998 Guideline, supra note 479, ch. 1, § 2(2).
Id. § 2(2)(A)(I)-(II).
Id. § 2(2)(C); Valat et al., supra note 452, at France-5.
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satisfied by offering the goods or services at a price that varies in
49 0
accordance with the economic or social situation of the client.
Publicity. Under the rubric of the final P, the methods utilized
by the NGO to perform its activities must be examined to determine
Particular
whether they are similar to commercial practices.
attention is paid to the manner in which the NGO disseminates
information concerning its activities. On the one hand, the tax
authorities acknowledge that it may be appropriate for a NGrO to
apprise the public of its activities or to make a fundraising appeal in
support of those activities, but, on the other hand, they consider
systematic publicity such as billboard, magazine, radio, and television
491
advertising to be an indication that the activity is profit-oriented.
If, after applying the rule of the four Ps, it is determined that the
NGO conducts its activities in a fashion similar to a profit-making
enterprise, then the NGO is considered to be engaged in profitmaking activities.
If a NGO is engaged in profit-making activities, then the NGO is
subject to corporate tax with respect to all of its activities, both profitmaking and nonprofit. 492 Corporate tax is generally imposed at a
rate of thirty-three percent, 493 subject to a surcharge of six percent for
accounting years ending in 2001 and three percent for accounting
years ending after January 1, 2002. 494 If, however, (i) the NGO
isolates its profit-making activities from its nonprofit activities, (ii)
the profit-making activities are dissociable from the nonprofit
activities, and (iii) the nonprofit activities predominate, then
corporate tax will be imposed only on the income derived from the
NGO's profit-making activities. 4 95 Furthermore, if the managemerit
of the NGO is disinterested, its nonprofit activities predominate, and
the receipts from its profit-making activities do not exceed EUR
4 96
60,000, then the NGO will be exempted from corporate tax.
Income of a NGO derived from nonprofit activities is exempt
from corporate tax, unless it consists of rental income, agricultural
income, or income from passive investments, in which case it is
taxable at a reduced rate of either ten percent or twenty-four
percent. 497 A NGO that is exempt from corporate tax, or that is only

490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.

1998 Guideline, supra note 479, ch. 1, § 2(2)(C).
Id. § 2(2)(D).
Code Gbnbral des Impbts [C.G.I.] art. 206(1) (Fr.).
Id. art. 219(1).
Id. art. 235 ter ZA.
1998 Guideline, supra note 479, ch. 4; 1999 Guideline, supra note 479, ch.

2.
496.
C.G.I. art. 206 his (1); Instruction of Oct. 30, 2000, Bull. Officiel des Impbts
4 H-3-00, Nov. 7, 2000 (Fr.), available at http://www.impots.gouv.fr/documentation/
reglementaire/boi/4h3-00.pdf [hereinafter 2000 Guideline].
497.
C.G.I. arts. 206(5), 219 bis; Valat et al., supra note 452, at France-6.
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subject to corporate tax at reduced rates, is exempted from the
corporate minimum tax,, which is imposed on the basis of turnover
rather than on profit. 498 If a NGO is partially subject to corporate
tax, then it will likewise be partially subject to the corporate
499
minimum tax (i.e., only with respect to its profit-making activities).
An additional tax that may be of concern to NGOs in France is
the inheritance and gift tax, which is imposed on the donee of the gift

or bequest. 500 Inheritance and gift tax is imposed at a rate of thirtyfive percent on the first FRF 150,000 of gifts or bequests, and at a
rate of forty-five percent on any excess. 50 1 Dons manuels are
generally exempt from inheritance and gift tax. 50 2 Recognized
associations and foundations of public benefit, which are the only
NGOs permitted to receive contributions other than dons manuels,
are subject to inheritance and gift tax on such contributions unless
their resources are exclusively earmarked for scientific, cultural, or
artistic objectives of a disinterested character or for assistance,
50 3
protection of the environment; or the protection of animals.
Foreign NGOs do not benefit from these exemptions from
inheritance and gift tax. 50 4 Nevertheless, through bilateral tax
treaties, France has, under certain conditions, extended the benefit of
these exemptions to certain NGOs that are tax residents of Austria,
Bolivia, Cameroon, Finland, Germany, Israel, Italy, the Ivory Coast,
Lebanon, Mexico, Senegal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
50 5
United States.

498.
499.
500.
501.
502.

C.G.I. art. 223 septies.
2000 Guideline, supra note 496, 32.
Valat et al., supra note 452, at France-9.
C.G.I. art. 777, tableau III.
Id.

503.

Id. art. 795(2°), (40).

504.
Kergall, supra note 451, at 407. But cf. Valat et al., supra note 452, at
France-9 to -10, -17.
505.
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, July 31, 1995, Fr.-Isr.,
art. 24(6)(b), 1996 J.O. 13,901 (Fr.); Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation
with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, Dec. 15, 1994, Fr.-Bol., art. 24(5)(b),
1996 J.O. 17,389 (Fr.); Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Succession and Gift Taxes, June 8, 1994,
Fr.-Swed., art. 11(2), 1996 J.O. 4,090 (Fr.); Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Inheritances,
Estates, and Gifts, Mar. 26, 1993, Fr.-Aus., art. 10(2), 1994 J.O. 18,053 (Fr.) (on a caseby-case basis); Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes-on Income, Nov. 7, 1991, Fr.-Mex., art. 22(5)(b),
1993 J.O. 3,536 (Fr.); Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Inheritances, Estates, and Gifts, Dec. 20,
1990, Fr.-Italy, art. 17(2), 1995 J.O. 5,383 (Fr.); Accord Concerning the Fiscal
Treatment of Gifts Made for Public Interest Purposes, Oct. 30, 1979, Fr.-Switz., 1982
J.O. 682 (Fr.); Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Estates, Inheritances, and Gifts, Nov. 24,
1978, Fr.-U.S., art. 10, 1980 J.O. 2,274 (Fr.); FiscalConvention, Oct. 21, 1976, Fr.-
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c. Donor Tax Relief
In France, until the 1980s, the tax relief afforded for
contributions made to NGOs was of a symbolic nature only. 50 6 At
present, both individuals and companies are entitled to tax relief for
contributions made to NGOs, whether domestic or foreign, that take
the form of recognized associations or foundations of public benefit
and that are of a philanthropic, educational, scientific, social,
humanitarian, sporting, familial, or cultural character or that
contribute to the promotion of the artistic heritage, the protection of
the environment, or the promotion of French culture, language, or
scientific knowledge. 50 7 If approved by the Council of State, a
recognized association or foundation of public benefit may serve as an
intermediary for contributions made to other organizations with
similar purposes. 50 8 For a donation to qualify for tax relief, the NGO
must carry out its activities in France (or from France, in the case of
humanitarian relief efforts or the promotion of French culture,
language, and scientific knowledge). 50 9 No tax relief is afforded for
contributions to organizations that do not undertake their activities
in France or that undertake only limited activities in France in favor
of a restricted group of persons. 5 10 This restriction is apparently
based on the notion that the government should only forego tax
revenue in the name of encouraging the activities of a NGO, if those
511
activities 'grant[ ] a benefit to the national community."'

Cameroon, Protocol, art. 20, 1997 J.O. 1,360 (Fr.); Convention, Mar. 29, 1974, Fr.-Sen.,
Protocol, art. 12, 1993 J.O. 3,144 (Fr.); Convention, Apr. 6, 1966, Fr.-C6te D'Ivoire,
Protocol, art. 16, 1995 J.O. 7,185 (Fr.); Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and for the Establishment of Rules for Reciprocal Administrative Assistance
with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Successions, Jan. 8, 1963, Fr.-Spain, art. 38,
1964 J.O. 227 (Fr.); Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Establishment of Rules for Reciprocal Administrative Assistance with Respect to Taxes
on Income and on Successions, July 24, 1962, Fr.-Leb., art. 36, 1964 J.O. 251 (Fr.);
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and for the Establishment of Rules
for Reciprocal Juridical and Administrative Assistance with Respect to Taxes on
Income and on Capital as well as with Respect to Business and Land Taxes, July 21,
1959, Fr.-F.R.G., Protocol, art. 6, 1990 J.O. 13,546 (Fr.); Convention for the Avoidance
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Succession
Duties, Aug. 25, 1958, Fr.-Fin., art. 12, 1959 J.0. 849 (Fr.).
ARCHAMBAULT, supra note 429, at 69-70.
506.
C.G.I. arts. 200(1)(a)-(b), 238 bis (1).
507.
C.G.I. arts. 200(2), 238 bis (2).
508.
Valat et al., supra note 452, at France-11; Kergall, supra note 451, at 410.
509.
510.
Valat et al., supra note 452, at France-l1; Kergall, supra note 451, at 410.
511.
Froti~e & de Monseignat, supra note 452, at France-9. As indicated above,
activities that benefit the national community include not only activities undertaken in
France, but also certain humanitarian and cultural activities undertaken abroad. See
supra text accompanying note 509.
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Individuals are entitled to a tax credit for contributions made to
qualifying NGOs. 512 The amount of the tax credit is generally equal
to fifty percent of the contributions made, 513 but the total credit
cannot exceed ten pecent of taxable income.5 14 Companies are
entitled to a deduction for their contributions made to qualifying
NGOs.5 15 This deduction is limited to 0.325% of turnover in the case
of contributions to recognized associations and foundations of public
benefit and is limited to 0.225% of turnover in the case of
contributions to other NGOs. 516 Any contributions in excess of this
5 17
limit can be carried over to the five succeeding taxable years.
5. Costa Rica
a. Development of the Nonprofit Sector
The development of the nonprofit sector in Costa Rica has
5 18
generally paralleled its development in Latin America as a whole.
The roots of the nonprofit sector in Latin America lie in the work of
the Catholic Church, which "has been a pillar of civil society in Latin
America since colonial times." 519 Nevertheless, NGOs did not truly
begin to take hold in Latin America until about fifty years ago.5 20
Following World War II, charitable NGOs were established "to
provide medicine, food, and clothes to those in need," and U.S. NGOs
that had originally been established to provide war relief began
working with these organizations.5 21 During the post-war period,
U.S. NGOs, particularly the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, also
began actively to donate to research NGOs in Latin America.5 22 The
Rockefeller Foundation began to fund agricultural research and
training in the 1940s, and the Ford Foundation became a leading
52 3
source of funds for social science research in the 1950s and 1960s.
The rise of repressive military regimes in the late 1960s and 1970s

512.
C.G.I. art. 200(1).
513.
In the case of contributions that benefit needy persons, the amount of the
tax credit is increased to 60%. Id. art. 200(4). For 2001, the maximum credit for such
contributions cannot exceed EUR 400. Id.
514.
Id. art. 200(1).
515.
Id. art. 238 his.
516.
Id. art. 238 bis (1)-(2).
Id. art. 238 bis (3).
517.
518.

See CARRIE A. MEYER, THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF NGOS IN LATIN

AMERICA 44-46 (1999).
519.
Id. at 25.
520.
Id. at 46.
521.
Id. at 25.
522.
Id. For a study of research NGOs in Latin America, see DANIEL C. LEVY,
LATIN AMERICA'S PRIVATE RESEARCH
BUILDING THE THIRD SECTOR (1996).

523.

CENTERS AND

MEYER, supra note 518, at 25-26.
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caused foreign NGOs to shift their resources from public institutions
to NGOs, which often sheltered politicians and intellectuals who had
been ousted from their positions in government or universities
5
through political and/or economic pressure. 24
In Latin America, the 1980s were marked by both economic and
political turmoil. During this period, an economic crisis caused many
Latin American countries to reduce their public sectors and to
transfer the provision of some public services to NGOs. 52 5 In
response, social funds sprung up across Latin America to provide
"funding to contractors and NGOs for the construction of social
'526
infrastructure and the delivery of emergency social programs.
While still in the grip of this economic crisis, Central America became
"infested" with civil wars in the wake of the Sandinista revolution in
Nicaragua. 527
This political instability spurred the creation of
politically polarized NGOs throughout Central America. 528
The
growth of NGOs in Central America did not, however, slow with the
advent of peace efforts; indeed, it accelerated. 529 Adding to the sense
of political turmoil, the 1980s witnessed a shift in many Latin
American countries from repressive
military rule toward
democracy. 530
During the 1990s, NGOs experienced increased
participation in the policy-making processes of these fledgling Latin
531
American democracies.
b. NGO Tax Relief
In Costa Rica, NGOs take one of two legal forms: the association
or the foundation. 53 2 An association may be created for scientific,
artistic, sporting, charitable, recreational, or other legal purposes, so
long as the association does not have profit-making as its sole and
exclusive goal. 533 The minimum number of incorporators necessary
to create an association is ten, and the incorporators must appear
before a notary public to have the association's articles of

524.
Id. at 32; LEVY, supra note 522, at 55-59.
525.
MEYER, supranote 518, at 33; LEVY, supranote 522, at 59-62.
526.
MEYER, supranote 518, at 33.
527.
Id.; LEVY, supra note 522, at 63.
528.
MEYER, supranote 518, at 33; LEVY, supra note 522, at 63.
529.
MEYER, supranote 518, at 45. See also LEVY, supranote 522, at 63-64.
530.
MEYER, supra note 518, at 20.
531.
Id. at 35-36.
532.
Carlos Manuel Valverde & Harry J. Ziircher, Costa Rica, in
INTERNATIONAL CHARITABLE GIVING, supra note 353, at Costa Rica-1, Costa Rica-1 to
-2.

533.

Law on Associations, Law No. 218, Aug. 8, 1939, art. I (Costa Rica),

reprinted in REPUBLICA DE COSTA RICA: LEY DE AsoCIACIONES Y LEYES CONEXAS 5 (2d

ed. 1997) [hereinafter LEY DE ASOCIACIONES].
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incorporation notarized. 534
Once notarized, the articles of
incorporation must be submitted to the Association Registry for
registration. 535 A foundation is a private legal entity of public benefit
that is not established for the purpose of making a profit. 536 A
foundation may be established for the purpose of achieving (or aiding
in the achievement of) educational, charitable, artistic, literary,
scientific, or other social welfare activities. 537 In contrast to an
association, the minimum number of persons needed to create a
foundation is only one.538 A foundation may be created either by will
or public deed, and the founder may either be an individual or a legal

entity, whether

domestic. or foreign.5

39

Foundations0 must be
54

registered with the Person Section of the Public Registry.
Only the activities of foundations and associations of public
benefit are encouraged through the Costa Rican tax laws. To qualify
as an association of public benefit, an association must make an

application to the Ministry of Justice. 54 1 The application must
contain "a statement of the organization's objectives; specific plans for
achieving these objectives; a statement of need for the organization's
activities; and the geographic scope of the organization. ' 542 Among
the activities that are considered to be of public benefit are "cultural
or educational activities; caring for the sick, elderly or indigent; [and]
protection of the environment or human rights." 54 3 There is no
544
geographic limitation on where these activities may be undertaken.
Applications for public benefit status "are strictly reviewed" by the

534.
Id. art. 18 (as amended by Law No. 6020, Jan. 3, 1977), reprinted in LEY DE
ASOCIACIONES, supra note 533, at 9-10; Regulations Under the Law on Associations,
Decree No. 18,670-J, Nov. 28, 1988, art. 12 (Costa Rica), reprinted in LEY DE
ASOCIACIONES, supra note 533, at 20; Valverde & Ziircher, supra note 532, at Costa
Rica-1 to -2.
535.
Law on Associations, Law No. 218, Aug. 8, 1939, art. 5 (as amended by Law
No. 6020, Jan. 3, 1977) (Costa Rica), reprinted in LEY DE AsOCIACIONES, supra note
533, at 6; Valverde & Zdircher, supra note 532, at Costa Rica-2.
536.
Law on Foundations, Law No. 5338, Aug. 9, 1973, art. 1 (Costa Rica),
reprinted in LEY DE ASOCIACIONES, supra note 533, at 121.
537.
Id.
538.
Valverde & Ziircher, supra note 532, at Costa Rica-1; Law on Foundations,
Law No. 5338, Aug. 9, 1973, art. 2 (Costa Rica), reprinted in LEY DE ASOCIAcIONES,
supra note 533, at 121.
539.
Law on Foundations, Law No. 5338, Aug. 9, 1973, art. 2 (Costa Rica),
reprinted in LEY DE ASoCIACIONES, supra note 533, at 121.
540.
Id. art. 3, reprinted in LEY DE ASOCIACIONES, supra note 533, at 121;
Valverde & Ztircher, supra note 532, at Costa Rica-2.
541.
Regulations Under the Law on Associations, Decree No. 18,670-J, Nov. 28,
1988, art. 28 (Costa Rica), reprinted in LEY DE ASOCIACIONES, supra note 533, at 24;
Valverde & Ziircher, supra note 532, at Costa Rica-2.
542.
Valverde & Ziircher, supra note 532, at Costa Rica-2. See also Regulations
Under the Law on Associations, Decree No. 18,670-J, Nov. 28, 1988, art. 29 (Costa
Rica), reprinted in LEY DE ASOCIACIONES, supra note 533, at 25.
543.
Valverde & Ziircher, supra note 532, at Costa Rica-3.
544.
Id.
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government, and "the number of such organizations is rather tightly
545
controlled" because of the "fiscal advantages" accorded to them.
Foundations and associations of public benefit are exempt from
income tax so long as (i) their income is dedicated exclusively to one
or more of the public benefit purposes described above and (ii) their
546
income is not distributed directly or indirectly to their members.
To claim this tax exemption, foundations and associations of public
547
benefit must register with the Directorate General of Taxation.
Registration is accomplished by presenting a certificate of good
standing from the appropriate governmental agency along with a list
of the NGO's members and any other documents required by the
548
Directorate General of Taxation.
549
c. Donor Tax Relief

Costa Rica affords tax relief to donors of contributions made to
qualifying foundations and associations. 550
Donors, whether
individuals, corporations, trusts, or estates, are entitled to a tax
deduction for contributions made to foundations and associations that
are engaged in scientific, cultural, or social welfare activities and for
contributions made to civil or sporting associations that have been
declared to be of public benefit. 551 To be eligible to receive taxdeductible contributions, these NGOs must be registered with, and
approved by, the Directorate General of Taxation. 552 The registration
and approval process entails an application to the Directorate
General of Taxation, which must be accompanied by conformed copies
of the articles of incorporation and by-laws of the NGO, a list of

545.
Id.
546.
Income Tax Law, Law No. 7092, Apr. 21, 1988, art. 3(ch) (Costa Rica)
[hereinafter Law No. 7092], available at http://www.hacienda.go.cr/tributacion/
marco legal.html; Alonso Arroyo, Costa Rica, in INT'L BUREAb OF FISCAL
DOCUMENTATION, LATIN AMERICA TAXATION § 2.05(a) (2000); Valverde & Ziircher,

supra note 532, at Costa Rica-4.
547.
Income Tax Regulations, Decree No. 18,445-H, Sept. 9, 1988, art. 6 (Costa
Rica) [hereinafter Decree No. 18445-H] available at http://www.hacienda.go.cr/
tributacion/marcojlegal.html.
548.
Id.
549.
There is no inheritance or gift tax in Costa Rica. Arroyo, supra note 546,
§ 7.07. Accordingly, the discussion in the text below is confined to the income tax relief
provided to donors of contributions made to NGOs.
550.
Valverde & Ziircher, supra note 532, at Costa Rica-4; Law No. 7092, supra
note 546, art. 2 (listing the persons who are subject to income tax). Note that an
individual's wages are subject to a final withholding tax and cannot be offset by
deductions for charitable contributions. Law No. 7092, supra note 546, arts. 8(b)
(allowing a deduction from the general income tax for wages), 32-46 (setting forth the
withholding tax regime applicable to wages).
551.
Law No. 7092, supra note 546, art. 8(q); Arroyo, supra note 546, § 2.09(e).
552.
Decree No. 18,445-H, supra note 547, art. 12(l)(I).
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members of the NGO, and any other documents required by the
Directorate General of Taxation. 553 Only contributions made after
the NGO has been registered with, and approved by, the Directorate
General of Taxation are deductible. 554 Contributions are 'deductible
whether they are made in the form of money or other property 5 55 and
whether they are made to domestic or foreign NGOs, so long as the
foreign NGO is registered with, and has been approved by, the
556
Directorate General of Taxation.
6. Czech Republic
a. Development of the Nonprofit Sector
The roots of the Czech nonprofit sector lie in religion. During the
Middle Ages, the Catholic Church "played a dominant role ... in
creating charitable institutions. ''557
Other religions, including
Judaism in particular, also contributed to the development of the
Czech nonprofit sector. 558 But, as urban centers began to grow, so did
secular philanthropy. 559 During the late Middle Ages and the
Renaissance, the role of the Church diminished and the
560
secularization of the nonprofit sector continued.
During the period of Enlightened Absolutism that occurred in
the latter half of the eighteenth century under the Habsburg Empire,
the state took property from the Church and transferred it to "public
charities and foundations for humanitarian and social purposes,
which [were] used to centralize social care and welfare. '561 The State
also introduced a secular educational system that caused "the
position of the Church [to] diminish[ ] in elementary, secondary, and
university education. ' 562
Civic associations and foundations
"blossomed" during the National Revival that occurred from about
1830 to the early 1850s, and "a number of patriotic societies
supporting the arts and education were formed" during the ensuing
563
neo-absolutist period.
When the Czechoslovak Republic gained its independence in
1918 and democracy was introduced, "[a] new surge of societies,

553.
554.
555.
556.

Id. art. 12(1)(I)-(111).
Id. art. 12(l) (flush language).
Valverde & Zfircher, supra note 532, at Costa Rica-5.
Id.

557.

PAVOL

FRIt ET AL.,

DEFINING THE

NONPROFIT

SECTOR: THE

CZECH

REPUBLIC 2 (The Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, Working
Paper, 1998).
558.
Id.
559.
Id.
560.
Id.
561.
Id.
562.
Id.
563.
Id. at 3.
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associations and foundations" occurred.5 64 These organizations "were
often formed on the basis of ethnic or religious principles for cultural,
educational, and charitable activities or to attack social and health
problems. ' 565 However, this surge of civic activities came to an
abrupt end :with the Nazi occupation that began in 1939.566 Many
organizations became either "dysfunctional or were banned
entirely." 567 After World War II, most organizations began their work
anew, "but it was not long before their development was violently
interrupted again by the coup of 1948."568
With the advent of communism, it became impossible to conduct
civic activities through independent organizations. 569 The state
confiscated the property of these associations and persecuted or
imprisoned "a number of democratically-minded people. '570 In a
"campaign against the Church" that began in 1951, all church-related
charitable and diocesan associations "were systematically dissolved,"
and "[iln 1960, diocesan facilities had to relinquish their remaining
social care establishments and institutions to the state." 571 All social
and political activities that were permitted by the state were
consolidated in the National Front, which was comprised of "a variety
of political organizations, trade unions, and so-called 'voluntary social
organizations.' '5 72 The organizations that comprised the National
Front were subsidized by the state and served "as yet another
'5 73
instrument of state control over social and private life.
For a short period during the late 1960s, interest in civic
activities "reawakened" as civic appeals were launched (e.g., SOS for
Children's Family Homes) and the Scouts and Sokol (a physical
however, the
education association) became active again;
reawakening came to a close when these activities were banned after
the end of the Prague Spring in 1968. 574 During the 1980s another,
longer-lasting reawakening occurred as "new educational and
575
scientific groups, societies, and self-help cooperatives appeared.
Gradually, "[t]he activities of officially permitted and 'tolerated'
576
organizations ... started to develop outside state control.

564.
565.
566.
567.
568.
569.
570.
571.
572.
573.
574.
575.
576.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
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Following the 1989 revolution, an act regulating the activities of
associations "was passed and new organizations independent of the
state developed." 57 7 Organizations were formed to tend to the social
and health care problems of groups that had been ignored by the
state under communism (e.g., gays and lesbians, AIDS victims, the
mentally ill, and the homeless) as well as to address local and
578
regional problems.
At present, "the Czech nonprofit sector is still in a period of selfidentification." 579 This process has been complicated by the current
negative public perception of NGOs, 580 by political obstacles (i.e., the
nonprofit sector "is regarded as peripheral to the overall process of
economic transformation"), and by financial obstacles (i.e., the lack of
independent sources of revenue). 581
b. NGO Tax Relief
In the Czech Republic, most NGOs take the form of a civil
association. 582 The permissible activities of a civil association are not
affirmatively defined by law. 583
Instead, the law negatively
delineates the boundaries of a civil association's permissible activities
by providing that a civil association cannot have as one of its
purposes "to deny or to restrict personal, political or other civil rights
because of nationality, sex, race, origin, political or other opinions,
religion and social status, to foster hate and intrasigency [sic] for
these reasons, to assist in violence, or otherwise to commit breach of
constitution and laws. ' 58 4 Furthermore, a civil association cannot be
created for the primary purpose of making a profit. 585 A civil
association is created by a preparatory committee, which must be
comprised of no less than three persons (including corporate bodies),
of whom at least one must have reached the age of eighteen. 58 6 A
civil association does not come into existence until it has been

577.
Id.
578.
Id.
579.
Id. at 1.
580.
Id.; Milton Cerny, Czech Republic, in INTERNATIONAL CHARITABLE GIVING,
supra note 353, at Czech Republic-i, Czech Republic-1 to -2.
581.
FRII ET AL., supra note 557, at 1.
582.
Law on the Association of Citizens, Act No. 83/1990, Mar. 27, 1990, § 2(1)
(Czech
Rep.),
translation available at
http://www.icnl.org/library/cee/laws/
czeactcitizensassociations.htm [hereinafter Law on the Association of Citizens]; FRI6 ET AL.,
supra note 557, at 6. Civil associations may also be referred to as societies, unions,
movements, or clubs. Law on the Association of Citizens, supra, § 2(1).
583.

FRIH ET AL., supra note 557, at 6.

584.
585.
586.

Law on the Association of Citizens, supra note 582, § 4(a).
Id. § 1(3)(b); FRI ETAL., supra note 557, at 6.
Law on the Association of Citizens, supra note 582, §§ 2(2), 6(2).
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registered with the Ministry of the Interior, which determines
58 7
whether the requisites for.incorporation have been satisfied.
NGOs may also take the form of a 'foundation or fund.
Foundations and funds are defined as a "purposeful association[ ] of
assets" that is established "for the achievement of publicly beneficial
s
goals. 5 88
"Publicly beneficial goals" include the "development of
spiritual values; protection of human rights or other humanitarian
values; protection of the environment, cultural monuments and
traditions; [and] developments in science, education, physical
education and sports. '58 9 If. there is more than one founder, a
foundation or fund is established by an agreement in writing among
the founders. 590 Each of the founders' signatures on the agreement
must be officially verified. 591 If there is only one founder, then a
foundation or fund may be established either by execution of a
foundation charter or a testament, both of which must take the form
of a notarial deed.5 92 Foundations and funds do not obtain legal
personality until they are entered in the foundation register of the
register court, which also maintains the register of commercial
593
entities.
. The primary difference between foundations and funds is that a
foundation must have an endowment. A foundation's endowment
cannot be less than CZK 500,000, must consist of "either cash kept in
a special bank account, real, estate, or other assets that generate
substantial income," and must be entered in the foundation's
register.5 94 A foundation's. endowment cannot itself be used to
achieve the purposes for which the foundation was created. 595 Only
the income from the endowment and assets not included in the
endowment may be used to achieve those purposes.59 6 Because it
does not have an endowment, a fund may use any or all of its assets
59 7
to achieve the purposes for which it was created.
With the exception of administrative expenses, foundations and
funds must use their assets solely for the purposes for which they

587.
Id. 9§ 6(1), 7(1)-(3).
Act on Foundations and Funds, Sept. 3, 1997, § 1(1) (Czech Rep.), translation
588.
available
at
http://www.icnl.orglibrary/cee/laws/czeactFoundationsEndFunds.htm
[hereinafter Act on Foundations and Funds].

589.
590.

Id. § 1(1).
Id. § 3(1).

591.
Id.
592.
Id.
593.
Id. § 5(1); FRIC ETAL., supra note 557, at 8.
594.
Act on Foundations and Funds,. supra note 588, §§.2(2), 3(4)-(5); FRiW ET
AL., supranote 557, at 7.
595.
Act on Foundations and Funds, supra note 588, § 2(2); FRIt ET AL., supra
note 557, at 7.
596.
FRIt ET AL., supra note 557, at 8.
597.
Act on Foundations and Funds, supra note 588, § 2(3).
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were created. 598 To curb administrative expenses, foundations and
funds must adopt a limit on the amount of such expenses that may be
incurred each year, "expressed as a percentage of either the total
income from the registered endowment, total grant expenditures, or
the overall value of assets. '599 This limitation cannot be changed for
at least five years following its adoption.60 0 Additionally, foundations
and funds "are expressly prohibited from using their property for the
benefit of employees, members of the board of directors or the
supervisory committee."60 1
Foundations and funds are also prohibited from engaging in
business activities either on their own or in partnership.60 2 The only
exception to this rule applies to foundations, which are permitted to
hold interests in publicly-traded joint stock companies. A foundation
may in no event, however, hold more than a twenty percent interest
in any joint-stock company, and its total investments in joint-stock
companies cannot3 exceed twenty percent of its assets, not including
60
its endowment.
The Czech Republic recently created an additional legal form for
NGOs-the public benefit corporation. A public benefit corporation is
defined as a legal entity that "renders generally beneficial services to
the general public and to all clients under identical terms and
conditions and.., the profit of which may not be used for the benefit
of its Founders, members of its bodies or employees and must serve to
render the generally beneficial services for which [it] was
established. ' 60 4 If there is more than one founder, a public benefit
corporation is established by an agreement in writing among the
founders. 60 5 Each of the founders' signatures on the agreement must
be officially verified. 60 6 If there is only one founder, then a public
benefit corporation is formed by a deed of establishment, which must
take the form of a notarial deed. 60 7 The founders of a public benefit
corporation may include individuals as well as legal and

598.
Id. § 21(1)-(2); FRII ET AL., supra note 557, at 8.
FRit ET AL., supra note 557, at 8. See also Act on Foundations and Funds,
599.
supra note 588, § 22(1).
600.
Act on Foundations and Funds, supra note 588, § 22(2).
601.
FRIC ET AL., supra note 557, at 8. See also Act on Foundations and Funds,
supra note 588, §§ 21(5), 23(6).
602.
Act on Foundations and Funds, supra note 588, § 23(1), (4)-(5); FRI6 ET AL.,
supra note 557, at 8.
Act on Foundations and Funds, supra note 588, § 23(4); FR1C ET AL., supra
603.
note 557, at 8.
604.
Law on Public Benefit Corporations, Act No. 248/1995, Sept. 28, 1995, art.
2(1) (Czech Rep.), translation available at http://www.icnl.org/library/cee/laws/
czeact248.htm [hereinafter Law on Public Benefit Corporations].
605.
Id. art. 4(1).
606.
Id.
607.
Id.
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governmental entities.6 08 The public benefit corporation obtains legal
personality when it is entered in the public benefit corporations
register of the register court, which, as mentioned above, also
maintains the register of commercial entities and of foundations and
6 09
funds.
In addition to its publicly beneficial services, a public benefit
corporation may engage in "complementary operations" that "improve
the utilization of [itsl assets without jeopardizing the quality, scope
610
and availability of the publicly beneficial services" that it renders.
A public benefit corporation is not prohibited from making a profit
from its activities, but those profits "must first be assigned to a
reserve fund to cover any future losses and then may be used for the
extension of the services for which the public benefit corporation was
however,
established. 6 1 1 A public benefit corporation may not,
612
participate in the commercial activities of other persons.
As this description of civil associations, foundations and funds,
and public benefit corporations indicates, the ability of Czech NGOs
to engage in business activities is limited. Nevertheless, to the extent
that Czech NGOs do generate income, whether through permissible
business activities or through activities related to their public benefit
purposes, they will be subject to income tax unless the item of income
generated is specifically exempted from tax.6 13 Among the items of
income that are exempted from tax, are: (i) subsidies and other forms
of support received from the state, 614 (ii) interest on amounts held in
16
Foundations are
a current account, 615 and (iii) membership fees.6
from their
derived
also generally exempted from tax on the income
6 17
with
separately
tax
NGOs calculate their income
endowment.
618
in
one
loss
a
net
has
If a NGO
respect to "each program area."
a
tax
claim
can
the
NGO
program area and net income in another,
allowance equal to CZK 100,000 or thirty percent of the relevant tax
base (but not in excess of CZK 3 million), whichever is greater,

Id. art. 3.
608.
Id. art. 5(1).
609.
610.
Id. art. 17(1).
FRIt ET AL., supra note 557, at 9. See also Law on Public Benefit
611.
Corporations, supra note 604, art. 17(3)-(4).
Law on Public Benefit Corporations, supra note 604, art. 17(2).
612.
Income Tax Act, Act No. 586/1992, §§ 17(1), 18(1) (Czech Rep.), translated
613.
in CZECH TAXATION IN 2000, at 72 (2000).
Id. § 18(4)(b), translated in CZECH TAXATION IN 2000, supra note 613, at 73.
614.
Id. § 18(4)(c), translated in CZECH TAXATION IN 2000, supranote 613, at 73.
615.
Id. § 19(1)(a), translated in CZECH TAXATION IN 2000, supra note 613, at 75.
616.
Id. § 19(1)(r), translatedin CZECH TAXATION IN 2000, supra note 613, at 77.
617.
FRI ET AL., supra note 557, at 11.
618.
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''provided the amount will be fully used to offset losses in other
6 19
related programs."
In the Czech Republic, the recipient of a gift, bequest, or devise is
subject to gift or inheritance tax.6 20 Although taxable recipients
include both individuals and legal entities,6 2 1 NGOs are exempted
from gift and inheritance taxes .under certain circumstances.
Property received by a civil association with its seat on the territory
of the Czech Republic is exempt from the gift and inheritance taxes if
the property is "determined for financing facilities and humanitarian
events relating to culture, schools, science and education, health care,
social care, environment, physical education, sports, education and
protection of children and youth, and fire protection"-provided that
the civil association was itself established for performing such
activities. 62 2 Property received by a public benefit corporation is
exempt from the gift and inheritance taxes if the property is more
generally "determined for [its] activities." 623 , Foundations and funds
benefit from the least restrictive exemption, as any property received
by a foundation or fund is exempt from the gift and 'inheritance
taxes.

624

c. Donor Tax Relief
In the Czech Republic, both individuals and corporations are
entitled to tax relief for contributions made for "public benefit
purposes" to legal entities that have their registered, office on the
territory of the Czech Republic.6 2 5 Public benefit purposes include: (i)
science and education, research and development, culture, schools,
the police, fire-prevention services, youth welfare, and animal
protection; (ii) social, health care, environmental, or humanitarian
purposes; and (iii) physical education and sports.6 26 No tax relief is
allowed for contributions made to a foreign NGO, and, to qualify as
an eligible recipient, a domestic NGO must limit its operations to the

619.
Id. at 11. See also Income Tax Act, Act No. 586/1992, § 20(7) (Czech Rep.),
translatedin CZECH TAXATION IN 2000, supranote 613, at 78-79.
Inheritance Tax, Gift Tax and Real Estate Transfer Tax Act, Act No.
620.
357/1992, §§ 2, 5(1) (Czech Rep.), translated in CZECH TAXATION IN 2000, supra note
613, at 447, 449, 453.
621.
Id. § 11, translatedin CZECH TAXATION IN 2000, supra note 613, at 453.
622.
Id. § 20(4)(a), translated in CZECH TAXATION IN 2000, supra note 613, at
460.
Id. § 20(4)(c), translated in CZECH TAXATION IN 2000, supra note 613, at
623.
460.
624.
Id. § 20(4)(d), translated in CZECH TAXATION IN 2000', supra note 613, at
461.
625.
FRIt ET AL., supra note 557, at 12.
Income Tax Act, Act No. 586/1992, §§ 15(8), 20(8) (Czech Rep.), translated
626.
in CZECH TAXATION IN 2000, supra note 613, at 69, 79.
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This restrictive approach to tax relief for
Czech Republic. 627
contributions made to foreign NGOs may reflect the fact that (i) the
Czech nonprofit sector is still in its infancy; (ii) the public generally
distrusts NGOs and generally "appear[s] to equate the nonprofit
sector with fraudulence, waste of public resources, or inconsequential
fringe groups"; 628 and (iii) "low interest in providing support for the
nonprofit sector and the failure to recognize its potential social and
economic. impact have been the main features of the relationship
between the government and the nonprofit sector in the recent
past."62 9
The form of the tax relief-a deduction from the tax base-is the
same for all taxpayers, but the limitations on the deduction differ
depending on whether the taxpayer is an individual or corporation.
An individual is entitled to a deduction for her contributions only if
her total contributions for the taxable period exceed either two
If an individual's
percent of her tax base or CZK 1,000.630
contributions exceed this threshold, they will be deductible up to a
maximum of ten percent of the individual's tax base. 631 A corporation
is entitled to a deduction for its contributions only if its total
contributions for the taxable period exceed CZK 2,000.632 If the
corporation's contributions exceed this threshold, they will be
deductible up to a maximum of two percent of the corporation's tax
633
base.
7. The Netherlands
a. Development of the Nonprofit Sector
The roots of the Dutch nonprofit sector "can be traced to church
related activities in poor relief, health care and education." 63 4 With
the advent of Protestantism in the sixteenth century, religious
diversity began to emerge in the Netherlands. 63 5 This diversity
spurred the growth of sectarian organizations and culminated in the
"pillarization" that occurred in the late nineteenth and early

627.
Cerny, supra note 580, at Czech Republic-8.
FRIC ET AL., supra note 557, at 15.
628.
629.
Id. at 16.
Income Tax Act, Act No. 586/1992, § 15(8) (Czech Rep.), translated in
630.
CZECH TAXATION IN 2000, supra note 613, at 69.
Id.
631.
632.
Id. § 20(8), translatedin CZECH TAXATION IN 2000, supra note 613, at 79.
633.
Id.
634.

VIC VELDHEER & ARY BURGER, HISTORY OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN THE

NETHERLANDS 23 (The Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, Working
Paper, 1999).
635.
Id. at 19-20, 23-24.

1204

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 35.1105

twentieth centuries. 636 The phenomenon of pillarization occurred at

all socio-economic, political, and cultural strata of Dutch society, and
resulted in "a great variety of denominational organizations such as
political parties, labor unions, housing associations, newspapers,
broadcasting associations, and also schools, hospitals and sport
clubs. ' 637

Pillarization

continued

to be

the

"most dominant

sector until the 1960s, when its
characteristic" of the Dutch nonprofit
638
dominance began to weaken.
Despite the important influence of religion, nonreligious and
nonsectarian initiatives also made significant contributions to the
creation and development of the Dutch nonprofit sector. 639 The
Maatschappij tot Nut van 't Algemeen (Society for the General Good)
is an example of a nonsectarian organization that "has left its mark
on the whole structure of Dutch society."6 40 The Society for the
General Good was founded in 1784 to educate "the ordinary
people."1641 To achieve this purpose, the society "set up a national

training school, published many school books, and established a book
fund. '642

The society also founded elementary schools and lending

libraries, and it targeted adults "by organizing evenings and
lectures." 643 Over time, the Society for the General Good also
"undertook efforts aimed at fighting poverty and caring for the poor,"
and it focused attention on pressing social issues through the
publication of "thorough-going reports. '644 After World War I, the
society's activities shifted somewhat from social issues to cultural
645
activities.
The government has also played a role in the development of the
Dutch nonprofit sector. Municipal authorities became involved in the
activities of religious and nonreligious organizations "at a very early
date."6 46 For some time, governmental involvement in the nonprofit
sector was confined to financial support, and private organizations
handled matters themselves. 647 But, as the government's financial
commitment to the nonprofit sector has grown, so has its desire "to
In
play a role in the decision-making within the sector. '648

636.
Id. at 19, 21. "Pillarization (Verzuiling in Dutch) is the process by which
groups of citizens organize themselves along religious and political lines." Id. at 21.
637.
Id.
638.
Id. at 20.
639.
Id. at 24.
640.
Id. at 8.
641.
Id.
642.
Id. at 9.
643.
Id.
644.
Id. at 9-10.
645.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 25.
646.
Id. at 20, 26.
647.
648.
Id. at 26.
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particular, the influence of the central government has grown
markedly since 1945, and it now extends "across virtually all areas of
care and welfare. '6 49 Recently, however, there has been a move
"towards a more hands-off approach on the part of the
6' 50
government.
b. NGO Tax Relief
In the Netherlands, NGOs generally take the form of either a
foundation or an association, with the foundation being the more
common of the two forms. 651
A foundation is an entity that
administers capital for a certain purpose, has no shareholders or
members, and cannot make distributions to its founders or managing
directors.6 52 A foundation may be formed either by execution of a
deed before a notary public or under a will executed before a notary
public.6 53 In contrast, an association has members, but it cannot
have the realization of profits for distribution to those members as
one of its purposes. 654 An association can be formed with or without
the execution of a deed; however, an association that is formed
without the execution of a deed cannot receive legacies, and its
members remain personally liable for all of its debts. 655 After
execution of the deed establishing the entity, the foundation or
association is required to be entered in the foundations register
(Stichtingenregister)
or
the
associations
register
(Verenigingenregister), as appropriate, of the local Chamber of
6 56
Commerce and Industry:
Although there is historical evidence that foundations were
intended to be used solely for charitable purposes, foundations are
not required to include a charitable purpose in their charters as a

649.
650.
651.

Id. at 21.
Id. at 25.
John Graham & Dries Duynstee, The Netherlands, in INTERNATIONAL
CHARITABLE GIVING, supra note 353, at The Netherlands-1, The Netherlands-L Ineke
A. Koele & K.L. Harrie van Mens, Netherlands, in TAXATION OF NON-PROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 353, at 621, 622; Ren6 Offermanns & Paul J. te Boekhorst,
Netherlands, in CROSS-BORDER DONATIONS, supra note 356, at The Netherlands-i,

Netherlands-1.
652.
Graham & Duynstee, supra note 651, at The Netherlands-1; Koele & van
Mens, supra note 651, at 622; Offermanns & te Boekhorst, supra note 651, at
Netherlands-1.
653.
Graham & Duynstee, supra note 651, at The Netherlands-2.
654.
Id. at The Netherlands-1.
655.
Id. at The Netherlands-2; Offermanns & te Boekhorst, supra note 651, at
Netherlands-1.
656.
Graham & Duynstee, supra note 651, at The Netherlands-2 to -3;
Offermanns & te Boekhorst, supra note 651, at Netherlands-1.
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prerequisite to formation. 6 57 In fact, foundations have increasingly
come to be used for commercial and private purposes in the
Netherlands. 658 A charitable purpose is also not necessary for a
foundation or association to qualify for preferential corporate income
tax treatment. 659 Simply by reason of their form of organization,
foundations and associations are subject to corporate income tax in
the Netherlands only to the extent that they engage in business
activities or engage in activities that compete with taxable
commercial enterprises. 660 Any income of a foundation or association
including portfolio
that is unrelated to such commercial activities, 66
1
investment income, is completely exempt from tax.
A further exemption from corporate income tax is provided for
662
entities that carry on business activities that benefit the public.
Among the activities that will support a tax exemption are activities
that benefit the sick, elderly, and poor. 663 If, however, an entity that
qualifies for this exemption earns a profit, including profits on
liquidation, that profit must be used for the benefit of other exempt
664
organizations or for the public benefit.
Foreign NGOs are subject to tax in the Netherlands on a
somewhat broader base than domestic NGOs. 665 Foreign NGOs are
subject to tax on "any business income derived through a permanent
establishment in the Netherlands and any income from Dutch real
property."66 6 Absent a bilateral tax treaty, the NGO will also be
subject to tax on certain interest and dividends received from Dutch
66 7
entities.
In the Netherlands, gift and inheritance tax is imposed on the
recipients of gifts, bequests, and devises. 6 68 NGOs benefit from a
preferential gift and inheritance tax regime, but only if they are
6 69
organized for religious, charitable, cultural, or scientific purposes.
Qualifying NGOs are exempt from tax on gifts, bequests, and devises
that fall below a de minimis threshold (for 2001, NLG 8,394 for gifts

657.
658.
659.

Koele & van Mens, supra note 651, at 622-23.
Id. at 623.
Id.; Offermanns & te Boekhorst, supra note 651, at Netherlands-2. See also

NETH. MINISTRY OF FIN., TAxATION IN THE NETHERLANDS 2001 § 3.1 (2001), available at

http://www.minfin.nl/default.asp?CMSTCP=tcpAsset&id=A5AC250C5B6745B5B67B9434
2DDBEB21 [hereinafter NETHERLANDS 2001].
660.
Koele & van Mens, supra note 651, at 623-24.
Id. at 623-24, 630-31.
661.
Offermanns & te Boekhorst, supra note 651, at Netherlands-2.
662.
Id.
663.
664.
Id.
Koele & van Mens, supra note 651, at 628.
665.
666.
Id.
667.
Id.
668.
Offermanns & te Boekhorst, supra note 651, at Netherlands-4;
NETHERLANDS 2001, supra note 659, § 2.2.1, at 13.
669.
Offermanns & te Boekhorst, supra note 651, at Netherlands-4.
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and NLG 17,090 for bequests and devises). 670 If they exceed this de
minimis threshold, the gifts, bequests, and devises are taxed at a
reduced, flat rate-so long as they are not subject to a condition that
prevents their use for the public benefit.6 7' Gifts, bequests, and
devises to foreign NGOs generally do not qualify for this preferential
treatment.672
c. Donor Tax Relief
In the Netherlands, both individuals and corporations are
entitled to a deduction for contributions made to qualifying NGOs. A
qualifying NGO is a domestic NGO that is organized for charitable,
673
religious, scientific, cultural, or other public benefit purposes.
Since 1990, a foreign NGO will be considered a qualifying NGO for
this purpose if either (i) the, scope of the foreign NGO's activities
extends to the Netherlands or (ii) the foreign NGO's activities are of a
supranational character (e.g., environmental protection).674 There is
no requirement that a NGO apply to the government for recognition
or approval of its status as an entity eligible to receive deductible
contributions. 675 This "rather liberal and practical approach" 676 to
tax relief for contributions made to foreign NGOs is likely a product
foreign countries,"
of the Netherlands' historic "orient[ation] toward
6 77
which is reflected in its tax system in general.
In the case of an individual, contributions made to qualifying
NGOs are deductible to the extent that they exceed NLG 132 or one

670.
Id.
Id.
671.
Id. at Netherlands-8; Koele & van Mens, supra note 651, at 639.
672.
NETHERLANDS 2001, supra note 659, §§ 3.2.10, 4.2.3(X); Offermanns & te
673.
Boekhorst, supra note 651, at Netherlands-3.
674.
Ineke A. Koele, Netherlands, 37 EUR. TAX'N 354, 355 (1997); Koele & van
Mens, supra note 651, at 638; Offermanns & te Boekhorst, supra note 651, at
Netherlands-3.
675.
Graham & Duynstee, supra note 651, at The Netherlands-4.
Koele, supra note 674, at 354.
676.
Kees van Raad, General Description: The Netherlands, in AULT ET AL.,
677.
supra note 154, at 81, 95. In support of this contention, Professor van Raad points out
that the Netherlands derives i'an unusually large share of its GNP from import and
export activities," and that "both foreign direct investment by Netherlands companies
and investment in The Netherlands by foreign companies are large ... in comparative
and in absolute terms." Id. See also Dick Hofland & Michaela Vrouwenvelder,

Netherlands Finance Minister Releases InternationalTax Policy Report, WORLDWIDE
TAX DAILY, Aug. 24, 1998, available at LEXIS 98 TNI 163-2 (1998); Michael Molenaars

& Emile Bongers, Report Recommends Changes to Netherlands' Corporate Tax Regime,
12 J. INT'L TAX'N 58 (2001); Jeroen Pit & Klaas Verrips, New Tax Incentives Enhance

Netherlands as InternationalInvestment Location, 6 J. INT'L TAX'N 217 (1995).
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percent of taxable income, whichever is higher. 678 The deduction may
6 79
not, however, exceed ten percent of the individual's taxable income.
Neither of these limitations applies to a contribution made by an
individual to a qualifying NGO if the contribution (i) is memorialized
in a notarial deed and (ii) takes the form of annual payments to be
In the case of a
made for a minimum period of five years. 680
corporation, contributions are deductible to the extent that they
exceed NLG 500. 6 81 The deduction may not, however, exceed six
68 2
percent of the corporation's taxable income.
8. Spain

68 3

a. NGO Tax Relief
In 1994, Spain enacted Law 30/1994 to overhaul its laws
concerning NGOs and to clear away "the legislative brambles created
by disparate and dispersed rules, the force and effect of which are
more than doubtful. ' 684 The purpose of this overhaul was "to bring to
these rules clarity and rationality and to strengthen legal certainty,
while at the same time facilitating the work of those subject to the
rules," namely NGOs. 6 5 At present, only the activities of foundations
and associations that are declared to be of public benefit are
encouraged through the tax provisions in Law 30/1994.
A foundation is a nonprofit organization the funds of which are
permanently dedicated to the realization of goals that are of "public
interest. ' 68 6 To be of public interest, a foundation's goals must relate
to social assistance; civic, educational, or scientific matters; sports;
health; cooperation for development; protection of the environment;

678.
Kees van Raad, Business Operations in the Netherlands, Tax Mgmt. (BNA)
No. 973-2nd, § VII (B)(2)(b)(2)(c)(v) (2002).
Koele & van Mens, supra note 651, at 637; Offermanns & te Boekhorst,
679.
supra note 651, at Netherlands-3.
680.
Koele & van Mens, supra note 651, at 637; Offermanns & te Boekhorst,
supra note 651, at Netherlands-3.
681.
Offermanns & te Boekhorst, supra note 651, at Netherlands-3;
NETHERLANDS 2001, supra note 659, § 3.2.10.
Offermanns & te Boekhorst, supra note 651, at Netherlands-3;
682.
NETHERLANDS 2001, supra note 659, § 3.2.10.
A description of the development of the nonprofit sector in Spain has been
683.
omitted due to a lack of sources exploring this topic. Again, this lack of source material
is likely explained by the fact that study of the nonprofit sector, both here and abroad,
is still in its infancy.
Preamble to Law 30/1994, of 24 November, Regarding Foundations and Tax
684.
Incentives to the Private Participation in Activities of Public Interest, (B.O.E., 1994,
282) (Spain) [hereinafter Law 30/1994] (translation by author), available at
http://www.minhac.es/tributos/PDFs/Ley-30-1994.pdf.
685.
Id.
686.
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, art. 1(1); Alvaro de la Cueva, Spain, in
CROSS-BORDER DONATIONS, supra note 356, at Spain-i, Spain-1.
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encouragement of the economy or research; promotion of volunteer
work; or other similar goals. 687 .A foundation may be created by
individuals or legal entities (whether public or private), and it may be
created either by means of a notarial deed or by will.68 8 A foundation
will not, however, come into existence until it is entered in the
68 9
Register of Foundations.
A foundation must be governed by a board of directors whose
members serve without pay, other than the reimbursement of
The
expenses related to the performance of their duties. 690
foundation must also use at least seventy percent of its net income in
furtherance of its public interest purposes within the three-year
period beginning at the time the funds are received. 69 1 Any
remaining income, after the deduction of management expenses,
must be added to the foundation's endowment. 692 A foundation is
permitted to own an interest in an entity that enjoys limited liability,
and it may even be a majority shareholder of such an entity, but a
foundation is prohibited from owning an interest in a business
693
enterprise with unlimited liability.
Both foundations that plan to carry out their activities primarily
in Spain and foundations that register in Spain but that plan to carry
694
out their activities primarily abroad must be domiciled in Spain.
For this purpose, a foundation is considered to be domiciled at its seat
of management. 695 Foreign foundations that plan to carry on
activities in Spain must establish an office in Spain and must be
entered in the Register of Foundations. 696 Entry in the Register of
Foundations may be refused if the goals of the foreign foundation are
not of public interest (as described above), or if the foundation was
not validly created under the laws of its jurisdiction of
697
organization.

687.
688.
689.
Spain-1.
690.
Spain-2.
691.
Spain-2.
692.
Spain-2.
693.
Spain-2.
694.
2.
695.
696.
697.

Law 30/1994, supra note 684, art. 2(1).
Id. arts. 6(1), 7(i)-(3); de la Cueva, supra note 686, at Spain-2.
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, art. 3(1); de la Cueva, supra note (586, at
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, art. 13(4), (6); de la Cueva, supra note 686, at
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, art. 25(1)-(2); de la Cueva, supra note 686, at
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, art. 25(1); de la Cueva, supra note 686, at
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, art. 22; de la Cueva, supra note 686, at
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, art. 4; de la Cueva, supra note 686, at SpainLaw 30/1994, supra note 684, art. 4.
Id. art. 5; de la Cueva, supra note 686, at Spain-11.
Law 30/1994, supranote 684, art. 5; de la Cueva, supra note 686, at Spain-
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There are a number of separate laws governing different types of
associations; however, the basic Spanish law governing associations
is Law 191/1964.698 Law 191/1964 permits the exercise of the right of
association through an act evidencing the purpose of various
individuals who, having the capacity to act, have voluntarily joined
together to accomplish a defined, licit purpose identified in the
association's by-laws. 699 Associations are required to register with
the appropriate governmental authorities, and are entered in
provincial and national Registers of Associations. 70 0 To be declared
an association of public benefit, an association must make an
application to the Ministry of Justice and the Interior and meet the
following requirements:
"

Its goals must relate to social assistance; civic, educational, or
scientific matters; sports; health; cooperation for development;
protection of the environment; encouragement of the economy or
research; promotion of volunteer work; or other similar goals
(each, a "public interest" purpose);

*

Its activities cannot be confined to the exclusive benefit of its
members, but must be open to all who meet the conditions and
characteristics attendant to its purposes;
It must lack a profit-making purpose and cannot distribute to its
members the earnings that it eventually obtains;
Upon dissolution, its property must be dedicated to the
realization of public interest activities subject to the foregoing
requirements;
Members of its board of directors must serve without pay, other
than the reimbursement of expenses related to the performance
of their duties;
It must have adequate personnel and material resources as well
as a proper organizational structure to guarantee the fulfillment
of its public interest purposes; and
It must have been in existence and carrying out its public
interest purposes and satisfying all of the foregoing
requirements during, at a minimum, the two-year period prior
70 1
to applying for public benefit status.

*
*

*

"

*

In addition to meeting the organizational requirements described
above, a foundation or association of public benefit must separately

698.
Law 191/1964, of 24 December, Regarding Associations, (B.O.E. 1964, 311)
(Spain) [hereinafter Law 191/1964], available at http://www.mir.es/derecho/le/le191_64.htm.
699.
Id. art. 3(1).
700.
Id. art. 5.
701.
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, 13th Additional Provision (modifying Article
4 of Law 191/1964). The procedures for applying for public benefit status are set forth
in Articles 2 through 4 of Royal Decree 1786/1996, of 19 July, Regarding the
Procedures Relating to Associations of Public Benefit, (B.O.E. 1996, 209) (Spain),
available at http://www.mir.es/derecho/rd/rd178696.htm.
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meet the following set of requirements to qualify for the tax
incentives introduced by Law 30/1994:702
"
*

*

*
"
*

*

*

It must pursue one or more public interest purposes;
It must use at least seventy percent of its net income in
furtherance of its public interest purposes within the three-year
period beginning at the time of the receipt of the income;
If it holds a majority interest in a business enterprise, it must
inform the Ministry of Economy and the Treasury of the
existence of the interest and demonstrate that ownership of the
interest contributes to the accomplishment of its public interest
purposes and will not jeopardize the accomplishment of those
70 3
purposes;
It must render an annual accounting to the appropriate
governmental authorities;
Upon dissolution, its assets must be dedicated to public interest
purposes analogous to those pursued during its existence;
Neither its members nor its founders, nor their spouses or
relatives to the fourth degree of consanguinity, can be the
principal beneficiaries of its activities, nor can they benefit from
its services on special terms, unless it engages in activities
relating to social assistance or sports;
Not only must the members of its board of directors serve
without pay, other than the reimbursement of expenses related
to the performance of their duties, but they must also lack a
direct or indirect economic interest in the results of its activities;
and
70 4
It must register with the tax authorities.

Qualifying foundations and associations of public benefit are
exempt from corporate income tax on income derived from activities
related to their public interest purposes as well as on capital gains on
contributions (e.g., gifts, bequests, and devises) made to further those
purposes. 70 5 Included among the statutorily-enumerated categories

702.
First Final Provision 1 of Law 43/1995, of 27 December, On the Corporate
Income Tax, (B.O.E. 1995, 310) (Spain) [hereinafter Law 43/1995], available at
http://www.minhac.es/tributos/PDFs/Ley-43-1995.pdf.
703.
The procedures for complying with this requirement are set forth in Article
1 of Royal Decree 765/1995, of 5 May, Regulating Certain Questions Concerning the
Regime of Tax Incentives to the Private Participation in Activities of Public Interest,
(B.O.E. 1995, 123) (Spain) [hereinafter Royal Decree 765/1995], available at
http://v2.vlex.com/es/asp/norma-detalle.asp?nrm-textocompleto=RD765-1995.xml&nrmfechapubliboe:24/05/1995&nrm fechactl14/04/1997&TextoNorma:765/1995.
704.
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, arts. 42, 43, 46; de la Cueva, supra note 686,
at Spain-3 to -4. The procedures for registering with the tax authorities are set forth
in Article 2 of Royal Decree 765/1995, supra note 703.
705.
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, art. 48(1); de la Cueva, supra note 686, at
Spain-4.
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of income that fall within this exemption are: (i) membership fees, (ii)
public grants used for public interest purposes, and (iii) income from
sponsorship agreements. 70 6 Capital gains realized on the disposition
of tangible or intangible fixed assets or of shares in an entity are also
exempt from corporate income tax, but only if the proceeds are
reinvested in investments related to the NGO's public interest
707
activities.
The income derived by a foundation or association of public
benefit from business activities is, however, subject to corporate
income tax. 70 8 Nevertheless, the Ministry of Economy and the
Treasury may agree to extend the exemption described in the
previous paragraph to cover business income. 70 9 The exemption may
only be extended to business income if (i) the business activities are
consistent with NGO's public interest purposes, (ii) granting the
exemption will not give the NGO an unfair competitive advantage
over for-profit business enterprises engaged in the same activity, and
710
(iii) the business activities are directed toward the general public.
The tax base of a foundation or association of public benefit
includes all non-exempt income, reduced by an amount equal to thirty
percent of the interest derived from loans to third parties and one
hundred percent of the rents derived from immovable property that
constitutes part of the NGO's endowment-but only if this income is
used for public interest purposes within one year from the date of its
receipt. 711 In calculating its assessable tax base, a NGO may deduct
those expenditures that are normally deductible for corporate income
tax purposes, but not those expenditures that are directly or
indirectly related to its public interest activities. 712 Corporate income
tax is imposed on the NGO's assessable tax base at a reduced rate of
ten percent. 7 13 In calculating its tax, a NGO is entitled to any tax
credits that are generally available to companies, and a NGO is

706.
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, art. 49; de la Cueva, supra note 686, at
Spain-5.
707.
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, art. 52; de la Cueva, supra note 686, at
Spain-5. The foundation or association of public benefit must also have held at least a
5% interest in the entity for at least one year prior to the disposition. de la Cueva,
supra note 686, at Spain-5.
708.
de la Cueva, supra note 686, at Spain-4.
709.
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, art. 48(2); de la Cueva, supra note 686, at
Spain-4.
710.
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, art. 48(2); de la Cueva, supra note 686, at
Spain-4. The procedure for requesting an extension of the tax exemption to business
income is set forth in Article 3 of Royal Decree 765/1995, supra note 703.
711.
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, art. 50(1); de la Cueva, supra note 686, at
Spain-5.
712.
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, art. 51; de la Cueva, supra note 686, at
Spain-.
713.
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, art. 53; de la Cueva, supra note 686, at
Spain-6.
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additionally entitled to a credit of ESP 200,000 if its only activity
714
consists of'providing free services.
If a foundation or association of public benefit does not qualify
for the preferential tax regime established by Law 30/1994, then it
will be taxed under the normal regime applicable to foundations and
associations. 7 15 Under the normal tax regime, foundations and
associations are exempt from corporate income tax only on income
derived from (i) activities related to their public interest purposes, (ii)
donations made to further their public interest purposes, and (iii)
capital gains arising from the transfer of goods related to their public
interest purposes, but only if the proceeds are reinvested in
investments related to the NGO's public interest activities.7 16 Under
the normal tax regime, there is no possibility of obtaining an
exemption for business income, of reducing the tax base by a portion
of interest and rents received, or of obtaining the ESP 200,000 tax
credit for NGOs that provide free services. 717 Furthermore, under the
normal tax regime, the NGO will be subject to corporate income tax
at the reduced rate of twenty-five percent, rather than at the ten
percent rate applicable under'Law 30/1994.718
b. Donor Tax Relief
In Spain, both individuals and corporations are afforded tax
relief for contributions made to foundations and associations of public
benefit. Individuals and corporations are entitled to tax relief for
contributions of (i) registered cultural assets, (ii) works of art of a
guaranteed quality that are given to NGOs that pursue museumrelated activities and that agree to exhibit the donated artwork, (iii)
goods that will contribute to the realization of the NGO's public
interest purposes, and (iv) cash gifts made to further the realization
of the NGO's public interest purposes.7 19 To be entitled to this tax
relief, the donor must obtain a certificate from the donee NGO
documenting the donation. 720 The manner in which tax relief is

714.
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, art. 55; de la Cueva, supra note 686, at
Spain-6.
715.
Law 43/1995, supra note 702, art. 133(a).
716.
Id. art. 134(1); de la Cueva, supra note 686, at Spain-6.
717.
de la Cueva, supra note 686, at Spain-6.
718.
Law 43/1995, supra note 702, art. 26(2)(e).
719.
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, arts. 59, 63; Art. 55(3)(a) of Law 40/1998, of 9
December, On the Personal Income Tax and Other Tax Rules, (B.O.E. 1998, 295)
(Spain) [hereinafter Law 40/1998], available at http://www.minhac.es/tributos/
PDFs/Ley40-1998.pdf; Law 43/1995, supra note 702, Sole Derogating Provision
2,
First Final Provision 2; de la Cueva, supra note 686, at Spain-8.
720.
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, art. 66.
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provided differs depending on whether the donor is an individual or a
corporation.
In the case of individuals, tax relief is provided in the form of a
tax credit. If the contribution is made to a foundation or association
of public benefit that qualifies for the tax regime established by Law
30/1994, then the credit is equal to twenty percent of the value of the
contributed property. 72 1 If, however, the donee is subject to the
normal tax regime applicable to foundations and associations, then
the credit is equal to ten percent of the value of the contributed
property. 722 In the case of registered cultural assets and works of art
of a guaranteed quality, the tax credit is computed by reference to the
value placed on the item by the tax authorities. 723 In the case of
other in-kind contributions, the tax credit is computed by reference to
the acquisition value of the property or, in the case of property
manufactured by the donor, the cost of production. 72 4 The amount of
the tax credit cannot, however, exceed ten percent of the individual's
725
assessable tax base.
In the case of corporations, tax relief is provided in the form of a
tax deduction. The deduction is equal to the value of the property
contributed by the corporation to foundations and associations of
public benefit that qualify for the tax regime established by Law
30/1994.726 The valuation rules used in calculating this deduction are
similar, but not identical, to the rules used in calculating the tax
relief afforded to individuals. In the case of registered cultural assets
and works of art of a guaranteed quality, the value of the property is
determined by the tax authorities. 72 7 In the case of other in-kind
contributions, the value of the property is: (i) in the case of new goods
manufactured by the donor, the cost of production; (ii) in the case of
new goods acquired from third parties, acquisition value, but in no
event more than market value; and (iii) in the case of goods used by
the donor, book value.7 28 The deduction is limited to ten percent of
the corporation's tax base for the year in which the contribution is

721.
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, art. 59; de la Cueva, supra note 686, at
Spain-9.
722.
Law 40/1998, supra note 719, art. 55(3)(b); de la Cueva, supra note 686, at
Spain-9.
723.
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, art. 60(1).
724.
Id. art. 60(2).
725.
Law 40/1998, supra note 719, art. 56(1), Sole Derogating Provision 2(10)
(superseding Article 61 of Law 30/1994).
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, art. 63; Law 43/1995, supra note 702, Sole
726.
2; de la Cueva, supra note 686, at Spain-9. If the donee is
Derogating Provision
subject to the normal tax regime, the contribution will generally not be deductible.
Law 43/1995, supra note 702, art. 14(1)(e), (2).
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, art. 64(1); de la Cueva, supra note 686, at
727.
Spain-9.
728.
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, art. 64(2); de la Cueva, supra note 686, at
Spain-9.
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made (before taking the charitable contribution deduction into
account); this limit is increased to thirty percent in the case of
contributions of registered cultural assets and works of art of a
guaranteed quality. 729 Alternatively, the corporation may choose to
apply a limit of 0.1% of turnover in place of the 10% limit (and a limit
of 0.3% of turnover in place of the 30% limit) described in the
730
previous sentence.
Tax relief is also afforded to persons engaged in business who
enter into sponsorship agreements with foundations and associations
of public benefit that qualify for the tax regime established by Law
30/1994. A sponsorship agreement is a written contract between a
donor and a donee organization. 731 In the contract, the donor agrees
to make an economic contribution that will aid in the realization of
the activities undertaken by the donee in furtherance of its public
interest purposes. 732 The donee, in turn, agrees to publicize the
collaboration of the donor in those activities. 7 33 Tax relief is provided
in the form of a deduction equal to the amounts paid by the donor,
limited to the greater of 5% of the donor's tax base or 0.5% of the
donor's turnover. 734 In the case of individual entrepreneurs or
professionals, the five percent limit is applied to the portion of the tax
735
base attributable to net business income.
Neither individuals nor corporations are liable for tax on capital
gains realized upon the contribution of assets in kind.7 36 In addition,
gifts to NGOs are exempt from inheritance and gift tax because this
tax is imposed only on individual recipients of gifts, bequests, and
devises-tax is not imposed either on donors or on donees that are
737
legal entities.

729.
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, art. 63(2); de la Cueva, supra note 686, at
Spain-9.
730.
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, art. 63(3); de la Cueva, supra note 686, at
Spain-9.
731.
Law 30/1994, supra note. 684, art. 68; de la Cueva, supra note 686, at
Spain-10.
732.
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, art. 68; de la Cueva, supra note 686, at
Spain-10.
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, art. 68; de la Cueva, supra note 686, at
733.
Spain-10.
734.
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, art. 68; de la Cueva, supra note 686, at
Spain-10.
735.
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, art. 68; de la Cueva, supra note 686, at
Spain-10.
736.
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, arts. 61, 65; de la Cueva, supra note 686, at
Spain-9, -10.
Arts. 1(1), 3(2) of Law 29/1987, of 18 December, On Inheritance and Gift
737.
Tax, (B.O.E. 1987, 303) (Spain), available at http://www.minhac.es/tributos/PDFs/
Ley_29-1987.pdf.

1216

VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 351105

Foreign foundations that are registered in Spain with the
Register of Foundations are entitled to the benefits of the tax regime
established by Law 30/1994, but only with respect to the activities of
their Spanish office. 738 As is the case with France, this restriction is
apparently based on the notion that the government should only
forego tax revenue in the name of encouraging the activities of a NGO
739
if those activities directly benefit the national community.
9. Japan
a. Development of the Nonprofit Sector
The Japanese nonprofit sector has its roots in the charitable
activities undertaken in Buddhist temples, with the financial support
of the aristocracy, during the Japanese medieval period.740 The
Buddhist temples that carried out these activities were not
"independent institutions; rather they were established in the
interest of either the State or powerful clans."'741 Near the end of the
Japanese medieval period, charitable activities were also undertaken
742
by Catholic missionaries who had come to Japan to proselytize.
During the Edo period (1603-1868), the Japanese nonprofit sector
charitable
power
of
became
secularized
as
"the
Buddhism... declined" and mutual aid associations and private
743
schools were created.
When the Japanese Civil Code was enacted in 1896 during the
Meiji era (1868-1912), a legal basis was provided for incorporating
744
NGOs in the form of koeki hojin ("public interest corporations").
During the Meiji era and the pre-World War II period, the nonprofit
sector was active in social welfare activities, the provision of
education and educational scholarships, the funding of scholarly
research, and the provision of mutual aid through neighborhood
associations; 745 however, few of these activities were wholly private in
nature, the majority being either "government supervised or semi-

Law 30/1994, supra note 684, 16th Additional Provision. Spain has by
738.
treaty extended the benefit of any exemptions from inheritance and gift tax to NGOs
that are tax residents of France. See supra note 505 and accompanying text.
739.
Law 30/1994, supra note 684, Preamble, §§ VI-VII ("In this way, a
substantial incentive will be created for the carrying out of public interest activities
that will decisively redound to the benefit of the community.") (translation by author).
740.

Takayoshi Amenomori, Japan, in DEFINING THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra

note 264, at 188, 190; Yoshinori Yamaoka, On the History of the Nonprofit Sector in
Japan, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN JAPAN 19, 19-21 (Tadashi Yamamoto ed., Johns
Hopkins Nonprofit Sector Series No. 7, 1998).
741.
Amenomori, supra note 740, at 190.
742.
Id. at 191; Yamaoka, supra note 740, at 21.
743.
Yamaoka, supra note 740, at 21-24.
744.
Amenomori, supra note 740, at 192; Yamaoka, supra note 740, at 24-25.
Yamaoka, supra note 740, at 27-36.
745.

20021

SPONTANEOUS TAX COORDINATION

governmental, semi-private in nature. '746 The Meiji era and the preWorld War II period also witnessed the creation of onshi zaidan
("imperial endowments") outside of the koeki hojin system. 747 As
their name indicates, the imperial endowments were created at the
direction of, and with financial support from, the emperor. 748 Each of
the various imperial endowments was created for a specific purpose,
such as providing medical care to the poor, health and welfare
support to mothers and children, or health and welfare support to
soldiers' families. 749 Businesses and others were expected to make
financial contributions to the imperial endowments to supplement the
750
imperial grant.
nonprofit
In the post-war period, "numerous private
751
movements."
resident
and
citizen
around
up
grew
organizations
During the 1950s and 1960s, these organizations embraced the peace
movement, the anti-nuclear movement, and the human rights
movement. 752 Beginning in the 1970s, there was a shift away from
opposition movements toward "proactive" movements such as the
consumer movement and the environmental protection movement,
and later toward "such areas as welfare, education, . . . health,
culture, international exchange, and international cooperation. '753 At
the same time, the business community began to create more
conservative grant-making foundations that focused on the fields of
science and technology. 754 These foundations filled the gap left by the
large number of such organizations that either had been disbanded or
had ceased operating following the war. 755 The post-war period also
witnessed a boom in the creation of private educational institutions at
the college and junior and senior high school levels. 75 6 In addition,
although a legal framework had been established in 1922 for creating
koeki shintaks ("charitable trusts"), the system of charitable trusts
did not become active until the late 1970s. 757 Since that time there
has been a dramatic increase in the creation of charitable trusts, with
their assets being dedicated to such diverse purposes as providing
scholarships, international cooperation, medical research, scholarly

746.
747.
748.
749.
750.
751.
752.
753.
754.
755.
756.
757.

Id. at 24. See also Amenomori, supra note 740, at 192.
Yamaoka, supra note 740, at 25-26.
Id. at 26.
Id.; Amenomori, supra note 740, at 192.
Yamaoka, supra note 740, at 26; Amenomori, supra note 740, at 192.
Yamaoka, supra note 740, at 47.
Amenomori, supranote 740, at 193.
Yamaoka, supra note 740, at 47.
Id. at 44-47. See also Amenomori, supra note 740, at 193.
Yamaoka, supra note 740, at 44.
Id. at 43-44.
Id. at 41, 56.
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research, the advancement of social education, and the advancement
758
of the arts and culture.
b. NGO Tax Relief
In Japan, NGOs are not confined to a prescribed legal form;
rather, NGOs can take the form of a corporation, an unincorporated
association, or a trust. 759 Most commonly, NGOs are formed either as
7
public interest corporations or as unincorporated associations. 60
Although unincorporated associations far outnumber public interest
corporations in Japan, 761 unincorporated associations are afforded
less corporate income tax relief than public interest corporations, and
donors are less likely to be afforded tax relief for contributions made
to unincorporated associations than they are for contributions made
to public interest corporations.
The importance attached to
incorporation in Japan is described in the following passage:
While the concepts of k5 [public] and shi [private] are deeply rooted in
Japanese culture and Confucianism, and while their conunotations may
have changed somewhat in recent decades, there remains nonetheless a
strong tendency to regard k5 as superior to shi. . . . An important
consequence of the pattern is that private initiatives, whether for-profit
or nonprofit, tend to seek the "official blessing" of the public sector. The
most significant aspect of public approval is the status of legal
personality granted by the government authorities to private
organizations. Within the Japanese context, the complex and timeconsuming registration process and over-sight procedures necessary do
not carry negative connotations. Moreover, the close supervision of
nonprofit corporations by public authorities implies considerable
influence on the part of the government in nonprofit sector affairs.
Depending on the actual public agency responsible for registering the
different types of nonprofit organizations ... applicants seeking
incorporation are often advised to accept former bureaucrats as
members of the board or senior staff. In many cases, however, the
situation is anticipated by applicants, and an offer is made to invite exgovernment officials to the board of the new organizations in the hope
of achieving a positive impact on the public agency in general, and
762
those in charge of the registration procedure in particular.

To incorporate, a NGO must either meet the requirements for
incorporation as a public interest corporation (koeki hojin) under
Article 34 of the Japanese Civil Code or must meet the requirements
of one of the laws dealing with special classes of NGOs (e.g.,

758.
Id.
759.
Paul Bater & Nancy J. Payne, Japan, in CROSS-BORDER DONATIONS, supra
note 356, at Japan-i, Japan-1; Yasuyuki Kawabata, Japan, in TAXATION OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 353, at 539, 542-43.
760.
Bater & Payne, supra note 759, at Japan-i; Toshiaki Katsushima & Keiji
Kondo, Japan, in INTERNATIONAL CHARITABLE GIVING, supra note 353, at Japan-1,
Japan-1.
761.
Amenomori, supra note 740, at 15; Kawabata, supra note 759, at 539.
762.
Amenomori, supra note 740, at 207-08.
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763
educational, religious, social welfare, or medical organizations).
There are two types of public interest corporations in Japan:
incorporated associations ("shadan hojin") and incorporated
foundations ("zaidan hojin.")764 The difference between these two
types of public interest corporations lies in the subject of the
incorporation. In the case of an incorporated association, what is
being incorporated is a "group of people associated for a publicinterest purpose." 765 The association acts as a single entity, is
governed by the general assembly of its members by majority vote,
and its existence is unaffected by changes in the size of its
membership. 76 6 In the case of an incorporated foundation, what is
being incorporated is "an endowed fund so that the endowment
donated for a public-benefit purpose will be maintained and managed
in order to serve the purpose stipulated by the donor."767 Unlike an
association, a foundation has no members and is not governed by a
its directors, operating in
general assembly; rather, it is governed by
7 68
accordance with the foundation's charter.
To be incorporated as a public interest corporation, an
association or foundation must promote the public interest and
cannot be organized for the purpose of making a profit.7 69 Among the
examples of public interest activities listed in Article 34 of the
770
Japanese Civil Code are worship, religion, charity, science, and art.
To be considered of public interest, these activities must benefit
"society in general or many and unspecified persons." 771 The
requirement that the association or foundation not be organized for
the purpose of making a profit does not prevent a NGO from engaging
in commercial activities, it only prevents the NGO from seeking a
7 72
profit and distributing that profit among its members.
Furthermore, a NGO that engages in commercial activities that are
unrelated to its public interest purposes must do so within the
following limits: (i) the commercial activities must be undertaken "on
a modest scale," meaning that they can produce no more than onehalf of total revenue; (ii) the commercial activities must not be of a
type that breaches the "social trust". vested in a public interest

763.

Bater & Payne, supra note 759, at Japan-1; Kawabata, supra note 759, at

542.
Takako Amemiya, The Nonprofit Sector: Legal Background, in THE
764.
NONPROFIT SECTOR IN JAPAN, supra note 740, at 59, 60.
Id. at 65-66.
765.
Id. at 66.
766.
Id.
767.
Id.
768.
Id. at 63-64; Katsushima & Kondo, supra note 760, at Japan-2.
769.
770.
Amemiya, supra note 764, at 63.
Id. at 64.
771.
Id. at 64-65.
772.
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corporation; (iii) the commercial activities must not impede the
NGO's public interest activities; and (iv) the income from the
commercial activities in excess of the amount necessary for the
healthy management of the NGO must be used for public interest
773
activities.
A NGO that meets the foregoing requirements must apply to the
"competent authorities" for permission to incorporate. 774 The identity
of the competent authorities depends on the public interest purpose(s)
that the NGO intends to undertake. 775 Thus, for example, a NGO
that intends to undertake activities relating to international
exchange would apply to the Ministry of Foreign' Affairs for
permission to incorporate, while a NGO that intends to undertake
cultural, artistic, or scientific activities would apply to the Ministry of
Education. 776 If the intended activities of a NGO come under the
jurisdiction of more than one ministry, the permission of each affected
77 7
ministry must be obtained.
In 1998, a new form of incorporated NGO was introduced in
Japan-the "specified nonprofit corporation. ''77 8 The impetus for
creating this new form of incorporated NGO arose out of legal
difficulties that were encountered by unincorporated NGOs in
carrying out relief efforts after the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji
earthquake. 779 Because of their lack of legal personality, these
unincorporated NGOs encountered "some difficulties such as hiring
offices, receiving subsidies from public organizations/governments,
auditing of their accounts, tax treatment of their activities, and so
on."

78 0

To be incorporated as a specified nonprofit corporation, a NGO
must have as its main purpose the accomplishment of one or more
"specified" nonprofit activities, and the NGO must not be organized
for the purpose of making a profit.7 8
Included in the list of
"!specified" nonprofit activities are: (i) promotion of health, medical
treatment, or welfare; (ii) promotion of social education; (iii)
promotion of community development; (iv) promotion of culture, the
arts, or sports; (v) conservation of the environment; (vi) disaster
relief; (vii) promotion of community safety; (viii) protection of human

773.
Id. at 65.
774.
Id. at 66.
775.
Id.
776.
Id. at 67.
777.
Id.
778.
Bater & Payne, supra note 759, at Japan-4; Kawabata, supra note 759, at
548-49. A translation of the Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit Activities is available
from the Japan Center for International Exchange at http://www.jcie.or.jp/civilnet
civilsocmonitor/npolaw.html.
779.
Kawabata, supra note 759, at 539.
780.
Id.
781.
Id. at 549..
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rights or promotion of peace; (ix) international cooperation; (x)
promotion of a society with equal gender participation; and (xi) sound
nurturing of youth. 78 2 To qualify as a specified nonprofit corporation,
a NGO must also meet the following requirements:
0

It cannot unreasonably condition the acquisition or loss of
membership;

0

No more than one-third of its officers may receive remuneration;

*

Its activities cannot be for the purpose of spreading religious
teachings, performing religious ceremonies, or proselytizing;

*

Its activities cannot be for the purpose of promoting, supporting,
or opposing a political principle; and

*

Its activities cannot be for the purpose of recommending,
supporting, or opposing a candidate for public office, a person
783
holding a public office, or a political party.

Applications to create specified nonprofit corporations must be made
to the governor of the prefecture in which the main office of the NGO
78 4
is to be located.
The income that a Japanese NGO derives from public interest
activities is exempt from corporate income tax, whether the NGO
takes the form of a public interest corporation, a specified nonprofit
corporation, or an unincorporated association. 78 5 The corporate
income tax rate applicable to income derived from profit-making
activities (without regard to the relation of those activities to the
public interest purposes of the NGO) does, however, depend on the
legal form that the NGO takes. 78 6 Public interest corporations are
subject to corporate income tax on their income from profit-making
activities at a reduced rate of twenty-two percent, 78 7 while specified
nonprofit corporations and unincorporated associations are subject to
tax on such income at the normal rates of up to thirty percent.788 A

782.
Bater & Payne, supra note 759, at Japan-4 to -5; Kawabata, supra note
759, at 549.
783.
Kawabata, supra note 759, at 549.
784.
Bater & Payne, supra note 759, at Japan-5.
785.
Id. at Japan-3, -4; Kawabata, supra note 759, at 550-51.
786.
Bater & Payne, supra note 759, at Japan-3 to -4.
787.
Japanese government sources have recently indicated that "[t]he
government and ruling parties will drastically review the preferential tax system for
nonprofit corporations, with an eye to revising the system in fiscal 2003." Government
Eyeing Tax Changes for Nonprofit Firms, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), Jan. 12, 2002,
available at LEXIS, News Library, The Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo) File. The catalyst for
this review appears to be the widespread perception that "some nonprofit corporations,
which are entrusted to provide services for or undertake business on behalf of the
government, are making a large amount of profit and pressuring private firms that are
engaged in similar businesses." Id.
788.
Bater & Payne, supra note 759, at Japan-4. A public interest corporation
that is engaged in profit-making activity may deduct contributions of income derived
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foreign NGO may benefit from this partial exemption from tax and
from the reduced rate of tax on income derived from profit-making
activities if (i) it is designated a foreign public interest corporation by
the Ministry of Finance and (ii) its main office is located in a country
789
that extends similar treatment to Japanese NGOs.
c. Donor Tax Relief
In Japan, individuals and corporations are afforded tax relief for
contributions made to certain NGOs. An individual may only deduct
contributions of cash made to (i) public interest corporations
designated by the Ministry of Finance to be of extreme national
importance, provided further that the contribution is made in the
course of a public fundraising campaign; (ii) specially-designated
corporations that promote the public interest; and (iii) approved
specified nonprofit corporations. 790 Such contributions are deductible
to the extent that they exceed JPY 10,000, up to a maximum of
twenty-five percent of the donor's annual taxable income. 79 1 In-kind
contributions made by individuals are not deductible, and any gain
792
realized on making such a contribution is subject to income tax.
A corporation may fully deduct contributions made to NGOs
described in the previous paragraph. 793 Contributions made to other
NGOs are also deductible, but subject to a maximum limit equal to
794
If
50% of the sum of 2.5% of profit plus 0.25% of paid-in capital.
the donee NGO is a public interest corporation or is organized under
a special law for the promotion of cultural, social welfare, or other
designated purposes, then the corporate donor is entitled to an
additional deduction of up to 50% of the sum of 2.5% of profit plus
0.25% of paid-in capital. 795 Unlike individuals, corporations may
deduct contributions whether made in cash or in-kind, but any gain
realized on the making of an in-kind contribution will be subject to
income tax.

796

from its profit-making activity that it makes to its public interest activity, up to 20% of
the income derived from the profit-making activity (50% in the case of certain
educational and social welfare corporations-but not in excess of JPY 2 million). Id. at
Japan-2 to -3.
789.
Id. at Japan-4; Kawabata, supra note 759, at 558-59.
790.
Amemiya, supra note 764, at 83; Bater & Payne, supra note 759, at Japan2, -7; Griffith Way et al., Business Operations in Japan, Tax Mgmt. (BNA) No. 969,
§ V(C)(9), at A-149 (2001).
791.
Amemiya, supra note 764, at 83; Bater & Payne, supra note 759, at Japan7; Way et al., supra note 790, § V(C)(9), at A-149.
792.
Bater & Payne, supra note 759, at Japan-7.
793.
Id. at Japan-2, -7.
794.
Id. at Japan-7.
795.
Id. at Japan -7 to -8.
796.
Id. at Japan-7.
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Neither an individual nor a corporation is, however, subject to
income tax on the gain realized on making an in-kind contribution to
a public interest corporation if "the contribution is recognized by the
tax authorities as promoting education or science, improving culture
or social welfare or otherwise contributing to the advancement of the
public interest. '797 Gifts to NGOs are also exempt from inheritance
and gift tax because this tax is imposed only on individual recipients
of gifts, bequests, and devises-tax is not imposed either on donors or
on donees that are legal entities. 798 Additionally, an individual
recipient of a bequest or devise is exempted from inheritance tax with
respect to property that he or she contributes to a specially
designated corporation promoting the public interest, or to an
approved specified nonprofit corporation, so long as the contribution
7 99
is made within ten months of the decedent's death.
A contribution made to a foreign NGO is deductible only if the
foreign NGO has been designated by the Ministry of Finance as an
organization to which deductible contributions may be made. 8 0° In
practice, only a few foreign NGOs have been so designated.8 0 '
Because of the lack of geographical limitations on the activities of
Japanese NGOs, it is also possible to make deductible contributions
to foreign NGOs through certain domestic intermediary NGOs, such
as the Japan Foundation and the Council for Better Corporate
80 2
Citizenship.
B. Identification Phase
Once the descriptions have been completed, the next step in the
comparative analysis is to compare and contrast the rules of the
chosen legal systems in an effort to identify any similarities among
them and differences between them. As summarized below, the
instant study has revealed that, with regard to the tax treatment of
contributions made by domestic taxpayers to foreign NGOs, the
differences between legal systems predominate over the similarities.
Rather than following a "clear or well-established trend," the
countries chosen for study have adopted an entire spectrum of

797.
798.
799.
800.
A-149.
801.
A-149.
802.

Id. at Japan-8.

id. at Japan-6.
Id. at Japan-8.
Kawabata, supra note 759, at 565; Way et al., supra note 790, § V(C)(9), at
Kawabata, supra note 759, at 565; Way et al., supra note 790, § V(C)(9), at
Bater & Payne, supra note 759, at Japan-8 to -9, -11.
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approaches to the encouragement, or, in some cases,
80 3
discouragement, of contributions to foreign NGOs.

active

The Czech Republic lies on the most restrictive end of this
spectrum, because it affords no tax relief for contributions made
directly to foreign NGOs and it effectively prohibits indirect
contributions by limiting the operations of domestic NGOs to the
domestic arena. The Czech Republic's severely restrictive approach
may reflect the fact that (i) its nonprofit sector is still in its infancy,
(ii) the Czech public generally distrusts and has a negative perception
of NGOs, and (iii) the government has generally had little interest in
80 4
supporting the nonprofit sector.
Lying near the Czech Republic on the restrictive end of the
spectrum are Spain and France. At first blush, Spain and France
seem to have adopted rather permissive rules regarding the
availability of tax relief for contributions made to foreign NGOs.
Indeed, neither of these countries imposes a place-of-organization
limitation on the tax relief afforded for contributions made to NGOs.
Upon further inspection, however, one discovers that the availability
of tax relief for contributions made to foreign NGOs is severely
constrained by a place-of-use limitation. Accordingly, even though
both Spain and France afford tax relief for contributions made to
foreign NGOs, they limit that tax relief to contributions that support
activities undertaken in Spain and France, respectively.
This
restriction is apparently intended to ensure that tax revenue is
foregone only in exchange for a direct benefit to the "national
8 05
community."
Lying near the center of the spectrum are England and Wales,
the United States (with regard to income tax relief for individuals
and corporations), and Japan. Although England and Wales afford no
tax relief for contributions made directly to foreign NGOs, the
stringency of their rules is ameliorated by the fact that tax relief can
be obtained by passing contributions through a domestic
intermediary NGO, because domestic NGOs in England and Wales
are permitted to undertake activities abroad. In the case of income
tax relief for individuals and corporations, the U.S. rules are the
same as those of England and Wales: tax relief is nominally denied
for contributions made to foreign NGOs (unless a tax treaty provides
otherwise), but tax relief can be obtained if the contribution is passed
through a domestic intermediary NGO in an appropriate manner.
Despite nominally affording tax relief for contributions made directly
to designated foreign NGOs, the Japanese rules are also similar to

803.

See David Gliksberg,

General Report, in TAXATION OF NON-PROFIT

ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 353, at 58.

804.
805.

See supra notes 628 and 629 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 511 and 739 and accompanying text.
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those of England and Wales. Japanese taxpayers who wish to obtain
tax relief for contributions made to foreign NGOs must normally pass
their contributions through a limited number of domestic
intermediary NGOs because the tax authorities have, in practice,
only rarely designated a foreign NGO as an eligible recipient of taxdeductible contributions. In the case of both England and Wales and
the United States, this moderately restrictive approach appears to be
a vestige of more insular or isolationist periods in their history.80 6 In
the case of Japan, this approach may simply be a by-product of the
fact that tax relief is generally provided to only a limited number of
NGOs-either directly or indirectly through tax relief for
80 7
contributions made to such NGOs.
Lying near the more permissive end of the spectrum are New
Zealand, Costa Rica, and the United States (with regard to estate and
gift tax relief and income tax relief for trusts and estates). New
Zealand affords tax relief for contributions made directly to foreign
NGOs that apply for specific legislative approval, and such approval
has in fact been granted to a number of foreign NGOs. New Zealand
requires advance legislative approval because it views this tax relief
as a form of governmental expenditure. By requiring legislative
approval, New Zealand seeks to ensure that its expenditures on tax
relief in support of-the foreign activities of NGOs will be consistent
with its foreign aid program.80 8 Similarly, Costa Rica affords tax
relief for contributions made to foreign NGOs that register with, and
are approved by, its tax authorities. Costa Rica generally exercises
tight control over grants of public benefit status, because public
benefit status is accompanied by an exemption from income tax and
the ability to receive tax-deductible contributions.8 0 9 In the case of
estate and gift tax relief and income tax relief for trusts and estates,
the United States also falls at the more permissive end of the
spectrum, because it affords tax relief for contributions made directly
to foreign NGOs.
The Netherlands lies at the most permissive end of the spectrum.
The Netherlands affords tax relief for contributions made directly to
foreign NGOs so long as the scope of their activities either (i) extends
to the Netherlands or (ii) is of a supranational character. Unlike New

806.
See supra note 368 and accompanying text for a discussion of the historical
context of the English and Welsh place-of-organization limitation. See TOWNSEND
HOOPES & DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, FDR AND THE CREATION OF THE U.N. 8-9, 17-21 (1997),

and ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 95-99 (1973) for a
discussion of the isolationism that dominated the national mood in the United States
during the 1930s.
807.
See supra Part V.A.9.b-c.
808.
See supra note 418 and accompanying text.
809.
See supra note 545 and accompanying text.
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Zealand, Costa Rica, and the United States, however, the
Netherlands does not require foreign NGOs to obtain governmental
recognition of their eligibility to receive contributions that give rise to
tax relief.
This internationalist approach to tax relief for
contributions made directly to foreign NGOs may be a product of the
Netherlands' historic orientation toward foreign countries, which is
8 10
reflected in its tax system in general.
C. Explanatory Phase
The final step in the comparative analysis consists of a critical
evaluation of what was discovered in the course of the comparisonwith an eye toward developing a viable reform proposal. Both for the
sake of completeness and to obtain a more global perspective, at least
one representative of each of the eight "families" of income tax laws
was included in this study. As described in the previous subpart,
these countries have adopted widely divergent approaches to the tax
treatment of contributions made by domestic taxpayers to foreign
NGOs.
Their approaches range from the purely nationalistic
approach of the Czech Republic, which does not afford tax relief for
any contribution to a foreign NGO-whether made directly or
indirectly, to the internationalist approach of the Netherlands, which
affords tax relief for contributions made to any foreign NGO the
activities of which either extend to the Netherlands or are of a
supranational character-without even requiring the NGO to register
in advance with governmental authorities. Of the available choices in
this spectrum of possible approaches, the internationalist approach of
the Netherlands would seem to be the most in keeping with the trend
toward increasing globalization and the growing recognition of the
need for coordinated, multilateral solutions to emerging international
tax problems.
Nonetheless, the purpose of adopting STC/Comparative Law as a
framework for reform is not simply to implement the rule that is, in
the abstract, "superior" to the others, but rather to determine the
most "appropriate" rule by balancing the benefits of the superior rule
against all of the relevant theoretical and practical considerations
that normally inform U.S. international tax policy-making. In the
instant situation, the relevant domestic tax policy considerations
include
efficiency,
fairness,
the
competitiveness
of U.S.
multinationals, the impact on political relations with foreign
countries, the need to raise revenue, and the prevention of tax
avoidance and evasion. When these considerations are taken into
account, it becomes apparent that the most "appropriate" rule for

810.

See supra note 677 and accompanying text.
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enactment by the United States is similar to, but more modest than,
the "superior" rule adopted by the Netherlands.
1. Efficiency
If the United States were to emulate the Netherlands'
internationalist approach, it could greatly improve the efficiency of its
rules governing the tax relief afforded for contributions made to
foreign NGOs.
The Netherlands has generally refrained from
imposing geographic limitations on the tax relief that it affords for
contributions made to foreign NGOs. The United States, on the other
hand, imposes a place-of-organization and a place-of-use limitation on
the tax relief that it affords to individuals and corporations that make
contributions to foreign NGOs. The place-of-organization limitation,
which applies to both U.S. individuals and corporations, restricts
income tax relief to contributions made to domestic NGOs. As a
practical matter, however, this limitation has proved easy to
circumvent-all that is required is for a contribution to a foreign
NGO to be routed through a domestic NGO. Due to the indirect
availability of tax relief, a foreign NGO that wishes actively to solicit
contributions from the United States is essentially required to create
a domestic NGO to serve as a conduit for those contributions. The
creation and maintenance of a domestic intermediary NGO naturally
entail significant administrative costs, such as filing fees, reporting
requirements, and bank charges, 'that diminish the portion of the
foreign NGO's endowment that is ultimately dedicated to purposes
that benefit the public. The place-of-organization limitation therefore
reduces efficiency by causing a foreign NGO to incur costs that it may
not have chosen to incur absent the existence of this tax limitation.
Compounding this inefficiency is the place-of-use limitation that
is imposed on contributions made by U.S. corporations. Under this
limitation, a U.S. corporation that makes contributions to a domestic
NGO that takes the form of a trust, chest, fund, or foundation will be
afforded tax relief only if the contributed funds are to be used within
the United States. Contributions made to incorporated domestic
NGOs are not subject to this limitation and, as a result, give rise to
tax relief whether the contributed funds are to be used within or
without the United States. When this place-of-use limitation is
considered in combination with the place-of-organization limitation, it
becomes clear that the U.S. tax rules have created a bias in favor of
using incorporated NGOs as domestic intermediaries, because only
incorporated NGOs may be used as intermediaries by both U.S.
individuals and corporations. The place-of-use limitation therefore
further reduces efficiency by causing the choice of intermediary entity
to be determined solely by reference to tax concerns. Accordingly,
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and place-of-use limitations

2. Fairness
Eliminating these geographic limitations would also equalize the
treatment of different categories of U.S. domestic taxpayers. At
present, no geographic limitations are imposed on the income tax
relief afforded for contributions made by complex trusts and estates, a
place-of-organization limitation is imposed on the income tax relief
afforded for contributions made by individuals-but no geographic
limitations are imposed on the estate and gift tax relief afforded for
these same contributions, and both a place-of-organization and a
place-of-use limitation are imposed on the income tax relief afforded
for contributions made by corporations. By eliminating geographic
limitations with respect to all taxpayers, no category of taxpayers
would be favored over any other when it comes to affording tax relief
for contributions made to foreign NGOs.
3. Competitiveness
Affording tax relief for contributions made directly to foreign
NGOs could enhance the competitiveness of U.S. multinational
corporations. These companies have come under growing pressure to
contribute to the communities in foreign countries where they have
operations or employees.8 11 Abolishing the geographic limitations
would make it much easier for such corporate giving to occur.
4. Political Relations
Abolishing the geographic limitations could serve to improve our
political relations with other countries. As discussed above, the
geographic limitations have already been relaxed by treaty in the
case of contributions made to Canadian, Mexican, and Israeli NGOs.
While only three countries have successfully obtained a relaxation of
the geographic limitations, they are clearly not the only ones
interested in seeing the geographic limitations relaxed or abolished.
At least two other countries-Brazil and Barbados-have expressed
an interest during income tax treaty negotiations in having these
limitations relaxed.

811.
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5. Revenue
Abolishing the geographic limitations should not have a
significant impact on revenue. Individuals and corporations can
already obtain income tax relief for contributions made to foreign
NGOs so long as they are appropriately funneled through domestic
Moreover, for estate and gift tax purposes,
intermediaries.
individuals are currently afforded tax relief for contributions made
directly to foreign NGOs.
6. Tax Avoidance and Evasion
The Netherlands has not only refrained from imposing
geographic limitations on the tax relief that it affords for
contributions made to foreign NGOs, but it has also refrained from
requiring foreign NGOs to obtain government approval of their
eligibility to receive contributions that give rise to tax relief.
Although a requirement of advance government approval might, to
some extent, inhibit the flow of cross-border contributions, the United
States might not wish to emulate this aspect of the Netherlands'
approach because it would entail too great a risk of tax avoidance and
evasion. Absent a requirement of advance government approval,
taxpayers could claim a deduction for contributions made to foreign
NGOs in the hope that the Internal Revenue Service either (i) would
not investigate the propriety of the claimed deductions or (ii) if it did
investigate, would settle the matter because of the burdens of
collecting the relevant information, the hazards of litigation, or other
reasons.
The opportunity for tax avoidance and evasion could, however, be
curtailed by limiting tax relief to contributions made to foreign NGOs
that appear on a published list of organizations that have been
approved by the Internal Revenue Service as eligible to receive taxdeductible contributions. In that case, an Internal Revenue Service
agent would be able quickly and easily to determine whether a
taxpayer was entitled to the claimed tax relief. In its Publication No.
78, the Internal Revenue Service already maintains a list of domestic
NGOs that are exempt from income tax and eligible to receive taxdeductible contributions. Moreover, foreign NGOs that receive fifteen
percent or more of their support from U.S. sources are currently
required to apply to the Internal Revenue Service for recognition of
Implementing the requirement of
their tax-exempt status.8 12
advance government approval would, therefore, require no more than

812.

See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
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(i) an extension of the current registration requirement to all foreign
NGOs that wish to solicit contributions from U.S. donors and (ii) the
publication of the names of approved organizations in Publication No.
78. It is worth noting that two of the countries included in this
study-New Zealand and Costa Rica-have adopted this approach;
they each limit tax relief to contributions made to foreign NGOs that
have obtained advance approval from the government. In the case of
New Zealand, the Parliament must provide the approval, and in
Costa Rica, it is the tax authorities that must provide the approval.
Requiring advance government approval may also confer another
benefit. If one takes the view that the deduction for charitable
contributions is a form of governmental expenditure, 1 3 then, by
requiring foreign NGOs to obtain government approval before such
expenditures are made, the government would be able to retain
tighter control over the types of activities to which the government
contributes. This view has been adopted by New Zealand, which
limits approval to foreign NGOs engaged in activities that are
consistent with its foreign aid program.
Thus, after balancing the "superior" Netherlands approach
against the relevant domestic policy considerations, it appears that
the most fruitful path to reform would be to abolish the existing
geographic limitations and to afford tax relief for contributions made
directly to foreign NGOs, but to restrict that relief to foreign NGOs
that have obtained advance approval from the Internal Revenue
Service of their eligibility to receive tax-deductible contributions.
Having ascertained the most appropriate rule for adoption by the
United States, it is now necessary to return to the underlying purpose
of adopting the proposed framework and to determine whether the
adoption of this rule will reduce the existing complexity of the U.S.
international tax regime.
The adoption of this rule should, in fact, result in a significant
External
reduction of both external and internal complexity.
complexity would be reduced by bringing the U.S. rules closer in line
with those of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Costa Rica, and other
countries that have adopted a similar approach to the tax treatment
of cross-border charitable contributions. The similarity in these rules
would facilitate the cross-border activities of NGOs that are
indigenous to this group of countries by reducing transaction costs
and delays and by enabling such activities to be conducted in the
framework of familiar laws. Even though no well-established trend

813.
Recognizing, of course, that there is some controversy concerning the tax
expenditure concept and its appropriate boundaries. See, e.g., Thomas D. Griffith,
Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 343, 345-66
(1989); Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Tax Expenditure Budgets: A Critical
View, 54 TAX NOTES 1661 (1992); Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures:A Reassessment,
1988 DUKE L.J. 1155, 1163-70 (1988).
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exists in this area, one can only expect that, as the nonprofit sectors
of other countries continue to evolve and mature and as the trend
toward globalization continues, other countries will subscribe to the
progressive, internationalist approach of the Netherlands, New
Zealand, and Costa Rica.
As additional countries adopt this
approach, external complexity will be further reduced.
By focusing attention on the results of the comparative analysis,
the proposed framework effectively constrains the tendency of the
conflicting policy considerations that normally inform U.S.
international tax policy-making to produce internal complexity. In
the case of the instant reform proposal, the proposed framework
would not only prevent the current level of internal complexity from
increasing, but would actually reduce it. First, by adopting the same
rule for income and estate and gift tax purposes, the possibility that a
contribution made by an individual may be deductible for estate or
gift tax purposes but not for income tax purposes would be
eliminated. Second, by adopting the same rule for all persons subject
to the income tax, the current complexity created by imposing
different requirements on contributions made by individuals,
corporations, and estates and complex trusts would be eliminated.
Moreover, as described above, adopting the same rule for all
taxpayers would level the playing field by ensuring that one group of
taxpayers is not favored over the others. Third, by limiting tax relief
to contributions made to foreign NGOs that have obtained advance
government approval, all that a taxpayer (whether an individual, a
corporation, an estate or a trust) would need to do to ensure its ability
to claim a tax deduction would be to find the name of the foreign
NGO in Internal Revenue Service Publication No. 78, which currently
lists the domestic NGOs that are eligible to receive tax-deductible
contributions.8 1 4 Individuals and corporations would no longer need
to ensure that a domestic intermediary NGO has adopted an
appropriate procedure for passing contributions along to foreign
NGOs, and corporations would no longer need to take the further step
of determining whether the domestic intermediary NGO is
incorporated.

VI. CONCLUSION
The U.S. international tax regime has reached the point where it
is in danger of collapsing under the weight of its own complexity.

814.
It is worth noting that a searchable version of Publication No. 78 is
available to taxpayers on the Internal Revenue Service's web site at
http://apps.irs.gov/search/eosearch.html.
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Nevertheless, commentators engaged in the ongoing debate over how
to reform this regime have paid little attention to the mundane need
for simplification, instead focusing their energy on abstract efficiency
and fairness concerns. When they have seriously considered the need
for simplification, these commentators have taken a parochial view of
the problem. The purpose of this Article has been to underscore the
need for simplification while bringing a more practical dimension to
the reform debate by broadening the perspective from which the U.S.
international tax regime and, in turn, the problem of complexity, is
viewed.
When the problem is viewed solely from a national perspective, it
appears that only the internal complexity of the U.S. international
tax regime needs to be addressed in order to achieve simplification.
While a certain measure of internal complexity inheres in any mature
system of legal rules, the current level of internal complexity in the
U.S. international tax regime exceeds that which can be attributed to
the maturation process alone. The excess complexity has been
attributed, in part, to the failure of Congress to take an integrated
approach to the formulation of U.S. international tax policy. But,
given the multitude of conflicting theoretical and practical
considerations that must be taken into account when formulating
U.S. international tax policy, it is questionable whether such an
integrated approach is an independently attainable objective.
Even if Congress were able to take an integrated approach to
formulating international tax policy and reduce internal complexity,
only a portion of the overall complexity problem would be solved.
Those experienced in the practical application of the U.S.
international tax regime realize that it applies only to cross-border
movements of capital and labor, movements that necessarily
implicate the international tax regimes of other countries. The rules
of these foreign regimes often conflict with the existing U.S. rules,
thereby creating additional, external complexity.
External
complexity imposes significant costs on U.S. and foreign taxpayers,
and for this reason, may render cross-border movements of capital
and labor impracticable or even impossible. In addition, external
complexity creates opportunities for tax arbitrage, the purpose of
which is to drain one or more national treasuries of tax revenue.
The United States has already taken steps to mitigate the
problems created by external complexity by entering into a broad
network of tax treaties that coordinate the U.S. international tax
regime with those of its treaty partners. Unfortunately, such
concerted tax coordination at the international level has proved to be
only a limited means of mitigating external complexity. This Article
has explored the viability of pursuing tax coordination at the national
level as well, by employing STC/Comparative Law as a framework
within which the U.S. international tax regime might be reformed.
The potential benefits of pursuing tax coordination at the national
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level include (i) simplification of cross-border transactions, (ii)
increased certainty as to the legal treatment of cross-border
transactions, (iii) reduction of the costs and delays of undertaking
cross-border transactions, (iv) elimination of opportunities for tax
arbitrage, and (v) reduction of information asymmetries. A potential
cost of pursuing such coordination may be a reduction in efficiency.
Nevertheless, the flexibility of the proposed framework (i.e., its ability
to accommodate national political, economic, and social norms and
allow for a measure of difference in international tax rules) allows a
proper balance to be achieved between these potential costs and
benefits.
As demonstrated by the application of the proposed
framework to the task of reforming the U.S. rules governing the tax
treatment of cross-border charitable contributions, a collateral benefit
of pursuing tax coordination at the national level may be a reduction
in the existing level of internal complexity. In this concrete example,
the proposed framework served to constrain the tendency of
conflicting domestic policy considerations to produce internal
complexity in the U.S. international tax regime.
Thus, by shifting from a national to an international perspective,
a more holistic approach to reform is fostered, which may allow both
the burdens created by the internal and external complexity of the
U.S. international tax regime to be addressed and, perhaps,
remedied.
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